Fourth Book

The Politics


Chapter 33

The Insular Supremacy and the Continental Powers -- North America
and France


    In all ages there have been cities or countries which have been
pre-eminent above all others in industry, commerce, and navigation;
but a supremacy such as that which exists in our days, the world
has never before witnessed. In all ages, nations and powers have
striven to attain to the dominion of the world, but hitherto not
one of them has erected its power on so broad a foundation. How
vain do the efforts of those appear to us who have striven to found
their universal dominion on military power, compared with the
attempt of England to raise her entire territory into one immense
manufacturing, commercial, and maritime city, and to become among
the countries and kingdoms of the earth, that which a great city is
in relation to its surrounding territory. to comprise within
herself all industries, arts, and sciences; all great commerce and
wealth; all navigation and naval power -- a world's metropolis
which supplies all nations with manufactured goods, and supplies
herself in exchange from every nation with those raw materials and
agricultural products of a useful or acceptable kind, which each
other nation is fitted by nature to yield to her -- a
treasure-house of all great capital -- a banking establishment for
all nations, which controls the circulating medium of the whole
world, and by loans and the receipt of interest on them makes all
the peoples of the earth her tributaries. Let us, however, do
justice to this Power and to her efforts. The world has not been
hindered in its progress, but immensely aided in it, by England.
She has become an example and a pattern to all nations -- in
internal and in foreign policy, as well as in great inventions and
enterprises of every kind; in perfecting industrial processes and
means of transport, as well as in the discovery and bringing into
cultivation uncultivated lands, especially in the acquisition of
the natural riches of tropical countries, and in the civilisation
of barbarous races or of such as have retrograded into barbarism.
Who can tell how far behind the world might yet remain if no
England had ever existed? And if she now ceased to exist, who can
estimate how far the human race might retrograde? Let us then
congratulate ourselves on the immense progress of that nation, and
wish her prosperity for all future time. But ought we on that
account also to wish that she may erect a universal dominion on the
ruins of the other nationalities? Nothing but unfathomable
cosmopolitanism or shopkeepers' narrow-mindedness can give an
assenting answer to that question. In our previous chapters we have
pointed out the results of such denationalisation, and shown that
the culture and civilisation of the human race can only be brought
about by placing many nations in similar positions of civilisation,
wealth, and power; that just as England herself has raised herself
from a condition of barbarism to her present high position, so the
same path lies open for other nations to follow: and that at this
time more than one nation is qualified to strive to attain the
highest degree of civilisation, wealth, and power. Let us now state
summarily the maxims of State policy by means of which England has
attained her present greatness. They may be briefly stated thus:
    Always to favour the importation of productive power,(1*) in
preference to the importation of goods.
    Carefully to cherish and to protect the development of the
productive power.
    To import only raw materials and agricultural products, and to
export nothing but manufactured goods.
    To direct any surplus of productive power to colonisation, and
to the subjection of barbarous nations.
    To reserve exclusively to the mother country the supply of the
colonies and subject countries with manufactured goods, but in
return to receive on preferential terms their raw materials and
especially their colonial produce.
    To devote especial care to the coast navigation; to the trade.
Between the mother country and the colonies; to encourage
seafisheries by means of bounties; and to take as active a part as
possible in international navigation.
    By these means to found a naval supremacy, and by means of it
to extend foreign commerce, and continually to increase her
colonial possessions.
    To grant freedom in trade with the colonies and in navigation
only so far as she can gain more by it than she loses.
    To grant reciprocal navigation privileges only if the advantage
is on the side of England, or if foreign nations can by that means
be restrained from introducing restrictions on navigation in their
own favour.
    To grant concessions to foreign independent nations in respect
of the import of agricultural products, only in case concessions in
respect of her own manufactured products can be gained thereby.
    In cases where such concessions cannot be obtained by treaty,
to attain the object of them by means of contraband trade.
    To make wars and to contract alliances with exclusive regard to
her manufacturing, commercial, maritime, and colonial interests. To
gain by these alike from friends and foes: from the latter by
interrupting their commerce at sea; from the former by ruining
their manufactures through subsidies which are paid in the shape of
English manufactured goods.
    These maxims were in former times plainly professed by all
English ministers and parliamentary speakers. The ministers of
George I in 1721 openly declared, on the occasion of the
prohibition of the importation of the manufactures of India, that
it was clear that a nation could only become wealthy and powerful
if she imported raw materials and exported manufactured goods. Even
in the times of Lords Chatham and North, they did not hesitate to
declare in open Parliament that it ought not to be permitted that
even a single horse-shoe nail should be manufactured in North
America. In Adam Smith's time, a new maxim was for the first time
added to those which we have above stated, namely, to conceal the
true policy of England under the cosmopolitical expressions and
arguments which Adam Smith had discovered, in order to induce
foreign nations not to imitate that policy.
    It is a very common clever device that when anyone has attained
the summit of greatness, he kicks away the ladder by which he has
climbed up, in order to deprive others of the means of climbing up
after him. In this lies the secret of the cosmopolitical doctrine
of Adam Smith, and of the cosmopolitical tendencies of his great
contemporary William Pitt, and of all his successors in the British
Government administrations.
    Any nation which by means of protective duties and restrictions
on navigation has raised her manufacturing power and her navigation
to such a degree of development that no other nation can sustain
free competition with her, can do nothing wiser than to throw away
these ladders of her greatness, to preach to other nations the
benefits of free trade, and to declare in penitent tones that she
has hitherto wandered in the paths of error, and has now for the
first time succeeded in discovering the truth.
    William Pitt was the first English statesman who clearly
perceived in what way the cosmopolitical theory of Adam Smith could
be properly made use of, and not in vain did he himself carry about
a copy of the work on the Wealth of Nations. His speech in 1786,
which was addressed neither to Parliament nor to the nation, but
clearly to the ears of the statesmen of France, who were destitute
of all experience and political insight, and solely intended to
influence the latter in favour of the Eden Treaty, is an excellent
specimen of Smith's style of reasoning. By nature he said France
was adapted for agriculture and the production of wine, as England
was thus adapted to manufacturing production. These nations ought
to act towards one another just as two great merchants would do who
carry on different branches of trade and who reciprocally enrich
one another by the exchange of goods.(2*) Not a word here of the
old maxim of England, that a nation can only attain to the highest
degree of wealth and power in her foreign trade by the exchange of
manufactured products against agricultural products and raw
materials. This maxim was then, and has remained since, an English
State secret; it was never again openly professed, but was all the
more persistently followed. If, however, England since William
Pitt's time had really cast away the protective system as a useless
crutch, she would now occupy a much higher position than she does,
and she would have got much nearer to her object, which is to
monopolise the manufacturing power of the whole world. The
favourable moment for attaining this object was clearly just after
the restoration of the general peace. Hatred of Napoleon's
Continental system had secured a reception among all nations of the
Continent of the doctrines of the cosmopolitical theory. Russia,
the entire North of Europe, Germany, the Spanish peninsula, and the
United States of North America would have considered themselves
fortunate in exchanging their agricultural produce and raw
materials for English manufactured goods. France herself would
perhaps have found it possible, in consideration of some decided
concessions in respect of her wine and silk manufactures, to depart
from her prohibitive system.
    Then also the time had arrived when, as Priestley said of the
English navigation laws, it would be just as wise to repeal the
English protective system as it had formerly been to introduce it.
    The result of such a policy would have been that all the
surplus raw materials and agricultural produce from the two
hemispheres would have flowed over to England, and all the world
would have clothed themselves with English fabrics. All would have
tended to increase the wealth and the power of England. Under such
circumstances the Americans or the Russians would hardly have taken
it into their heads in the course of the present century to
introduce a protective system, or the Germans to establish a
customs union. People would have come to the determination with
difficulty to sacrifice the advantages of the present moment to the
hopes of a distant future.
    But Providence has taken care that trees should not grow quite
up to the sky. Lord Castlereagh gave over the commercial policy of
England into the hands of the landed aristocracy, and these killed
the hen which had laid the golden eggs. Had they permitted the
English manufactures to monopolise the markets of all nations,
Great Britain would have occupied the position in respect to the
world which a manufacturing town does in respect to the open
country; the whole territory of the island of England would have
been covered with houses and manufactories, or devoted to pleasure
gardens, vegetable gardens, and orchards; to the production of milk
and of meat, or of the cultivation of market produce, and generally
to such cultivation as only can be carried on in the neighbourhood
of great cities. The production of these things would have become
much more lucrative for English agriculture than the production of
corn, and consequently after a time the English landed aristocracy
would have obtained much higher rents than by the exclusion of
foreign grain from the home market. Only, the landed aristocracy
having only their present interests in view, preferred by means of
the corn laws to maintain their rents at the high rate to which
they had been raised by the involuntary exclusion of foreign raw
materials and grain from the English market which had been
occasioned by the war; and thus they compelled the nations of the
Continent to seek to promote their own welfare by another method
than by the free exchange of agricultural produce for English
manufactures, viz. By the method of establishing a manufacturing
power of their own. The English restrictive laws thus operated
quite in the same way as Napoleon's Continental system had done,
only their operation was somewhat slower.
    When Canning and Huskisson came into office, the landed
aristocracy had already tasted too much of the forbidden fruit for
it to be possible to induce them by reasons of common sense to
renounce what they had enjoyed. These statesmen found themselves in
the difficult position of solving an impossible problem -- a
position in which the English ministry still finds itself. They had
at one and the same time to convince the Continental nations of the
advantages of free trade, and also maintain the restrictions on the
import of foreign agricultural produce for the benefit of the
English landed aristocracy. Hence it was impossible that their
system could be developed in such a manner that justice could be
done to the hopes of the advocates of free trade on both
continents. With all their liberality with philanthropical and
cosmopolitical phrases which they uttered in general discussions
respecting the commercial systems of England and other countries,
they nevertheless did not think it inconsistent, whenever the
question arose of the alteration of any particular English duties,
to base their arguments on the principle of protection.
    Huskisson certainly reduced the duties on several articles, but
he never omitted to take care that at that lower scale of duty the
home manufactories were still sufficiently protected. He thus
followed pretty much the rules of the Dutch water administration.
Wherever the water on the outside rises high, these wise
authorities erect high dykes; wherever it rises less, they only
build lower dykes. After such a fashion the reform of the English
commercial policy which was announced with so much pomp reduced
itself to a piece of mere politico-economical jugglery. Some
persons have adduced the lowering of the English duty on silk goods
as a piece of English liberality, without duly considering that
England by that means only sought to discourage contraband trade in
these articles to the benefit of her finances and without injury to
her own silk manufactories, which object it has also by that means
perfectly attained. But if a protective duty of 50 to 70 per cent
(which at this day foreign silk manufacturers have to pay in
England, including the extra duty(3*)) is to be accepted as a proof
of liberality most nations may claim that they have rather preceded
the English in that respect than followed them.
    As the demonstrations of Canning and Huskisson were specially
intended to produce an effect in France and North America, it will
not be uninteresting to call to mind in what way it was that they
suffered shipwreck in both countries. Just as formerly in the year
1786, so also on this occasion, the English received great support
from the theorists, and the liberal party in France, carried away
by the grand idea of universal freedom of trade and by Say's
superficial arguments, and from feelings of opposition towards a
detested Government and supported by the maritime towns, the wine
growers, and the silk manufacturers, the liberal party clamorously
demanded, as they had done in the year 1786, extension of the trade
with England as the one true method of promoting the national
welfare.
    For whatever faults people may lay to the charge of the
Restoration, it rendered an undeniable service to France, a service
which posterity will not dispute; it did not allow itself to be
misled into a false step as respects commercial policy either by
the stratagems of the English or by the outcry of the liberals. Mr
Canning laid this business so much to heart that he himself made a
journey to Paris in order to convince Monsieur Villèle of the
excellence of his measures, and to induce him to imitate them. M.
Villèle was, however, much too practical not to see completely
through this stratagem; he is said to have replied to Mr Canning,
'If England in the far advanced position of her industry permits
greater foreign competition than formerly, that policy corresponds
to England's own well-understood interests. But at this time it is
to the well-understood interests of France that she should secure
to her manufactories which have not as yet attained perfect
development, that protection which is at present indispensable to
them for that object. But whenever the moment shall have arrived
when French manufacturing industry can be better promoted by
permitting foreign competition than by restricting it, then he (M.
Villèle) would not delay to derive advantage from following the
example of Mr Canning.'
    Annoyed by this conclusive answer, Canning boasted in open
Parliament after his return, how he had hung a millstone on the
neck of the French Government by means of the Spanish intervention,
from which it follows that the cosmopolitan sentiments and the
European liberalism of Mr Canning were not spoken quite so much in
earnest as the good liberals on the Continent might have chosen to
believe. For how could Mr Canning, if the cause of liberalism on
the Continent had interested him in the least, have sacrificed the
liberal constitution of Spain to the French intervention owing to
the mere desire to hang a millstone round the neck of the French
Government? The truth is, that Mr Canning was every inch an
Englishman, and he only permitted himself to entertain
philanthropical or cosmopolitical sentiments, when they could prove
serviceable to him in strengthening and still further extending the
industry and commercial supremacy of England, or in throwing dust
into the eyes of England's rivals in industry and commerce.
    In fact, no great sagacity was needed on the part of M. Villèle
to perceive the snare which had been laid for him by Mr Canning. In
the experience of neighbouring Germany, who after the abolition of
the Continental system had continually retrograded farther and
farther in respect of her industry, M. Villèle possessed a striking
proof of the true value of the principle of commercial freedom as
it was understood in England. Also France was prospering too well
under the system which she had adopted since 1815, for her to be
willing to attempt, like the dog in the fable, to let go the
substance and snap at the shadow. Men of the deepest insight into
the condition of industry, such as Chaptal and Charles Dupin, had
expressed themselves on the results of this system in the most
unequivocal manner.
    Chaptal's work on French industry is nothing less than a
defence of the French commercial policy, and an exposition of its
results as a whole and in every particular. The tendency of this
work is expressed in the following quotation from it. 'Instead of
losing ourselves in the labyrinth of metaphysical abstractions, we
maintain above all that which exists, and seek above all to make it
perfect. Good customs legislation is the bulwark of manufacturing
industry. It increases or lessens import duties according to
circumstances; it compensates the disadvantages of higher wages of
labour and of higher prices of fuel; it protects arts and
industries in their cradle until they at length become strong
enough to bear foreign competition; it creates the industrial
independence of France and enriches the nation through labour,
which, as I have already often remarked, is the chief source of
wealth.'(4*)
    Charles Dupin had, in his work 'On the Productive Powers of
France, and on the Progress of French Industry from 1814 to 1847,'
thrown such a clear light on the results of the commercial policy
which France had followed since the Restoration, that it was
impossible that a French minister could think of sacrificing this
work of half a century, which had cost such sacrifices, which was
so rich in fruits, and so full of promise for the future, merely
for the attractions of a Methuen Treaty.
    The American tariff for the year 1828 was a natural and
necessary result of the English commercial system, which shut out
from the English frontiers the North American timber, grain, meal,
and other agricultural products, and only permitted raw cotton to
be received by England in exchange for her manufactured goods. On
this system the trade with England only tended to promote the
agricultural labour of the American slaves, while on the other
hand, the freest, most enlightened, and most powerful States of the
Union found themselves entirely arrested in their economical
progress, and thus reduced to dispose of their annual surplus of
population and capital by emigration to the waste lands of the
West. Mr Huskisson understood this position of affairs very well.
It was notorious that the English ambassador in Washington had more
than once correctly informed him of the inevitable consequence of
the English policy. If Mr Huskisson had really been the man that
people in other countries supposed him to be, he would have made
use of the publication of the American tariff as a valuable
opportunity for making the English aristocracy comprehend the folly
of their corn laws, and the necessity of abolishing them. But what
did Mr Huskisson do? He fell into a passion with the Americans (or
at least affected to do so), and in his excitement he made
allegations -- the incorrectness of which was well known to every
American planter -- and permitted himself to use threats which made
him ridiculous. Mr Huskisson said the exports of England to the
United States amounted to only about the sixth part of all the
exports of England, while the exports of the United States to
England constituted more than half of all their exports. From this
he sought to prove that the Americans were more in the power of the
English than the latter were in that of the former; and that the
English had much less reason to fear interruptions of trade through
war, cessation of intercourse, and so forth, than the Americans
had. If one looks merely at the totals of the value of the imports
and exports, Huskisson's argument appears sufficiently plausible;
but if one considers the nature of the reciprocal imports and
exports, it will then appear incomprehensible how Mr Huskisson
could make use of an argument which proves the exact opposite of
that which he desired to prove. All or by far the greater part of
the exports of the United States to England consisted of raw
materials, whose value is increased tenfold by the English, and
which they cannot dispense with, and also could not at once obtain
from other countries, at any rate not in sufficient quantity, while
on the other hand all the imports of the North Americans from
England consisted of articles which they could either manufacture
for themselves or procure just as easily from other nations. If we
now consider what would be the operation of an interruption of
commerce between the two nations according to the theory of values,
it will appear as if it must operate to the disadvantage of the
Americans; whereas if we judge of it according to the theory of the
productive powers, it must occasion incalculable injury to the
English. For by it two-thirds of all the English cotton
manufactories would come to a standstill and fall into ruin.
England would lose as by magic a productive source of wealth, the
annual value of which far exceeds the value of her entire exports,
and the results of such a loss on the peace, wealth, credit,
commerce, and power of England would be incalculable. What,
however, would be the consequences of such a state of things for
the North Americans? Compelled to manufacture for themselves those
goods which they had hitherto obtained from England, they would in
the course of a few years gain what the English had lost. No doubt
such a measure must occasion a conflict for life and death, as
formerly the navigation laws did between England and Holland. But
probably it would also end in the same way as formerly did the
conflict in the English Channel. It is unnecessary here to follow
out the consequences of a rivalry which, as it appears to us, must
sooner or later, from the very nature of things, come to a rupture.
What we have said suffices to show clearly the futility and danger
of Huskisson's argument, and to demonstrate how unwisely England
acted in compelling the North Americans (by means of her corn laws)
to manufacture for themselves, and how wise it would have been of
Mr Huskisson had he, instead of trifling with the question by such
futile and hazardous arguments, laboured to remove out of the way
the causes which led to the adoption of the American tariff of
1828.
    In order to prove to the North Americans how advantageous to
them the trade of England was, Mr Huskisson pointed out the
extraordinary increase in the English importations of cotton, but
the Americans also knew how to estimate this argument at its true
value. For the production of cotton in America had for more than
ten years previously so greatly exceeded the consumption of, and
the demand for, this article from year to year, that its prices had
fallen in almost the same ratio in which the export had increased;
as may be seen from the fact that in the year 1816 the Americans
had obtained for 80,000,000 pounds of cotton 24,000,000 dollars,
while in the year 1826 for 204,000,000 pounds of cotton they only
obtained 25,000,000 dollars.
    Finally, Mr Huskisson threatened the North Americans with the
organisation of a wholesale contraband trade by way of Canada. It
is true that under existing circumstances an American protective
system can be endangered by nothing so seriously as by the means
indicated by Mr Huskisson. But what follows from that? Is it that
the Americans are to lay their system at the feet of the English
Parliament, and await in humility whatever the latter may be
pleased to determine from year to year respecting their national
industry? How absurd! The only consequence would be that the
Americans would annex Canada and include it in their Union, or else
assist it to attain independence as soon as ever the Canadian
smuggling trade became unendurable. Must we not, however, deem the
degree of folly absolutely excessive if a nation which has already
attained industrial and commercial supremacy, first of all compels
an agricultural nation connected with her by the closest ties of
race, of language, and of interest, to become herself a
manufacturing nation, and then, in order to hinder her from
following the impulse thus forcibly given to her, compels her to
assist that nation's own colonies to attain independence?
    After Huskisson's death, Mr Poulett Thompson undertook the
direction of the commercial affairs of England; this statesman
followed his celebrated predecessor in his policy as well as in his
office. In the meantime, so far as concerned North America, there
remained little for him to do, for in that country, without special
efforts on the part of the English, by means of the influence of
the cotton planters and the importers, and by the aid of the
Democratic party, especially by means of the so-called Compromise
Bill in 1832, a modification of the former tariff had taken place,
which, although it certainly amended the excesses and faults of the
former tariff, and also still secured to the American manufactories
a tolerable degree of protection in respect of the coarser fabrics
of cotton and woollen, nevertheless gave the English all the
concessions which they could have desired without England having
been compelled to make any counter concessions.
    Since the passing of that Bill, the exports of the English to
America have enormously increased. And subsequently to this time
they greatly exceed the English imports from North America, so that
at any time it is in the power of England to draw to herself as
much as she pleases of the precious metals circulating in America,
and thereby to occasion commercial crises in the United States as
often as she herself is in want of money. But the most astonishing
thing in this matter is that that bill had for its author Henry
Clay, the most eminent and clearsighted defender of the American
manufacturing interest. For it must be remembered that the
prosperity of the American manufacturers which resulted from the
tariff of 1828 excited so greatly the jealousy of the cotton
planters, that the Southern States threatened to bring about a
dissolution of the Union in case the tariff of 1828 was not
modified. The Federal Government, which was dominated by the
Democratic party, had sided with the Southern planters from purely
party and electioneering motives, and also managed to get the
agriculturists of the Middle and Western States, who belonged to
that party, to adopt the same views.
    These last had lost their former sympathy with the
manufacturing interest in consequence of the high prices of produce
which had prevailed, which, however, were the result for the most
part of the prosperity of the home manufactories and of the
numerous canals and railways which were undertaken. They may also
have actually feared that the Southern States would press their
opposition so far as to bring about a real dissolution of the Union
and even civil war. Hence it became the party interests of the
Democrats of the Central and Eastern States not to alienate the
sympathies of the Democrats of the Southern States. In consequence
of these political circumstances, public opinion veered round so
much in favour of free trade with England, that there was reason to
fear that all the manufacturing interests of the country might be
entirely sacrificed in favour of English free competition. Under
such circumstances the Compromise Bill of Henry Clay appeared to be
the only means of at least partially preserving the protective
system. By this bill part of the American manufactures, viz. those
of finer and more expensive articles, was sacrificed to foreign
competition, in order to preserve another class of them, viz. the
manufacture of articles of a coarser and a less expensive
character. In the meantime all appearances seem to indicate that
the protective system in North America in the course of the next
few years will again raise its head and again make new progress.
However much the English may desire to lessen and mitigate the
commercial crises in North America, however large also may be the
amount of capital which may pass over from England to North America
in the form of purchases of stock or of loans or by means of
emigration, the existing and still increasing disproportion between
the value of the exports and that of imports cannot possibly in the
long run be equalised by those means. Alarming commercial crises,
which continually increase in their magnitude, must occur, and the
Americans must at length be led to recognise the sources of the
evil and to determine to put a stop to them.
    It thus lies in the very nature of things, that the number of
the advocates of the protective system must again increase, and
those of free trade again diminish. Hitherto, the prices of
agricultural produce have been maintained at an unusually high
level, owing to the previous prosperity of the manufactories,
through the carrying out of great public undertakings, through the
demand for necessaries of life arising from the great increase of
the production of cotton, also partially through bad harvests. One
may, however, foresee with certainty, that these prices in the
course of the next few years will fall as much below the average as
they have hitherto ranged above it. The greater part of the
increase of American capital has since the passing of the
Compromise Bill been devoted to agriculture, and is only now
beginning to become productive. While thus agricultural production
has unusually increased, on the other hand the demand for it must
unusually diminish. Firstly, because public works are no more being
undertaken to the same extent; secondly, because the manufacturing
population in consequence of foreign competition can no more
increase to an important extent; and thirdly, because the
production of cotton so greatly exceeds the consumption that the
cotton planters will be compelled, owing to the low prices of
cotton, to produce for themselves those necessaries of life which
they have hitherto procured from the Middle and Western States. If
in addition rich harvests occur, then the Middle and Western States
will again suffer from an excess of produce, as they did before the
tariff of 1828. But the same causes must again produce the same
results; viz. the agriculturists of the Middle and Western States
must again arrive at the conviction, that the demand for
agricultural produce can only be increased by the increase of the
manufacturing population of the country, and that that increase can
only be brought about by an extension of the protective system.
While in this manner the partisans of protection will daily
increase in number and influence, the opposite party will diminish
in like proportion until the cotton planters under such altered
circumstances must necessarily come to the conviction that the
increase of the manufacturing population of the country and the
increase of the demand for agricultural produce and raw materials
both consist with their own interests if rightly understood.
    Because, as we have shown, the cotton planters and the
Democrats in North America were striving most earnestly of their
own accord to play into the hands of the commercial interests of
England, no opportunity was offered at the moment on this side for
Mr Poulett Thompson to display his skill in commercial diplomacy.
    Matters were quite in another position in France. There people
still steadily clung to the prohibitive system. There were indeed
many State officials who were disciples of theory, and also
deputies who were in favour of an extension of commercial relations
between England and France, and the existing alliance with England
had also rendered this view to a certain extent popular. But how to
attain that object, opinions were less agreed, and in no respect
were they quite clear. It seemed evident and also indisputable that
the high duties on the foreign necessaries of life and raw
materials, and the exclusion of English coal and pig-iron, operated
very disadvantageously to French industry, and that an increase in
the exports of wines, brandy, and silk fabrics would be extremely
advantageous to France.
    In general, people confined themselves to universal declamation
against the disadvantages of the prohibitive system. But to attack
this in special cases did not appear at the time to be at all
advisable. For the Government of July had their strongest
supporters among the rich bourgeoisie, who for the most part were
interested in the great manufacturing undertakings.
    Under these circumstances Mr Poulett Thompson formed a plan of
operations which does all honour to his breadth of thought and
diplomatic adroitness. He sent to France a man thoroughly versed in
commerce and industry and in the commercial policy of France, well
known for his 'liberal sentiments' a learned man and a very
accomplished writer, Dr Bowring, who travelled through the whole of
France, and subsequently through Switzerland also, to gather on the
spot materials for arguments against the prohibitive system and in
favour of free trade. Dr Bowring accomplished this task with his
accustomed ability and adroitness. Especially he clearly indicated
the before-mentioned advantages of a freer commercial intercourse
between the two countries in respect of coal, pig-iron, wines, and
brandies. In the report which he published, he chiefly confined his
arguments to these articles; in reference to the other branches of
industry he only gave statistics, without committing himself to
proofs or propositions how these could be promoted by means of free
trade with England.
    Dr Bowring acted in precise accordance with the instructions
given to him by Mr Poulett Thompson, which were framed with
uncommon art and subtlety, and which appear at the head of his
report. In these Mr Thompson makes use of the most liberal
expressions. He expresses himself, with much consideration for the
French manufacturing interests, on the improbability that any
important result was to be expected from the contemplated
negotiations with France. This instruction was perfectly adapted
for calming the apprehensions respecting the views of England
entertained by the French woollen and cotton manufacturing
interests which had become so powerful. According to Mr Thompson,
it would be folly to ask for important concessions respecting
these.
    On the other hand, he gives a hint how the object might more
easily be attained in respect of 'less important articles.' These
less important articles are certainly not enumerated in the
instruction, but the subsequent experience of France has completely
brought to light what Mr Thompson meant by it, for at the time of
the writing of this instruction the exports of linen yarn and linen
fabrics of England to France were included in the term 'less
important.'
    The French Government, moved by the representations and
explanations of the English Government and its agents, and with the
intention of making to England a comparatively unimportant
concession, which would ultimately prove advantageous to France
herself, lowered the duty on linen yarn and linen fabrics to such
an extent that they no longer gave any protection to French
industry in face of the great improvements which the English had
made in these branches of manufacture, so that even in the next few
years the export of these articles from England to France increased
enormously (1838, 32,000,000 francs); and that France stood in
danger, owing to the start which England had thus obtained, of
losing its entire linen industry, amounting to many hundred
millions in value, which was of the greatest importance for her
agriculture and for the welfare of her entire rural population,
unless means could be found to put a check on the English
competition by increasing the duties.
    That France was duped by Mr Poulett Thompson was clear enough.
He had already clearly seen in the year 1834 what an impulse the
linen manufacture of England would receive in the next few years in
consequence of the new inventions which had been made there, and in
this negotiation he had calculated on the ignorance of the French
Government respecting these inventions and their necessary
consequences. The advocates of this lowering of duties now indeed
endeavoured to make the world believe that by it they only desired
to make a concession to the belgian linen manufactures. But did
that make amends for their lack of acquaintance with the advances
made by the English, and their lack of foresight as to the
necessary consequences?
    Be that as it may, this much is clearly demonstrated, that it
was necessary for France to protect herself still more, under
penalty of losing the greater part of her linen manufacturing for
the benefit of England; and that the first and most recent
experiment of the increase of freedom of trade between England and
France remains as an indelible memorial of English craft and of
French inexperience, as a new Methuen Treaty, as a second Eden
Treaty. But what did Mr Poulett Thompson do when he perceived the
complaints of the French linen manufacturers and the inclination of
the French Government to repair the mistake which had been made? He
did what Mr Huskisson had done before him, he indulged in threats,
he threatened to exclude French wines and silk fabrics. This is
English cosmopolitanism. France must give up a manufacturing
industry of a thousand years' standing, bound up in the closest
manner with the entire economy of her lower classes and especially
with her agriculture, the products of which must be reckoned as
chief necessaries of life for all classes, and of the entire amount
of between three and four hundred millions, in order thereby to
purchase the privilege of exporting to England some few millions
more in value of wines and silk manufactures. Quite apart from this
disproportion in value, it must be considered in what a position
France would be placed if the commercial relations between both
nations became interrupted in consequence of a war; in case viz.
that France could no more export to England her surplus products of
silk manufactures and wines, but at the same time suffered from the
want of such an important necessary of life as linen.
    If anyone reflects on this he will see that the linen question
is not simply a question of economical well-being, but, as
everything is which concerns the national manufacturing power, is
still more a question of the independence and power of the nation.
    It seems indeed as if the spirit of invention had set itself
the task, in this perfecting of the linen manufacture, to make the
nations comprehend the nature of the manufacturing interest, its
relations with agriculture, and its influence on the independence
and power of the State, and to expose the erroneous arguments of
the popular theory. The school maintains, as is well known, that
every nation possesses special advantages in various branches of
production, which she has either derived from nature, or which she
has partly acquired in the course of her career, and which under
free trade compensate one another. We have in a previous chapter
adduced proof that this argument is only true in reference to
agriculture, in which production depends for the most part on
climate and on the fertility of the soil, but that it is not true
in respect to manufacturing industry, for which all nations
inhabiting temperate climates have equal capability provided that
they possess the necessary material, mental, social, and political
qualifications. England at the present day offers the most striking
proof of this. If any nations whatever are specially adapted by
their past experience and exertions, and through their natural
qualifications, for the manufacture of linen, those are the
Germans, the belgians, the Dutch, and the inhabitants of the North
of France for a thousand years past. The English, on the other
hand, up to the middle of the last century, had notoriously made
such small progress in that industry, that they imported a great
proportion of the linen which they required, from abroad. It would
never have been possible for them, without the duties by which they
continuously protected this manufacturing industry, even to supply
their own markets and colonies with linen of their own manufacture.
And it is well known how Lords Castlereagh and Liverpool adduced
proof in Parliament, that without protection it was impossible for
the Irish linen manufactures to sustain competition with those of
Germany. At present, however, we see how the English threaten to
monopolise the linen manufacture of the whole of Europe, in
consequence of their inventions, notwithstanding that they were for
a hundred years the worst manufacturers of linen in all Europe,
just as they have monopolised for the last fifty years the cotton
markets of the East Indies, notwithstanding that one hundred years
previously they could not even compete in their own market with the
Indian cotton manufacturers. At this moment it is a matter of
dispute in France how it happens that England has lately made such
immense progress in the manufacture of linen, although Napoleon was
the first who offered such a great reward for the invention of a
machine for spinning cotton, and that the French machinists and
manufacturers had been engaged in this trade before the English.
The inquiry is made whether the English or the French possessed
more mechanical talent. All kinds of explanations are offered
except the true and the natural one. It is absurd to attribute
specially to the English greater mechanical talent, or greater
skill and perseverance in industry, than to the Germans or to the
French. Before the time of Edward III the English were the greatest
bullies and good-for-nothing characters in Europe; certainly it
never occurred to them to compare themselves with the Italians and
Belgians or with the Germans in respect to mechanical talent or
industrial skill; but since then their Government has taken their
education in hand, and thus they have by degrees made such progress
that they can dispute the palm of industrial skill with their
instructors. If the English in the last twenty years have made more
rapid progress in machinery for linen manufacture than other
nations, and especially the French, have done, this has only
occurred because, firstly, they had attained greater eminence in
mechanical skill; secondly, that they were further advanced in
machinery for spinning and weaving cotton, which is so similar to
that for spinning and weaving linen; thirdly, that in consequence
of their previous commercial policy, they had become possessed of
more capital than the French; fourthly, that in consequence of that
commercial policy their home market for linen goods was far more
extensive than that of the French; and lastly that their protective
duties, combined with the circumstances above named, afforded to
the mechanical talent of the nation greater stimulus and more means
to devote itself to perfecting this branch of industry.
    The English have thus given a striking confirmation of the
opinions which we in another place have propounded and explained --
that all individual branches of industry have the closest
reciprocal effect on one another; that the perfecting of one branch
prepares and promotes the perfecting of all others; that no one of
them can be neglected without the effects of that neglect being
felt by all; that, in short, the whole manufacturing power of a
nation constitutes an inseparable whole. Of these opinions they
have by their latest achievements in the linen industry offered a
striking confirmation.

NOTES:

1. Even a part of the production of wool in England is due to the
observance of this maxim. Edward IV imported under special
privileges 3,000 head of sheep from Spain (where the export of
sheep was prohibited), and distributed them among various parishes,
with a command that for seven years none were to be slaughtered or
castrated. (Essai sur le Commerce d'Angleterre, tome i. p. 379.) As
soon as the object of these measures had been attained, England
rewarded the Spanish Government for the special privileges granted
by the latter, by prohibiting the import of Spanish wool. The
efficacy of this prohibition (however unjust it may be deemed) can
as little be denied as that of the prohibitions of the import of
wool by Charles II (1672 and 1674).

2. France, said Pitt, has advantages above England in respect of
climate and other natural gifts, and therefore excels England in
its raw produce; on the other hand, England has the advantage over
France in its artificial products. The wines, brandies, oils, and
vinegars of France, especially the first two, articles of such
importance and of such value, that the value of our natural
products cannot be in the least compared with them. But, on the
other hand, it is equally certain that England is the exclusive
producer of some kinds of manufactured goods, and that in respect
of other kinds she possesses such advantages that she can defy
without doubt all the competition of France. This is a reciprocal
condition and a basis on which an advantageous commercial treaty
between both nations should be founded. As each of them has its
peculiar staple commodities, and each possesses that which is
lacking to the other, so both should deal with one another like two
great merchants who are engaged in different branches of trade, and
by a reciprocal exchange of their goods can at once become useful
to one another. Let us further only call to mind on this point the
wealth of the county with which we stand in the position of
neighbours, its great population, its vicinity to us, and the
consequent quick and regular exchange. Who could then hesitate a
moment to give his approval to the system of freedom, and who would
not earnestly and impatiently wish for the utmost possible
expedition in establishing it? The possession of such an extensive
and certain market must give quite an extraordinary impulse to our
trade, and the customs revenue which would then be diverted from
the hands of the smuggler into the State revenue would benefit our
finances, and thus two main springs of British wealth and of
British power would be made more productive.

3. Since List wrote these lines, the duties which foreign silk
manufacturers had to pay on the import of their goods into England
have been totally abolished. The results of their abolition may be
learned from Mr Wardle's report on the English silk trade, as
follows: London, in 1825, contained 24,000 looms and 60,000
operatives engaged in silk manufacture. At the present time these
have dwindled to 1,200 looms and less then 4,000 operatives. In
Coventry, in 1861, the ribbon trade is stated to have given
subsistence to 40,600 persons; while at the present time probably
not more than 10,000 persons are supported by it, and the
power-looms at work in Coventry have decreased from 1,800 to 600.
In Derby the number of operatives employed in silk manufacture has
decreased from 6,650 (in 1850) to 2,400 at present. In the
Congleton district they have decreased from 5,186 (in 1860) to
1,530 (in 1884); while of the forty silk-throwsters' works which
that district contained (in 1859) only twelve now remain, with
'about three-fourths of their machinery employed.' In Manchester
this trade has practically died out, while at Middleton the
industry is 'simply ruined.' These results (stated by Mr Wardle)
may account for the decrease in England's imports of raw silk, from
8,000,000 pounds (in 1871) to less than 3,000,000 pounds.
    On the other hand, since List wrote, the United States of
America have increased and steadily maintained a considerable
protective duty on the importation of foreign silk manufactures.
The results of that policy were publicly stated by Mr Robert P.
Porter (member of the United States' Tariff Commission), in a
speech in 1883, to have been as follows:
    Five thousand persons were employed in silk manufacture in the
United States before the Morill tariff (1861). In 1880 their number
had increased to 30,000. The value of silk manufactures produced in
the States increased from 1,200,000 l. in 1860 to more than
8,000,000 l. in 1880. 'Yet the cost of the manufactured goods to
the consumer, estimated on a gold basis, has steadily declined at
a much greater rate than the cost of the raw material.' After
reference to the earthenware and plate-glass manufactures, Mr
Porter adds: 'The testimony before the Tariff Commission showed
unquestionably that the competition in the United States had
resulted in a reduction in the cost to the American consumer. In
this way, gentlemen, I contend, and am prepared to prove
statistically. that protection, so far as the United States are
concerned, has in every case ultimately benefited the consumer; and
on this ground I defend it and believe in it.' -- TRANSLATOR.

4. Chaptal, De l'Industrie Française vol. ii., p. 147.

Chapter 34

The Insular Supremacy and the German Commercial Union

    What a great nation is at the present day without a vigorous
commercial policy, and what she may become by the adoption of a
vigorous commercial policy, Germany has learnt for herself during
the last twenty years. Germany was that which Franklin once said of
the State of New Jersey, 'a cask which was tapped and drained by
its neighbours on every side.' England, not contented with having
ruined for the Germans the greater part of their own manufactories
and supplied them with enormous quantities of cotton and woollen
fabrics, excluded from her ports German grain and timber, nay from
time to time also even German wool. There was a time when the
export of manufactured goods from England to Germany was ten times
greater than that to her highly extolled East Indian Empire.
Nevertheless the all-monopolising islanders would not even grant to
the poor Germans what they conceded to the conquered Hindoos, viz.
to pay for the manufactured goods which they required by
agricultural produce. In vain did the Germans humble themselves to
the position of hewers of wood and drawers of water for the
Britons. The latter treated them worse than a subject people.
Nations, like individuals, if they at first only permit themselves
to be ill-treated by one, soon become scorned by all, and finally
become an object of derision to the very children. France, not
contented with exporting to Germany enormous quantities of wine,
oil, silk, and millinery, grudged the Germans their exports of
cattle, grain, and flax; yes, even a small maritime province
formerly possessed by Germany and inhabited by Germans, which
having become wealthy and powerful by means of Germany, at all
times was only able to maintain itself with and by means of
Germany, barred for half a generation Germany's greatest river by
means of contemptible verbal quibbles. To fill up the measure of
this contempt, the doctrine was taught from a hundred professorial
chairs, that nations could only attain to wealth and power by means
of universal free trade. Thus it was; but how is it now? Germany
has advanced in prosperity and industry, in national self-respect
and in national power, in the course of ten years as much as in a
century. And how has this result been achieved? It was certainly
good and beneficial that the internal tariffs were abolished which
separated Germans from Germans; but the nation would have derived
small comfort from that if her home industry had thenceforth
remained freely exposed to foreign competition. It was especially
the protection which the tariff of the Zollverein secured to
manufactured articles of common use, which has wrought this
miracle. Let us freely confess it, for Dr Bowring(1*) has
incontrovertibly shown it, that the Zollverein tariff has not, as
was before asserted, imposed merely duties for revenue -- that it
has not confined itself to duties of ten to fifteen per cent as
Huskisson believed -- let us freely admit that it has imposed
protective duties of from twenty to sixty per cent as respects the
manufactured articles of common use.
    But what has been the operation of these protective duties? Are
the consumers paying for their German manufactured goods twenty to
sixty per cent more than they formerly paid for foreign ones (as
must be the case if the popular theory is correct), or are these
goods at all worse than the foreign ones? Nothing of the sort. Dr
Bowring himself adduces testimony that the manufactured goods
produced under the high customs tariff are both better and cheaper
than the foreign ones.(2*) The internal competition and the
security from destructive competition by the foreigner has wrought
this miracle, of which the popular school knows nothing and is
determined to know nothing. Thus, that is not true, which the
popular school maintains, that a protective duty increases the
price of the goods of home production by the amount of the
protective duty. For a short time the duty may increase the price,
but in every nation which is qualified to carry on manufacturing
industry the consequence of the protection will be, that the
internal competition will soon reduce the prices lower than they
had stood at when the importation was free.
    But has agriculture at all suffered under these high duties?
Not in the least; it has gained-gained tenfold during the last ten
years. The demand for agricultural produce has increased. The
prices of it everywhere are higher. It is notorious that solely in
consequence of the growth of the home manufactories the value of
land has everywhere risen from fifty to a hundred per cent, that
everywhere higher wages are being paid, and that in all directions
improvements in the means of transport are either being effected or
projected.
    Such brilliant results as these must necessarily encourage us
to proceed farther on the system which we have commenced to follow.
Other States of the Union have also proposed to take similar steps,
but have not yet carried them into effect; while, as it would
appear, some other States of the Union only expect to attain
prosperity solely by the abolition of the English duties on grain
and timber, and while (as it is alleged) there are still to be
found influential men who believe in the cosmopolitical system and
distrust their own experience. Dr Bowring's report gives us most
important explanations on these points as well as on the
circumstances of the German Commercial Union and the tactics of the
English Government. Let us endeavour to throw a little light on
this report.
    First of all, we have to consider the point of view from which
it was written. Mr Labouchere, President of the board of Trade
under the Melbourne Ministry, had sent Dr Bowring to Germany for
the same purpose as that for which Mr Poulett Thompson had sent him
to France in the year 1834. Just as it was intended to mislead the
French by concessions in respect of wines and brandies to open
their home market to English manufactured goods, so it was intended
to mislead the Germans to do the same by concessions in respect of
grain and timber; only there was a great difference between the two
missions in this respect, that the concession which was to be
offered to the French had to fear no opposition in England, while
that which had to be offered to the Germans had first to be fought
for in England herself.
    Hence the tendency of these two reports was of necessity of
quite a different character. The report on the commercial relations
between France and England was written exclusively for the French;
to them it was necessary to represent that Colbert had accomplished
nothing satisfactory through his protective regulations; it was
necessary to make people believe that the Eden Treaty was
beneficial to France, and that Napoleon's Continental system, as
well as the then existing French prohibitive system, had been
extremely injurious to her. In short, in this case it was necessary
to stick closely to the theory of Adam Smith; and the good results
of the protective system must be completely and unequivocally
denied. The task was not quite so simple with the other report, for
in this, one had to address the English land-owners and the German
Governments at one and the same time. To the former it was
necessary to say: See, there is a nation which has already in
consequence of protective regulations made enormous advances in her
industry, and which, in possession of all necessary means for doing
so, is making rapid steps to monopolise her own home market and to
compete with England in foreign markets. This, you Tories in the
House of Lords -- this, you country squires in the House of
Commons, is your wicked doing. This has been brought about by your
unwise corn laws; for by them the prices of provisions and raw
materials and the wages of labour have been kept low in Germany. By
them the German manufactories have been placed in an advantageous
position compared to the English ones. Make haste, therefore, you
fools, to abolish these corn laws. By that means you will doubly
and trebly damage the German manufactories : firstly, because the
prices of provisions and raw materials and the wages of labour will
be raised in Germany and lowered in England; secondly, because by
the export of German grain to England the export of English
manufactured goods to Germany will be promoted; thirdly, because
the German Commercial Union has declared that it is disposed to
reduce their duties on common cotton and woollen goods in the same
proportion in which England facilitates the import of German grain
and timber. Thus we Britons cannot fail once more to crush the
German manufactories. But the question cannot wait. Every year the
manufacturing interests are gaining greater influence in the German
Union; and if you delay, then your corn-law abolition will come too
late. It will not be long before the balance will turn. Very soon
the German manufactories will create such a great demand for
agricultural produce that Germany will have no more surplus corn to
sell to foreign countries. What concessions, then, are you willing
to offer to the German Governments to induce them to lay hands on
their own manufactories in order to hinder them from spinning
cotton for themselves, and from encroaching upon your foreign
markets in addition?
    All this the writer of the report was compelled to make clear
to the landowners in Parliament. The forms of the British State
administration permit no secret Government reports. Dr Bowring's
report must be published, must therefore be seen by the Germans in
translations and extracts. Hence one must use no expressions which
might lead the Germans to a perception of their true interests.
Therefore to every method which was adapted to influence
Parliament, an antidote must be added for the use of the German
Governments. It must be alleged, that in consequence of the
protective system much German capital had been diverted into
improper channels. The agricultural interests of Germany would be
damaged by the protective system. That interest for its part ought
only to turn its attention to foreign markets; agriculture was in
Germany by far the most important productive industry, for
three-fourths of the inhabitants of Germany were engaged in it. It
was mere nonsense to talk about protection for the producers; the
manufacturing interest itself could only thrive under foreign
competition : public opinion in Germany desired freedom of trade.
Intelligence in Germany was too universal for a desire for high
duties to be entertained. The most enlightened men in the country
were in favour of a reduction of duties on common woollen and
cotton fabrics, in case the English duties on corn and timber were
reduced.
    In short, in this report two entirely different voices speak,
which contradict one another like two opponents. Which of the two
must be deemed the true one-that which speaks to the Parliament, or
that which speaks to the German Governments? There is no difficulty
in deciding this point, for everything which Dr Bowring adduces in
order to induce Parliament to lower the import duties on grain and
timber is supported by statistical facts, calculations, and
evidence; while everything that he adduces to dissuade the German
Governments from the protective system is confined to mere
superficial assertions.
    Let us consider in detail the arguments by which Dr Bowring
proves to the Parliament that in case a check is not put to the
progress of the German protective system in the way which he
pointed out, the German market for manufactured goods must become
irrecoverably lost to England.
    The German people is remarkable, says Dr Bowring, for
temperance, thrift, industry, and intelligence, and enjoys a system
of universal education. Excellent polytechnic schools diffuse
technical instruction throughout the entire country.
    The art of design is especially much more cultivated there than
in England. The great annual increase of its population, of its
head of cattle, and especially of sheep, proves what progress
agriculture there has achieved. (The report makes no mention of the
improvement in the value of property, though that is an important
feature, nor of the increase in the value of produce.) The wages of
labour have risen thirty per cent in the manufacturing districts.
The country possesses a great amount of water power, as yet unused,
which is the cheapest of all motive powers. Its mining industry is
everywhere flourishing, more than at any previous time. From 1832
up to 1837 the imports of raw cotton have increased from 118,000
centners to 240,000 centners; the imports of cotton yarn from
172,000 centners to 322,000 centners; the exports of cotton fabrics
from 26,000 centners to 75,000 centners; the number of
cotton-weaving looms in Prussia from 22,000 in 1825 to 32,000 in
1834; the imports of raw wool from 99,000 centners to 195,000
centners; the exports of the same from 100,000 centners to 122,000
centners; the imports of woollen articles from 15,000 centners to
18,000 centners; the exports of the same from 49,000 centners to
69,000 centners.
    The manufacture of linen cloths contends with difficulty
against the high duties in England, France, and Italy and has not
increased. On the other hand, the imports of linen yarn have
increased from 30,000 centners in 1832 to 86,000 centners in 1835,
chiefly through the imports from England, which are still
increasing. The consumption of indigo increased from 12,000
centners in 1831 to 24,000 centners in 1837; a striking proof of
the progress of German industry. The exports of pottery have been
more than doubled from 1832 to 1836. The imports of stoneware have
diminished from 5,000 centners to 2,000 centners, and the exports
of it increased from 4,000 centners to 18,000 centners. The imports
of porcelain have diminished from 4,000 centners to 1,000 centners,
and the exports of it have increased from 700 centners to 4,000
centners. The output of coal has increased from 6,000,000 Prussian
tons in 1832 to 9,000,000 in 1836. In 1816 there were 8,000,000
sheep in Prussia; and in 1837, 15,000,000.
    In Saxony in 1831 there were 14,000 stocking-weaving machines;
in 2836, 20,000. From 1831 to 1837, the number of manufactories for
spinning woollen yarn and of spindles had increased in Saxony to
more than double their previous number. Everywhere machine
manufactories had arisen, and many of these were in the most
flourishing condition.
    In short, in all branches of industry, in proportion as they
have been protected, Germany has made enormous advances, especially
in woollen and cotton goods for common use, the importation of
which from England had entirely ceased. At the same time Dr Bowring
admits, in consequence of a trustworthy opinion which had been
expressed to him, 'that the price of the Prussian stuffs was
decidedly lower than that of the English; that certainly in respect
of some of the colours they were inferior to the best English
tints, but that others were perfect and could not be surpassed;
that in spinning, weaving, and all preparatory processes, the
German goods were fully equal to the British, but only in the
finish a distinct inferiority might be observed, but that the want
of this would disappear after a little time.'
    It is very easy to understand how by means of such
representations as these the English Parliament may at length be
induced to abandon its corn laws, which have hitherto operated as
a protective system to Germany. But it appears to us utterly
incomprehensible how the German Union, which has made such enormous
advances in consequence of the protective system, should be induced
by this report to depart from a system which has yielded them such
excellent results.
    It is very well for Dr Bowring to assure us that the home
industry of Germany is being protected at the expense of the
agriculturists. But how can we attach any credence to his
assurance, when we see, on the contrary, that the demand for
agricultural produce, prices of produce, the wages of labour, the
rents, the value of property, have everywhere considerably risen,
without the agriculturist having to pay more than he did before for
the manufactured goods which he requires?
    It is very well for Dr Bowring to give us an estimate showing
that in Germany three persons are engaged in agriculture to every
one in manufactures, but that statement convinces us that the
number of Germans engaged in manufacturing is not yet in proper
proportion to the number of German agriculturists. And we cannot
see by what other means this disproportion can be equalised, than
by increasing the protection on those branches of manufacture which
are still carried on in England for the supply of the German market
by persons who consume English instead of German agricultural
produce. It is all very well for Dr Bowring to assert that German
agriculture must only direct its attention to foreign countries if
it desires to increase its sale of produce; but that a great demand
for agricultural produce can only be attained by a flourishing home
manufacturing power is taught us not alone by the experience of
England, but Dr Bowring himself implicitly admits this, by the
apprehension which he expresses in his report, that if England
delays for some time to abolish her corn laws, Germany will then
have no surplus of either corn or timber to sell to foreign
countries.
    Dr Bowring is certainly right when he asserts that the
agricultural interest in Germany is still the predominant one, but
just for the very reason that it is predominant it must (as we have
shown in former chapters), by promoting the manufacturing
interests, seek to place itself in a just proportion with them,
because the prosperity of agriculture depends on its being in equal
proportion with the manufacturing interest, but not on its own
preponderance over it.
    Further, the author of the report appears to be utterly steeped
in error when he maintains that foreign competition in German
markets is necessary for the German manufacturing interest itself,
because the German manufacturers, as soon as they are in a position
to supply the German markets, must compete with the manufacturers
of other countries for the disposal of their surplus produce, which
competition they can only sustain by means of cheap production. But
cheap production will not consist with the existence of the
protective system, inasmuch as the object of that system is to
secure higher prices to the manufacturers.
    This argument contains as many errors and falsehoods as words.
Dr Bowring cannot deny that the manufacturer can offer his products
at cheaper prices, the more he is enabled to manufacture -- that,
therefore, a manufacturing Power which exclusively possesses its
home market can work so much the cheaper for foreign trade. The
proof of this he can find in the same tables which he has published
on the advances made by German industry; for in the same proportion
in which the German manufactories have acquired possession of their
own home market, their export of manufactured goods has also
increased. Thus the recent experience of Germany, like the ancient
experience of England, shows us that high prices of manufactured
goods are by no means a necessary consequence of protection.
    Finally, German industry is still very far from entirely
supplying her home market. In order to do that, she must first
manufacture for herself the 13,000 centners of cotton fabrics, the
18,000 centners of woollen fabrics, the 500,000 centners of cotton
yarn, thread, and linen yarn, which at present are imported from
England. If, however, she accomplishes that, she will then import
500,000 centners more raw cotton than before, by which she will
carry on so much the more direct exchange trade with tropical
countries, and be able to pay for the greater part if not the whole
of that requirement with her own manufactured goods.
    We must correct the view of the author of the report, that
public opinion in Germany is in favour of free trade, by stating
that since the establishment of the Commercial Union people have
acquired a clearer perception of what it is that England usually
understands by the term 'free trade,' for, as he himself says,
'Since that period the sentiments of the German people have been
diverted from the region of hope and of fantasy to that of their
actual and material interests.' The author of the report is quite
right when he says that intelligence is very greatly diffused
amongst the German people, but for that very reason people in
Germany have ceased to indulge in cosmopolitical dreams. People
here now think for themselves -- they trust their own conclusions,
their own experience, their own sound common sense, more than
one-sided systems which are opposed to all experience. They begin
to comprehend why it was that Burke declared in confidence to Adam
Smith 'that a nation must not be governed according to
cosmopolitical systems, but according to knowledge of their special
national interests acquired by deep research.' People in Germany
distrust counsellors who blow both cold and hot out of the same
mouth. People know also how to estimate at their proper value the
interests and the advice of those who are our industrial
competitors. Finally, people in Germany bear in mind as often as
English offers are under discussion the well-known proverb of the
presents offered by the Danaidae.
    For these very reasons we may doubt that influential German
statesmen have seriously given grounds for hope to the author of
the report, that Germany is willing to abandon her protective
policy for the benefit of England, in exchange for the pitiful
concession of permission to export to England a little grain and
timber. At any rate public opinion in Germany would greatly
hesitate to consider such statesmen to be thoughtful ones. In order
to merit that title in Germany in the present day, it is not enough
that a man should have thoroughly learned superficial phrases and
arguments of the cosmopolitical school. People require that a
statesman should be well acquainted with the powers and the
requirements of the nation, and, without troubling himself with
scholastic systems, should develop the former and satisfy the
latter. But that man would betray an unfathomable ignorance of
those powers and wants, who did not know what enormous exertions
are requisite to raise a national industry to that stage to which
the German industry has already attained; who cannot in spirit
foresee the greatness of its future; who could so grievously
disappoint the confidence which the German industrial classes have
reposed in their Governments, and so deeply wound the spirit of
enterprise in the nation; who was incapable of distinguishing
between the lofty position which is occupied by a manufacturing
nation of the first rank, and the inferior position of a country
which merely exports corn and timber; who is not intelligent enough
to estimate how precarious a foreign market for grain and timber is
even in ordinary times, how easily concessions of this kind can be
again revoked, and what convulsions are involved in an interruption
of such a trade, occasioned by wars or hostile commercial
regulations; who, finally, has not learned from the example of
other great states how greatly the existence, the independence, and
the power of the nation depends on its possession of a
manufacturing power of its own, developed in all its branches.
    Truly one must greatly under-estimate the spirit of nationality
and of unity which has arisen in Germany since 1830, if one
believed, as the author of the report does (p. 26), that the policy
of the Commercial Union will follow the separate interests of
Prussia, because two-thirds of the population of the Union are
Prussian. But Prussia's interests demand the export of grain and
timber to England; the amount of her capital devoted to
manufactures is unimportant; Prussia will therefore oppose every
system which impedes the import of foreign manufactures, and all
the heads of departments in Prussia are of that opinion.
Nevertheless the author of the report says at the beginning of his
report: 'The German Customs Union is an incarnation of the idea of
national unity which widely pervades this country. If this Union is
well led, it must bring about the fusion of all German interests in
one common league. The experience of its benefits has made it
popular. It is the first step towards the nationalisation of the
German people. By means of the common interest in commercial
questions, it has paved the way for political nationality, and in
place of narrow-minded views, prejudices, and customs, it has laid
down a broader and stronger element of German national existence.'
Now, how does the opinion agree with these perfectly true prefatory
observations, that Prussia will sacrifice the independence and the
future greatness of the nation to a narrow regard to her own
supposed (but in any case only momentary) private interest -- that
Prussia will not comprehend that Germany must either rise or fall
with her national commercial policy, as Prussia herself must rise
or fall with Germany? How does the assertion that the Prussian
heads of departments are opposed to the protective system, agree
with the fact that the high duties on ordinary woollen and cotton
fabrics emanated from Prussia herself? And must we not be compelled
to conjecture from these contradictions, and from the fact that the
author of the report paints in such glowing colours the condition
and the progress of the industry of Saxony, that he himself is
desirous of exciting the private jealousy of Prussia?
    Be that as it may, it is very strange that Dr Bowring attaches
such great importance to the private statements of heads of
departments, he an English author who ought to be well aware of the
power of public opinion -- who ought to know that in our days the
private views of heads of departments even in unconstitutional
states count for very little if they are opposed to public opinion,
and especially to the material interests of the whole nation, and
if they favour retrograde steps which endanger the whole
nationality. The author of the report also feels this well enough
himself, when he states at page 98 that the Prussian Government has
sufficiently experienced, as the English Government has done in
connection with the abolition of the English corn laws, that the
views of public officials cannot everywhere be carried into effect,
that hence it might be necessary to consider whether German grain
and timber should not be admitted to the English markets even
without previous concessions on the part of the German Union,
because by that very means the way might be paved for the admission
of the English manufactured goods into the German market. This view
is in any case a correct one. Dr Bowring sees clearly that the
German industry would never have been strengthened but for those
laws; that consequently the abolition of the corn laws would not
only check the further advances of German industry, but must cause
it again to retrograde greatly, provided always that in that case
the German customs legislation remains unchanged. It is only a pity
that the British did not perceive the soundness of this argument
twenty years ago; but now, after that the legislation of England
has itself undertaken the divorce of German agriculture from
English manufactures, after that Germany has pursued the path of
perfecting her industry for twenty years, and has made enormous
sacrifices for this object, it would betoken political blindness if
Germany were now, owing to the abolition of the English corn laws,
to abstain in any degree from pursuing her great national career.
Indeed, we are firmly convinced that in such a case it would be
necessary for Germany to increase her protective duties in the same
proportion in which the English manufactories would derive
advantage from the abolition of the corn laws as compared with
those of Germany. Germany can for a long time follow no other
policy in respect to England than that of a less advanced
manufacturing nation which is striving with all her power to raise
herself to an equal position with the most advanced manufacturing
nation. Every other policy or measure than that, involves the
imperilling of the German nationality. If the English are in want
of foreign corn or timber, then they may get it in Germany or where
else they please. Germany will not on that account any the less
protect the advances in industry which she has made up to this
time, or strive any the less to make future advances. If the
British will have nothing to do with German grain and timber, so
much the better. In that case the industry, the navigation, the
foreign trade of Germany will raise their heads so much the
quicker, the German internal means of transport will be so much the
sooner completed, the German nationality will so much the more
certainly rest on its natural foundation. Perhaps Prussia may not
in this way so soon be able to sell the corn and timber of her
Baltic provinces at high prices as if the English markets were
suddenly opened to her. But through the completion of the internal
means of transport, and through the internal demand for
agricultural produce created by the manufactories, the sales of
those provinces to the interior of Germany will increase fast
enough, and every benefit to these provinces which is founded on
the home demand for agricultural produce will be gained by them for
all future time. They will never more have to oscillate as
heretofore between calamity and prosperity from one decade to
another. But further, as a political power Prussia will gain a
hundred-fold more in concentrated strength in the interior of
Germany by this policy than the material values which she
sacrifices for the moment in her maritime provinces, or rather
invests for repayment in the future.
    The object of the English ministry in this report is clearly to
obtain the admission into Germany of ordinary English woollen and
cotton fabrics, partly through the abolition or at least
modification of charging duties by weight, partly through the
lowering of the tariff, and partly by the admission of the German
grain and timber into the English market. By these means the first
breach can be made in the German protective system. These articles
of ordinary use (as we have already shown in a former chapter) are
by far the most important, they are the fundamental element of the
national industry. Duties of ten per cent ad valorem, which are
clearly aimed at by England, would, with the assistance of the
usual tricks of under declaration of value, sacrifice the greater
part of the German industry to English competition, especially if
in consequence of commercial crises the English manufacturers were
sometimes induced to throw on the market their stocks of goods at
any price. It is therefore no exaggeration if we maintain that the
tendency of the English proposals aims at nothing less than the
overthrow of the entire Germ an protective system, in order to
reduce Germany to the position of an English agricultural colony.
With this object in view it is impressed on.the notice of Prussia
how greatly her agriculture might gain by the reduction of the
English corn and timber duties, and how unimportant her
manufacturing interest is. With the same view, the prospect is
offered to Prussia of a reduction of the duties on brandy. And in
order that the other states may not go quite empty away a five per
cent reduction of the duties on Nüremberg wares, children's toys,
eau de Cologne, and other trifles, is promised. That gives
satisfaction to the small German states, and also does not cost
much.
    The next attempt will be to convince the German governments, by
means of this report, how advantageous to them it would be to let
England spin cotton and linen yarns for them. It cannot be doubted
that hitherto the policy adopted by the Union, first of all to
encourage and protect the printing of cloths and then weaving, and
to import the medium and finer yarns, has been the right one. But
from that it in nowise follows that it would continue to be the
right one for all time. The tariff legislation must advance as the
national industry advances if it is rightly to fulfil its purpose.
We have already shown that the spinning factories, quite apart from
their importance in themselves, yet are the source of further
incalculable benefits, inasmuch as they place us in direct
commercial communication with the countries of warm climate, and
hence that they exercise an incalculable influence on our
navigation and on our export of manufactures, and that they benefit
our manufactories of machinery more than any other branch of
manufacture. Inasmuch as it cannot be doubted that Germany cannot
be hindered either by want of water power and of capable workmen,
or by lack of material capital or intelligence, from carrying on
for herself this great and fruitful industry, so we cannot see why
we should not gradually protect the spinning of yarns from one
number to another, in such a way that in the course of five to ten
years we may be able to spin for ourselves the greater part of what
we require. However highly one may estimate the advantages of the
export of grain and timber, they cannot nearly equal the benefits
which must accrue to us from the spinning manufacture. Indeed, we
have no hesitation in expressing the belief that it could be
incontestably proved, by a calculation of the consumption of
agricultural products and timber which would be created by the
spinning industry, that from this branch of manufacture alone far
greater benefits must accrue to the German landowners than the
foreign market will ever or can ever offer them.
    Dr Bowring doubts that Hanover, Brunswick, the two
Mecklenburgs, Oldenburg, and the Hanse Towns will join the Union,
unless the latter is willing to make a radical reduction in its
import duties. The latter proposal, however, cannot be seriously
considered, because it would be immeasurably worse than the evil
which by it, it is desired to remedy.
    Our confidence in the prosperity of the future of Germany is,
however, by no means so weak as that of the author of the report.
Just as the Revolution of July has proved beneficial to the German
Commercial Union, so must the next great general convulsion make an
end of all the minor hesitations by which these small states have
hitherto been withheld from yielding to the greater requirements of
the German nationality. Of what value the commercial unity has been
to the nationality, and of what value it is to German governments,
quite apart from mere material interests, has been recently for the
first time very strongly demonstrated, when the desire to acquire
the Rhine frontier has been loudly expressed in France.
    From day to day it is necessary that the governments and
peoples of Germany should be more convinced that national unity is
the rock on which the edifice of their welfare, their honour, their
power, their present security and existence, and their future
greatness, must be founded. Thus from day to day the apostasy of
these small maritime states will appear more and more, not only to
the states in the Union, but to these small states themselves, in
the light of a national scandal which must be got rid of at any
price. Also, if the matter is intelligently considered, the
material advantages of joining the Union are much greater for those
states themselves than the sacrifice which it requires. The more
that manufacturing industry, that the internal means of transport,
the navigation, and the foreign trade of Germany, develop
themselves, in that degree in which under a wise commercial policy
they can and must be developed in accordance with the resources of
the nation, so much the more will the desire become more vigorous
on the part of those small states directly to participate in these
advantages, and so much the more will they leave off the bad habit
of looking to foreign countries for blessings and prosperity.
    In reference to the Hanse Towns especially, the spirit of
imperial citizenship of the sovereign parish of Hamburg in no way
deters us from our hopes. In those cities, according to the
testimony of the author of the report himself, dwell a great number
of men who comprehend that Hamburg, Bremen, and Lubeck are and must
be to the German nation that which London and Liverpool are to the
English, that which New York, Boston, and Philadelphia are to the
Americans -- men who clearly see that the Commercial Union can
offer advantages to their commerce with the world which far exceed
the disadvantages of subjection to the regulations of the Union,
and that a prosperity without any guarantee for its continuance is
fundamentally a delusion.
    What sensible inhabitant of those seaports could heartily
congratulate himself on the continual increase of their tonnage, on
the continual extension of their commercial relations, if he
reflected that two frigates, which coming from Heligoland could be
stationed at the mouths of the Weser and the Elbe, would be in a
position to destroy in twenty-four hours this work of a quarter of
a century? But the Union will guarantee to these seaports their
prosperity and their progress for all future time, partly by the
creation of a fleet of its own and partly by alliances. It will
foster their fisheries, secure special advantages to their
shipping, protect and promote their foreign commercial relations,
by effective consular establishments and by treaties. Partly by
their means it will found new colonies, and by their means carry on
its own colonial trade. For a union of States comprising
thirty-five millions of inhabitants (for the Union will comprise
that number at least when it is fully completed), which owing to an
annual increase of population of one and a half per cent can easily
spare annually two or three hundred thousand persons, whose
provinces abound with well-informed and cultivated inhabitants who
have a peculiar propensity to seek their fortune in distant
countries, people who can take root anywhere and make themselves at
home wherever unoccupied land is to be cultivated, are called upon
by Nature herself to place themselves in the first rank of nations
who colonise and diffuse civilisation.
    The feeling of the necessity for such a perfect completion of
the Commercial Union is so universally entertained in Germany, that
hence the author of the report could not help remarking, 'More
coasts, more harbours, more navigation, a Union flag, the
possession of a navy and of a mercantile marine, are wishes very
generally entertained by the supporters of the Commercial Union,
but there is little prospect at present of the Union making head
against the increasing fleet of Russia and the commercial marine of
Holland and the Hanse Towns.' Against them certainly not, but so
much the more with them and by means of them. It lies in the very
nature of every power to seek to divide in order to rule. After the
author of the report has shown why it would be foolish on the part
of the maritime states to join the Union, he desires also to
separate the great seaports from the German national body for all
time, inasmuch as he speaks to us of the warehouses of Altona which
must become dangerous to the warehouses of Hamburg, as though such
a great commercial empire could not find the means of making the
warehouses of Altona serviceable to its objects. We will not follow
the author through his acute inferences from this point; we will
only say, that if they were applied to England, they would prove
that London and Liverpool would increase their commercial
prosperity in an extraordinary degree if they were separated from
the body of the English nation. The spirit which underlies these
arguments is unmistakably expressed in the report of the English
consul at Rotterdam. 'For the commercial interests of Great
Britain,' says Mr Alexander Ferrier at the end of his report, 'it
appears of the greatest possible importance that no means should be
left untried to prevent the aforesaid states, and also Belgium,
from entering the Zollverein, for reasons which are too clear to
need any exposition.' Who could possibly blame Mr Ferrier for
speaking thus, or Dr Bowring for speaking thus, or the English
ministers for acting as the others speak? The national instinct of
England speaks and acts through them. But to expect prosperity and
blessing to Germany from proposals which proceed from such a source
as that, would appear to exceed even a decent degree of national
good nature. 'Whatever may happen,' adds Mr Ferrier to the words
above quoted, 'Holland must at all times be considered as the main
channel for the commercial relations of South Germany with other
countries.' Clearly Mr Ferrier understands by the term 'other
countries' merely England; clearly he means to say that if the
English manufacturing supremacy should lose its means of access to
Germany or the North Sea and the Baltic, Holland would still remain
to it as the great means of access by which it could predominate
over the markets for manufactured goods and colonial produce of the
south of Germany.
    But we from a national point of view say and maintain that
Holland is in reference to its geographical position, as well as in
respect to its commercial and industrial circumstances, and to the
origin and language of its inhabitants, a German province, which
has been separated from Germany at a period of German national
disunion, without whose reincorporation in the German Union Germany
may be compared to a house the door of which belongs to a stranger:
Holland belongs as much to Germany as Brittany and Normandy belong
to France, and so long as Holland is determined to constitute an
independent kingdom of her own, Germany can as little attain
independence and power as France would have been enabled to attain
these if those provinces had remained in the hands of the English.
That the commercial power of Holland has declined, is owing to the
unimportance of the country. Holland will and must also,
notwithstanding the prosperity of her colonies, continue to
decline, because the nation is too weak to support the enormous
expense of a considerable military and naval power. Through her
exertions to maintain her nationality Holland must become more and
more deeply involved in debt. Notwithstanding her great colonial
prosperity, she is and remains all the same a country dependent on
England, and by her seeming independence she only strengthens the
English supremacy. This is also the secret reason why England at
the congress of Vienna took under her protection the restoration of
the Dutch seeming independence. The case is exactly the same as
with the Hanse Towns. On the side of England, Holland is a
satellite for the English fleet -- unite it with Germany, she is
the leader of the German naval power. In her present position
Holland cannot nearly so well derive profit from her colonial
possessions as if they became a constituent part of the German
Union, especially because she is too weak in the elements which are
necessary for colonisation -- in population and in mental powers.
Further than this, the profitable development of her colonies, so
far as that has hitherto been effected, depends for the most part
on German good nature, or rather on the nonacquaintance of the
Germans with their own national commercial interests; for while all
other nations reserve their market for colonial produce for their
own colonies and for the countries subject to them, the German
market is the only one which remains open to the Dutch for the
disposal of their surplus colonial produce. As soon as the Germans
clearly comprehend that those from whom they purchase colonial
produce must be made to understand that they on their part must
purchase manufactured goods from Germany under differentially
favourable treatment, then the Germans will also clearly see that
they have it in their power to compel Holland to join the
Zollverein. That union would be of the greatest advantage to both
countries. Germany would give Holland the means not only of
deriving profit from her colonies far better than at present, but
also to found and to acquire new colonies. Germany would grant
special perferential privileges to the Dutch and Hanseatic
shipping, and grant special preferential privileges to Dutch
colonial produce in the German markets. Holland and the Hanse
Towns, in return, would preferentially export German manufactures,
and preferentially employ their surplus capital in the
manufactories and the agriculture of the interior of Germany. 
    Holland , as she has sunk from her eminence as a commercial
power because she, the mere fraction of a nation, wanted to make
herself pass as an entire nation; because she sought her advantage
in the oppression and the weakening of the productive powers of
Germany , instead of basing her greatness on the prosperity of the
countries which lie behind her, with which every maritime state
must stand or fall; because she sought to become great by her
separation from the German nation instead of by her union with it;
Holland can only again attain to her ancient state of prosperity by
means of the German Union and in the closest connection with it.
Only by this union is it possible to constitute an agricultural
manufacturing commercial nationality of the first magnitude.
    Dr Bowring groups in his tables the imports and exports of the
German Customs Union with the Hanse Towns and Holland and Belgium
all together, and from this grouping it clearly appears how greatly
all these countries are dependent on the English manufacturing
industry, and how immeasurably they might gain in their entire
productive power by union. He estimates the imports of these
countries from England at 19,842,121 l. sterling of official value,
or 8,550,347 l. of declared value, but the exports of those
countries to England (on the other hand) at only 4,804,491 l.
sterling; in which, by the way, are included the great quantities
of Java coffee, cheese, butter, &c. which England imports from
Holland. These totals speak volumes. We thank the Doctor for his
statistical grouping together -- would that it might betoken a
speedy political grouping.

NOTES:

1. Report on the German Zollverein to Lord Viscount Palmerston, by
John Bowring, 1840.

2. See statement of R. B. Porter, note to p. 299.

Chapter 35

Continental Politics

    The highest ultimate aim of rational politics is (as we have
shown in our Second Book) the uniting of all nations under a common
law of right, an object which is only to be attained through the
greatest possible equalisation of the most important nations of the
earth in civilisation, prosperity, industry, and power, by the
conversion of the antipathies and conflicts which now exist between
them into sympathy and harmony. But the solution of this problem is
a work of immensely long duration. At the present time the nations
are divided and repelled from one another by manifold causes; chief
among these are conflicts about territory. As yet, the
apportionment of territory to the European nations does not
correspond to the nature of things. Indeed, even in theory, people
are not yet agreed upon the fundamental conditions of a just and
natural apportionment of territory. Some desire that their national
territory should be determined according to the requirements of
their metropolis without regard to language, commerce, race, and so
forth, in such a way that the metropolis should be situated in the
centre and be protected as much as possible against foreign
attacks. They desire to have great rivers for their frontiers.
Others maintain, and apparently with greater reason, that
sea-coasts, mountains, language, and race, constitute better
frontiers than great rivers. There still are nations who are not in
possession of those mouths of rivers and sea-coasts which are
indispensable to them for the development of their commerce with
the world and for their naval power.
    If every nation was already in possession of the territory
which is necessary for its internal development, and for the
maintenance of its political, industrial, and commercial
independence, then every conquest of territory would be contrary to
sound policy, because by the unnatural increase of territory the
jealousy of the nation which is thus encroached upon would be
excited and kept alive, and consequently the sacrifices which the
conquering nation would have to make for retaining such provinces
would be immeasurably greater than the advantages accruing from
their possession. A just and wise apportionment of territory is,
however, at this day not to be thought of, because this question is
complicated by manifold interests of another nature. At the same
time it must not be ignored that rectification of territory must be
reckoned among the most important requirements of the nations, that
striving to attain it is legitimate, that indeed in many cases it
is a justifiable reason for war.
    Further causes of antipathy between the nations are, at the
present time, the diversity of their interests in respect to
manufactures, commerce, navigation, naval power, and colonial
possessions, also the difference in their degrees of civilisation,
of religion, and of political condition. All these interests are
complicated in manifold ways through the interests of dynasties and
powers.
    The causes of antipathy are, on the other hand, causes of
sympathy. The less powerful nations sympathise against the most
powerful, those whose independence is endangered sympathise against
the aggressors, territorial powers against naval supremacy, those
whose industry and commerce are defective sympathise against those
who are striving for an industrial and commercial monopoly, the
half-civilised against the civilised, those who are subjects of a
monarchy against those whose government is entirely or partially
democratic.
    Nations at this time pursue their own interests and sympathies
by means of alliances of those who are like-minded and have like
interests against the interests and tendencies which conflict with
theirs. As, however, these interests and tendencies conflict with
one another in various ways, these alliances are liable to change.
Those nations who are friends to-day may be enemies to-morrow, and
vice versâ, as soon as ever some one of the great interests or
principles is at stake by which they feel themselves repelled from
or drawn towards one another.
    Politicians have long felt that the equalisation of the nations
must be their ultimate aim. That which people call the maintenance
of the European balance of power has always been nothing else than
the endeavours of the less powerful to impose a check on the
encroachments of the more powerful. Yet politics have not seldom
confounded their proximate object with their ultimate one, and vice
versâ.
    The proximate task of politics always consists in clearly
perceiving in what respect the alliance and equalisation of the
different interests is at the moment most pressing, and to strive
that until this equalisation is attained all other questions may be
suspended and kept in the background.
    When the dynastic, monarchic, and aristocratic interests of
Europe allied themselves against the revolutionary tendencies of
1789, disregarding all considerations regarding power and commerce,
their policy was a correct one.
    It was just as correct when the French Empire introduced the
tendency of conquest in place of that of revolution.
    Napoleon sought by his Continental system to establish a
Continental coalition against the predominant naval and commercial
power of England; but in order to succeed, it was necessary for
him, first of all, to take away from the Continental nations the
apprehension of being conquered by France. He failed, because on
their part the fear of his supremacy on land greatly outweighed the
disadvantages which they suffered from the naval supremacy.
    With the fall of the French Empire, the object of the great
alliance ceased. From that time forth, the Continental powers were
menaced neither by the revolutionary tendencies nor by the lust of
conquest of France. England's predominance in manufactures,
navigation, commerce, colonial possessions, and naval power, had,
on the other hand, enormously increased during the conflicts
against the Revolution and against the French conquest. From that
time forth, it became the interest of the Continental powers to
ally themselves with France against the commercial and naval
predominance. Solely from fear of the skin of the dead lion, the
Continental powers did not heed sufficiently the living leopard who
had hitherto fought in their ranks. The Holy Alliance was a
political error.
    This error also brought about its own punishment through the
revolution of Italy. The Holy Alliance had unnecessarily called
into life a counter force which no longer existed, or which at
least would not for a long time have revived again. Fortunately for
the Continental powers, the dynasty of July contrived to appease
the revolutionary tendency in France. France concluded the alliance
with England in the interests of the dynasty of July and of
strengthening the constitutional monarchy. England concluded it in
the interest of the maintenance of her commercial supremacy.
    The Franco-English alliance ceased as soon as ever the dynasty
of July and the constitutional monarchy in France felt themselves
to be sufficiently firmly established; but, on the other hand, the
interests of France in respect of naval power, navigation,
commerce, industry, and foreign possessions came again more to the
front. It is clear that France has again an equal interest with the
other Continental powers in these questions, and the establishing
of a Continental alliance against the naval predominance of England
appears to be becoming a question of the day, provided the dynasty
of July can succeed in creating perfect unity of will between the
different organs of State administration, also to thrust into the
background those territorial questions which are excited by the
revolutionary tendencies, and entirely to appease in the minds of
the monarchical Continental powers the fear of the tendencies of
France towards revolution and aggression.
    Nothing, however, at this time so greatly impedes a closer
union of the continent of Europe as the fact that the centre of it
still never takes the position for which it is naturally fitted.
Instead of being a mediator between the east and the west of that
continent, on all questions of arrangement of territory, of the
principle of their constitutions, of national independence and
power, for which it is qualified by its geographical position, by
its federal constitution which excludes all apprehension of
aggression in the minds of neighbouring nations, by its religious
toleration, and its cosmopolitical tendencies, and finally by its
civilisation and the elements of power which it possesses, this
central part of Europe constitutes at present the apple of discord
for which the east and the west contend, while each party hopes to
draw to its own side this middle power, which is weakened by want
of national unity, and is always uncertainly wavering hither and
thither.
    If, on the other hand, Germany could constitute itself with the
maritime territories which appertain to it, with Holland, Belgium,
and Switzerland, as a powerful commercial and political whole -- if
this mighty national body could fuse representative institutions
with the existing monarchical, dynastic, and aristocratic
interests, so far as these are compatible with one another -- then
Germany could secure peace to the continent of Europe for a long
time, and at the same time constitute herself the central point of
a durable Continental alliance.
    That the naval power of England greatly exceeds that of all
other nations, if not on the number of ships, yet certainly in
fighting power -- that hence the nations which are less powerful at
sea can only match England at sea by uniting their own naval power,
is clear. From hence it follows, that every nation which is less
powerful at sea has an interest in the maintenance and prosperity
of the naval power of all other nations who are similarly weak at
sea; and further, that fractions of other nations which, hitherto
divided, have possessed either no naval power whatever or only an
unimportant one, should constitute themselves into one united naval
power. In regard to England, France and North America sustain loss
if the naval power of Russia declines, and vice versâ. They all
gain, if Germany, Holland, and Belgium constitute together a common
naval power; for while separated these last are mere satellites to
the supremacy of England, but if united they strengthen the
opposition to that supremacy of all nations at sea.
    None of these less powerful nations possesses a mercantile
marine which exceeds the requirements of its own international
trade -- none of these nations possesses a manufacturing power
which would maintain important preponderance over that of the
others. None of them, therefore, has any ground to fear the
competition of the others. On the other hand, all have a common
interest in protecting themselves against the destructive
competition of England. Hence it must be to the interests of all
that the predominating manufacturing power of England should lose
those means of access (Holland, Belgium, and the Hanse Towns) by
means of which England has hitherto dominated the markets of the
Continent.
    Inasmuch as the products of tropical climates are chiefly paid
for by the manufactured products of temperate climates, and hence
the consumption of the former depends on the sale of the latter,
therefore every manufacturing nation should endeavour to establish
direct intercourse with tropical countries. And thus, if all
manufacturing nations of the second rank understand their own
interests and act accordingly, no nation will be permitted to
maintain a predominant amount of colonial possessions in tropical
countries. If, for instance, England could succeed in the object
for which she is at present striving, viz. to produce in India the
colonial produce which she requires -- in that case England could
only carry on trade with the West Indies to the extent to which she
was able to sell to other countries the colonial produce which she
now obtains from the West Indies in exchange for her manufactured
goods. If, however, she could not dispose of these to other
countries, then her West Indian possessions would become useless to
her. She would then have no other option than either to let them go
free, or to surrender the trade with them to other manufacturing
countries. Hence it follows that all manufacturing nations less
powerful at sea have a common interest in following this policy and
in reciprocally supporting one another in it, and it follows
further that no one of these nations would lose by the accession of
Holland to the German Commercial Union, and through the closer
connection of Germany with the Dutch colonies.
    Since the emancipation of the Spanish and Portuguese colonies
in South America and the West Indies, it is no longer indispensably
necessary that a manufacturing nation should possess colonies of
its own in tropical climates in order to put itself in a position
to carry on directly the exchange of manufactured goods against
colonial produce. As the markets of these emancipated tropical
countries are free, every manufacturing nation which is able to
compete in these free markets can carry on direct trade with them.
But these free tropical countries can only produce great quantities
of colonial products, and only consume great quantities of
manufactured goods, if prosperity and morality, peace and repose,
lawful order and religious tolerance, prevail within them. All
nations not powerful at sea, especially those who possess no
colonies, or only unimportant ones, have hence a common interest in
bringing about such a state of things by their united power. To
England, with her commercial supremacy, the circumstances of these
countries cannot matter so much because she is sufficiently
supplied, or at least hopes to become sufficiently supplied, with
colonial produce from her own exclusive and subject markets in the
East and West Indies. From this point of view also we must partly
judge respecting the extremely important question of slavery. We
are very far from ignoring that much philanthropy and good motive
lies at the root of the zeal with which the object of the
emancipation of the negroes is pursued by England, and that this
zeal does great honour to the character of the English nation. But
at the same time, if we consider the immediate effects of the
measures adopted by England in reference to this matter, we cannot
get rid of the idea that also much political motive and commercial
interest are mingled with it. These effects are: (1) That by the
sudden emancipation of the blacks, through their rapid transition
from a condition of disorder and carelessness little removed from
that of wild animals to a high degree of individual independence,
the yield of tropical produce of South America and the West Indies
will be extremely diminished and ultimately reduced to nothing, as
the example of St. Domingo incontestably shows, inasmuch as there
since the expulsion of the French and Spaniards the production has
greatly decreased from year to year, and continues to do so. (2)
That the free negroes continually seek to obtain an increase in
their wages, whilst they limit their labour to the supply of their
most indispensable wants; that hence their freedom merely leads to
idleness. (3) That, on the other hand, England possesses in the
East Indies ample means for supplying the whole world with colonial
products. It is well known that the Hindoos, owing to great
industry and great moderation in their food and other wants,
especially in consequence of the precepts of their religion, which
forbid the use of animal food, are excessively frugal. To these
must be added the want of capital among the natives, the great
fruitfulness of the soil in vegetable products, and the restriction
of caste and the great competition of those in want of work.
    The result of all this is, that wages in India are incomparably
lower than in the West Indies and South America, whether the
plantations there are cultivated by free blacks or by slaves; that
consequently the production of India, after trade has been set free
in that country, and wiser principles of administration have
prevailed, must increase at an enormous rate, and the time is no
longer distant when England will not only be able to supply all her
own requirements of colonial produce from India, but also export
great quantities to other countries. Hence it follows that England
cannot lose through the diminution of production in the West Indies
and South America, to which countries other nations also export
manufactured goods, but she will gain if the colonial production in
India becomes preponderant, which market England exclusively
supplies with manufactured goods. (4) Finally, it may be asserted,
that by the emancipation of the slaves England desires to hang a
sword over the head of the North American slave states, which is so
much the more menacing to the Union the more this emancipation
extends and the wish is excited among the negroes of North America
to partake of similar liberty. The question if rightly viewed must
appear a philanthropical experiment of doubtful benefit towards
those on whose behalf it was undertaken from motives of general
philanthropy, but must in any case appear to those nations who rely
on the trade with South America and the West Indies as not
advantageous to them; and they may not unreasonably inquire:
Whether a sudden transition from slavery to freedom may not prove
more injurious to the negroes themselves than the maintenance of
the existing state of things? -- whether it may not be the task of
several generations to educate the negroes (who are accustomed to
an almost animal state of subjection) to habits of voluntary labour
and thrift? -- whether it might not better attain the object if the
transition from slavery to freedom was made by the introduction of
a mild form of serfdom, whereby at first some interest might be
secured to the serf in the land which he cultivates, and a fair
share of the fruits of his labour, allowing sufficient rights to
the landlord in order to bind the serf to habits of industry and
order? -- whether such a condition would not be more desirable than
that of a miserable, drunken, lazy, vicious, mendicant horde called
free negroes, in comparison with which Irish misery in its most
degraded form may be deemed a state of prosperity and civilisation?
If, however, we are required to believe that the zeal of the
English to make everything which exists upon earth partakers of the
same degree of freedom which they possess themselves, is so great
and irrepressible that they must be excused if they have forgotten
that nature makes no advances by leaps and bounds, then we must
venture to put the questions: Whether the condition of the lowest
caste of the Hindoos is not much more wretched and intolerable than
that of the American negroes? -- and how it happens that the
philanthropic spirit of England has never been excited on behalf of
these most miserable of mankind? -- how it happens that English
legislation has never intervened for their benefit? -- how it
happens that England has been active enough in deriving means for
her own enrichment out of this miserable state of things, without
thinking of any direct means of ameliorating it?
    The English-Indian policy leads us to the Eastern question. If
we can dismiss from the politics of the day all that which at this
moment has reference to territorial conflicts, to the dynastic,
monarchic, aristocratic, and religious interests, and to the
circumstances of the various powers, it cannot be ignored that the
Continental powers have a great national economic interest in
common in the Eastern question. However successful the present
endeavours of the powers may be to keep this question in the
background for a time, it will continually again come to the front
with renewed force. It is a conclusion long arrived at by all
thoughtful men, that a nation so thoroughly undermined in her
religious, moral, social, and political foundations as Turkey is,
is like a corpse, which may indeed be held up for a time by the
support of the living, but must none the less pass into corruption.
The case is quite the same with the Persians as with the Turks,
with the Chinese and Hindoos and all other Asiatic people. Wherever
the mouldering civilisation of Asia comes into contact with the
fresh atmosphere of Europe, it falls to atoms; and Europe will
sooner or later find herself under the necessity of taking the
whole of Asia under her care and tutelage, as already India has
been so taken in charge by England. In this utter chaos of
countries and peoples there exists no single nationality which is
either worthy or capable of maintenance and regeneration. Hence the
entire dissolution of the Asiatic nationalities appears to be
inevitable, and a regeneration of Asia only possible by means of an
infusion of European vital power, by the general introduction of
the Christian religion and of European moral laws and order, by
European immigration, and the introduction of European systems of
government.
    If we reflect on the course which such a regeneration might
possibly pursue, the first consideration that strikes one is that
the greater part of the East is richly provided by nature with
resources for supplying the manufacturing nations of Europe with
great quantities of raw materials and necessary articles of every
kind, but especially for producing tropical products, and in
exchange for these for opening unlimited markets to European
manufacturers. From this circumstance, nature appears to have given
an indication that this regeneration, as generally is the case with
the civilisation of barbarous peoples, must proceed by the path of
free exchange of agricultural produce against manufactured goods.
For that reason the principle must be firmly maintained above all
by the European nations, that no exclusive commercial privileges
must be reserved to any European nation in any part of Asia
whatever, and that no nation must be favoured above others there in
any degree. It would be especially advantageous to the extension of
this trade, if the chief commercial emporiums of the East were
constituted free cities, the European population of which should
have the right of self-government in consideration of an annual
payment of tax to the native rulers. But European agents should be
appointed to reside with these rulers, after the example of English
policy in India, whose advice the native rulers should be bound to
follow in respect of the promotion of public security order, and
civilisation.
    All the Continental powers have especially a common interest
that neither of the two routes from the Mediterranean to the Red
Sea and to the Persian Gulf should fall into the exclusive
possession of England, nor remain impassable owing to Asiatic
barbarism. To commit the duty of protecting these important points
to Austria, would insure the best guarantees to all European
nations.
    Further, the Continental powers in general have a common
interest with the United States in maintaining the principle that
'free ships cover free goods,' and that only an effectual blockade
of individual ports, but not a mere proclamation of the blockade of
entire coasts, ought to be respected by neutrals. Finally, the
principle of the annexation of wild and uninhabited territories
appears to require revision in the common interest of the
Continental powers. People ridicule in our days the fact that the
Holy Father formerly undertook to make presents of islands and
parts of the globe, nay even to divide the world into two parts
with a stroke of the pen, and to apportion this part to one man and
that to another. Can it, however, be deemed much more sensible to
acknowledge the title to an entire quarter of the globe to vest in
the man who first erected somewhere on the earth a pole adorned
with a piece of silk? That in the case of islands of moderate size
the right of the discoverer should be respected, may be admitted
consistently with common sense; but when the question arises as to
islands which are as large as a great European kingdom (like New
Zealand) or respecting a continent which is larger than the whole
of Europe (like Australia), in such a case by nothing less than an
actual occupation by colonisation, and then only for the actually
colonised territory, can a claim to exclusive possession be
admitted consistently with common sense. And it is not clear why
the Germans and the French should not have the right to found
colonies in those parts of the world at points which are distant
from the English stations.
    If we only consider the enormous interests which the nations of
the Continent have in common, as opposed to the English maritime
supremacy, we shall be led to the conviction that nothing is so
necessary to these nations as union, and nothing is so ruinous to
them as Continental wars. The history of the last century also
teaches us that every war which the powers of the Continent have
waged against one another has had for its invariable result to
increase the industry, the wealth, the navigation, the colonial
possessions, and the power of the insular supremacy.
    Hence, it cannot be denied that a correct view of the wants and
interests of the Continent underlaid the Continental system of
Napoleon, although it must not be ignored that Napoleon desired to
give effect to this idea (right in itself) in a manner which was
contrary to the independence and to the interests of the other
Continental powers. The Continental system of Napoleon suffered
from three capital defects. In the first place, it sought to
establish, in the place of the English maritime supremacy, a French
Continental supremacy; it sought the humiliation, or destruction
and dissolution, of other nationalities on the Continent for the
benefit of France, instead of basing itself on the elevation and
equalisation of the other Continental nations. Furthermore, France
followed herself an exclusive commercial policy against the other
countries of the Continent, while she claimed for herself free
competition in those countries. Finally, the system almost entirely
destroyed the trade between the manufacturing countries of the
Continent and tropical countries, and found itself compelled to
find a remedy for the destruction of this international trade by
the use of substituted articles.(1*)
    That the idea of this Continental system will ever recur, that
the necessity of realising it will the more forcibly impress itself
on the Continental nations in proportion as the preponderance of
England in industry, wealth, and power further increases, is
already very clear, and will continually become more evident. But
it is not less certain that an alliance of the Continental nations
can only have a good result if France is wise enough to avoid the
errors of Napoleon. Hence, it is foolish of France if she raises
(contrary to all justice, and to the actual nature of
circumstances) claims for extension of frontiers at the expense of
Germany, and thereby compels other nations of the Continent to ally
themselves with England.
    It is foolish of France if she speaks of the Mediterranean Sea
as of a French lake, and seeks to acquire exclusive influence in
the Levant and in South America.
    An effective Continental system can only originate from the
free union of the Continental powers, and can succeed only in case
it has for its object (and also effects) an equal participation in
the advantages which result from it, for in that way only, and in
no other, can the maritime powers of second rank command respect
from the predominant power of England in such a way that the latter
without any recourse to the force of arms will concede all the just
requirements of the less powerful states. Only by such an alliance
as that will the Continental manufacturing powers be able to
maintain their relations with tropical countries, and assert and
secure their interests in the East and the West.
    In any case the British, who are ever too anxious for
supremacy, must feel it hard when they perceive in this manner how
the Continental nations will reciprocally raise their manufacturing
power by mutual commercial concessions and by treaties; how they
will reciprocally strengthen their navigation and their naval
power; how they will assert their claim to that share for which
they are fitted by nature in civilising and colonising barbarous
and uncultivated countries, and in trade with tropical regions.
Nevertheless, a glance into the future ought sufficiently to
console the britons for these anticipated disadvantages.
    For the same causes which have raised Great Britain to her
present exalted position, will (probably in the course of the next
century) raise the United States of America to a degree of
industry, wealth, and power, which will surpass the position in
which England stands, as far as at present England excels little
Holland. In the natural course of things the United States will
increase their population within that period to hundreds of
millions of souls; they will diffuse their population, their
institutions, their civilisation, and their spirit over the whole
of Central and South America, just as they have recently diffused
them over the neighbouring Mexican province. The Federal Union will
comprise all these immense territories, a population of several
hundred millions of people will develop the resources of a
continent which infinitely exceeds the continent of Europe in
extent and in natural wealth. The naval power of the western world
will surpass that of Great Britain, as greatly as its coasts and
rivers exceed those of Britain in extent and magnitude.
    Thus in a not very distant future the natural necessity which
now imposes on the French and Germans the necessity of establishing
a Continental alliance against the British supremacy, will impose
on the British the necessity of establishing a European coalition
against the supremacy of America. Then will Great Britain be
compelled to seek and to find in the leadership of the united
powers of Europe protection, security, and compensation against the
predominance of America, and an equivalent for her lost supremacy.
    It is therefore good for England that she should practise
resignation betimes, that she should by timely renunciations gain
the friendship of European Continental powers, that she should
accustom herself betimes to the idea of being only the first among
equals.

NOTES:

1. This fact is confirmed by Mad. Junot, in Mémoires de la Duchess
d'Abrantès. -- [TRANSLATOR.]


Chapter 36

The Commercial Policy of the German Zollverein

    If any nation whatever is qualified for the establishment of a
national manufacturing power, it is Germany; by the high rank which
she maintains in science and art, in literature and education, in
public administration and in institutions of public utility; by her
morality and religious character, her industry and domestic
economy; by her perseverance and steadfastness in business
occupations; as also by her spirit of invention, by the number and
vigour of her population; by the extent and nature of her
territory, and especially by her highly advanced agriculture, and
her physical, social, and mental resources.
    If any nation whatever has a right to anticipate rich results
from a protective system adapted to her circumstances, for the
progress of her home manufactures, for the increase of her foreign
trade and her navigation, for the perfecting of her internal means
of transport, for the prosperity of her agriculture, as also for
the maintenance of her independence and the increase of her power
abroad, it is Germany.
    Yes, we venture to assert, that on the development of the
German protective system depend the existence, the independence and
the future of the German nationality. Only in the soil of general
prosperity does the national spirit strike its roots, produce fine
blossoms and rich fruits; only from the unity of material interests
does mental power arise, and only from both of these national
power. But of what value are all our endeavours, whether we are
rulers or subjects, nobles or simple citizens, learned men,
soldiers, or civilians, manufacturers, agriculturists, or
merchants, without nationality and without guarantees for the
continuance of our nationality?
    Meanwhile, however, the German protective system only
accomplishes its object in a very imperfect manner, so long as
Germany does not spin for herself the cotton and linen yarn which
she requires; so long as she does not directly import from tropical
countries the colonial produce which she requires, and pay for it
with goods of her own manufacture; so long as she does not carry on
this trade with her own ships; so long as she has no means of
protecting her own flag; so long as she possesses no perfect system
of transport by river, canal, or railway; so long as the German
Zollverein does not include all German maritime territories and
also Holland and belgium. We have treated these subjects
circumstantially in various places in this book, and it is only
necessary for us here to recapitulate what we have already thus
treated.
    If we import raw cotton from Egypt, Brazil, and North America,
we in that case pay for it in our own manufactured goods; if, on
the other hand, we import cotton yarn from England, we have to pay
the value of it in raw materials and articles of food which we
could more advantageously work up or consume ourselves, or else we
must pay for it in specie which we have acquired elsewhere, and
with which we could more advantageously purchase foreign raw
materials to work up for ourselves, or colonial produce for our own
consumption.
    In the same way the introduction of spinning linen yarn by
machinery offers us the means not only of increasing our home
consumption of linen, and of perfecting our agriculture, but also
of enormously increasing our trade with tropical countries.
    For the two above-named branches of industry, as well as for
the manufacture of woollens, we are as favourably circumstanced as
any other nation, by an amount of water power hitherto not
utilised, by cheap necessaries of life, and by low wages. What we
lack is simply and solely a guarantee for our capitalists and
artisans by which they may be protected against loss of capital and
want of work. A moderate protective duty of about twenty-five per
cent during the next five years, which could be maintained for a
few years at that rate and then be lowered to fifteen to twenty per
cent, ought completely to accomplish this object. Every argument
which is adduced by the supporters of the theory of values against
such a measure, has been refuted by us. On the other hand, we may
add a further argument in favour of that measure, that these great
branches of industry especially offer us the means for establishing
extensive machine manufactories and for the development of a race
of competent technical instructors and practical foremen.
    In the trade in colonial produce Germany, as France and England
have done, has to follow the principle -- that in respect to the
purchase of the colonial produce which we require, we should give
a preference to those tropical countries which purchase
manufactured goods from us; or, in short, that we should buy from
those who buy from us. That is the case in reference to our trade
with the West Indies and to North and South America.
    But it is not yet the case in reference to our trade with
Holland, which country supplies us with enormous quantities of her
colonial produce, but only takes in return disproportionately small
quantities of our manufactured goods.
    At the same time Holland is naturally directed to the market of
Germany for the disposal of the greater part of her colonial
produce, inasmuch as England and France derive their supplies of
such produce for the most part from their own colonies and from
subject countries (where they exclusively possess the market for
manufactured goods), and hence they only import small quantities of
Dutch colonial produce.
    Holland has no important manufacturing industry of her own,
but, on the other hand, has a great productive industry in her
colonies, which has recently greatly increased and may yet be
immeasurably further increased. But Holland desires of Germany that
which is unfair, and acts contrary to her own interests if rightly
understood, inasmuch as she desires to dispose of the greater part
of her colonial produce to Germany, while she desires to supply her
requirements of manufactured goods from any quarter she likes best.
This is, for Holland, an only apparently beneficial and a
short-sighted policy; for if Holland would give preferential
advantages to German manufactured goods both in the mother country
and in her colonies, the demand in Germany for Dutch colonial
produce would increase in the same proportion in which the sale of
German manufactured goods to Holland and her colonies increased,
or, in other words, Germany would be able to purchase so much the
more colonial produce in proportion as she sold more manufactured
goods to Holland; Holland would be able to dispose of so much more
colonial produce to Germany as she purchased from Germany
manufactured goods. This reciprocal exchange operation is, at
present, rendered impracticable by Holland if she sells her
colonial produce to Germany while she purchases her requirements in
manufactured goods from England, because England (no matter how
much of manufactured goods she sells to Holland) will always supply
the greater part of her own requirements of colonial produce from
her own colonies, or from the countries which are subject to her.
    Hence the interests of Germany require that she should either
demand from Holland a differential duty in favour of Germany's
manufacturing production, by which the latter can secure to herself
the exclusive market for manufactured goods in Holland and her
colonies, or, in case of refusal, that Germany should impose a
differential duty on the import of colonial produce in favour of
the produce of Central and South America and of the free markets of
the West Indies.
    The above-named policy would constitute the most effective
means of inducing Holland to join the German Zollverein.
    As matters now stand, Germany has no reason for sacrificing her
own manufactories of beetroot sugar to the trade with Holland; for
only in case Germany can pay for her requirements of this article
by means of her own manufactured goods, is it more to her advantage
to supply that requirement by an exchange trade with tropical
countries, than by producing it herself at home.
    Hence the attention of Germany should be at once chiefly
directed to the extension of her trade with Northern, Central, and
South America, and with the free markets of the West Indies. In
connection with that, the following measures, in addition to that
above adverted to, appear desirable: the establishment of a regular
service of steamships between the German seaports and the principal
ports of those countries, the promotion of emigration thither, the
confirmation and extension of friendly relations between them and
the Zollverein, and especially the promotion of the civilisation of
those countries.
    Recent experience has abundantly taught us how enormously
commerce on a large scale is promoted by a regular service of
steamships. France and belgium are already treading in the
footsteps of England in this respect, as they well perceive that
every nation which is behindhand in this more perfect means of
transport must retrograde in her foreign trade. The German seaports
also have already recognised this; already one public company has
been completely formed in Bremen for building two or three steam
vessels for the trade with the United States. This, however, is
clearly an insufficient provision. The commercial interests of
Germany require not only a regular service of steam vessels with
North America, especially with New York, Boston, Charleston, and
New Orleans, but also with Cuba, San Domingo, and Central and South
America. Germany ought to be behind no other nation in respect to
these latter lines of steam navigation. It must certainly not be
ignored that the means which are required for these objects will be
too great for the spirit of enterprise, and perhaps also for the
power of the German seaports, and it seems to us they can only be
carried into effect by means of liberal subsidies on the part of
the states of the Zollverein. The prospect of such subsidies as
well as of differential duties in favour of German shipping, ought
at once to constitute a strong motive for these seaports to become
included in the Commercial Union. When one considers how greatly
the exports of manufactured goods and the imports of colonial
produce, and consequently also the customs revenue, of the states
of the Zollverein would be increased by such a measure, one cannot
doubt that even a considerable expenditure for this object must
appear as only a reproductive investment of capital from which rich
returns are to be expected.
    Through the increase of the means of intercourse of Germany
with the above-named countries, the emigration of Germans to those
countries and their settlement there as citizens would be no less
promoted; and by that means the foundation would be laid for future
increase of commerce with them. For this object the states of the
Zollverein ought to establish everywhere consulates and diplomatic
agencies, by means of which the settlement and undertakings of
German citizens could be promoted, and especially to assist those
states in every practicable way in giving stability to their
governments and improving their degree of civilisation.
    We do not share in the least the opinion of those who think
that the tropical countries of America offer less advantages to
German colonisation than those of temperate climate in North
America. However great, as we have openly confessed, is our
attachment for the last-named country, and however little we are
able or desire to deny that an individual German emigrant who
possesses a little capital has greater hope of permanently making
his fortune in Western North America, we must nevertheless here
express our opinion that emigration to Central and South America,
if it were well led and undertaken on a large scale, offers in a
national point of view much greater advantages for Germany than
emigration to North America. What good is it if the emigrants to
North America become ever so prosperous? In their personal relation
they are lost for ever to the German nationality, and also from
their material production Germany can expect only unimportant
fruits. It is a pure delusion if people think that the German
language can be maintained by the Germans who live in the interior
of the United States, or that after a time it may be possible to
establish entire German states there. We once ourselves entertained
this illusion, but after ten years' observation in the country
itself, on the spot, we have entirely given it up. It lies in the
very spirit of every nationality, and above all in that of the
United States, to assimilate itself in language, literature,
administration, and legislation; and it is good that that is so.
However many Germans may now be living in North America, yet
certainly not one of them is living there whose great-grandchildren
will not greatly prefer the English language to the German, and
that for the very natural reason that the former is the language of
the educated people, of the literature, the legislation, the
administration, the courts of justice, and the trade and commerce
of the country. The same thing can and will happen to the Germans
in North America as happened to the Huguenots in Germany and the
French in Louisiana. They naturally must and will be amalgamated
with the predominant population: some a little sooner, others a
little later, according as they dwell more or less together with
fellow-countrymen.
    Still less dependence can be placed on an active intercourse
between Germany and the German emigrants to the west of North
America. The first settler is always compelled by necessity to make
for himself the greater part of his articles of clothing and
utensils; and these customs, which originated from mere necessity,
continue for the most part to the second and third generation.
Hence it is that North America itself is a country which makes
powerful efforts in manufacturing industry, and will continually
strive more and more to gain possession of her home market for
manufactured goods, for her own industry.
    On the other hand, we would on that account by no means
maintain that the American market for manufactured goods is not a
very important one, and well worthy of regard, especially for
Germany On the contrary, we are of opinion that for many articles
of luxury and for manufactured articles which are easy of
transport, and in which the wages of labour constitute a chief
element of the price, that market is one of the most important, and
must from year to year, as respects the articles above named,
become more important for Germany. What we contend is only this,
that those Germans who emigrate to the west of North America give
no important assistance in increasing the demand for German
manufactured goods, and that in reference to that object emigration
to Central and South America requires and deserves very much more
direct encouragement.
    The above-mentioned countries, including Texas, are for the
most part adapted for raising colonial produce. They can and will
never make great progress in manufacturing industry. Here there is
an entirely new and rich market for manufactured goods to acquire;
whoever has here established firm commercial relations, may remain
in possession of them for all future time. These countries, without
sufficient moral power of their own to raise themselves to a higher
grade of civilisation, to introduce well-ordered systems of
government, and to endue them with stability, will more and more
come to the conviction that they must be aided from outside,
namely, by immigration. In these quarters the English and French
are hated on account of their arrogance, and owing to jealousy for
national independence -- the Germans for the opposite reasons are
liked. Hence the states of the Zollverein ought to devote the
closest attention to these countries.
    A vigorous German consular and diplomatic system ought to be
established in these quarters, the branches of which should enter
into correspondence with one another. Young explorers should be
encouraged to travel through these countries and make impartial
reports upon them. Young merchants should be encouraged to inspect
them -- young medical men to go and practise there. Companies
should be founded and supported by actual share subscription, and
taken under special protection, which companies should be formed in
the German seaports in order to buy large tracts of land in those
countries and to settle them with German colonists -- companies for
commerce and navigation, whose object should be to open new markets
in those countries for German manufactures and to establish lines
of steamships -- mining companies, whose object should be to devote
German knowledge and industry to winning the great mineral wealth
of those countries. In every possible way the Zollverein ought to
endeavour to gain the good-will of the population and also of the
governments of those countries, and especially to promote by that
means public security means of communication, and public order;
indeed, one ought not to hesitate, in case one could by that means
put the governments of those countries under obligation to us, also
to assist them by sending an important auxiliary corps.
    A similar policy ought to be followed in reference to the East
-- to European Turkey and the Lower Danubian territories. Germany
has an immeasurable interest that security and order should be
firmly established in those countries, and in no direction so much
as in this is the emigration of Germans so easy for individuals to
accomplish, or so advantageous for the nation. A man dwelling by
the Upper Danube could transport himself to Moldavia and Wallachia,
to Servia, or also to the south-western shores of the Black Sea,
for one-fifth part of the expenditure of money and time which are
requisite for his emigration to the shores of Lake Erie. What
attracts him to the latter more than to the former is, the greater
degree of liberty, security, and order which prevails in the
latter. But under the existing circumstances of Turkey it ought not
to be impossible to the German states, in alliance with Austria, to
exercise such an influence on the improvement of the public
condition of those countries, that the German colonist should no
longer feel himself repelled from them, especially if the
governments themselves would found companies for colonisation, take
part in them themselves, and grant them continually their special
protection.
    In the meantime it is clear that settlements of this kind could
only have a specially beneficial effect on the industry of the
states of the Zollverein, if no obstacles were placed in the way of
the exchange of German manufactured goods for the agricultural
produce of the colonists, and if that exchange was promoted by
cheap and rapid means of communication. Hence it is to the interest
of the states of the Zollverein, that Austria should facilitate as
much as possible the through traffic on the Danube, and that steam
navigation on the Danube should be roused to vigorous activity --
consequently that it should at the outset be actually subsidised by
the Governments.
    Especially, nothing is so desirable as that the Zollverein and
Austria at a later period, after the industry of the Zollverein
states has been better developed and has been placed in a position
of greater equality to that of Austria, should make, by means of a
treaty, reciprocal concessions in respect to their manufactured
products.
    After the conclusion of such a treaty, Austria would have an
equal interest with the states of the Zollverein in making the
Turkish provinces available for the benefit of their manufacturing
industry and of their foreign commerce.
    In anticipation of the inclusion in the Zollverein of the
German seaports and Holland, it would be desirable that Prussia
should now make a commencement by the adoption of a German
commercial flag, and by laying the foundation for a future German
fleet, and that she should try whether and how German colonies can
be founded in Australia, New Zealand, or in or on other islands of
Australasia.
    The means for such attempts and commencements, and for the
undertakings and subventions which we have previously recommended
as desirable, must be acquired in the same way in which England and
France have acquired the means of supporting their foreign commerce
and their colonisation and of maintaining their powerful fleets,
namely, by imposing duties on the imports of colonial produce.
United action, order, and energy could be infused into these
measures of the Zollverein, if the Zollverein states would assign
the direction of them in respect to the North and transmarine
affairs to Prussia, and in respect to the Danube and Oriental
affairs to Bavaria. An addition of ten per cent to the present
import duties on manufactures and colonial produce would at present
place one million and a half per annum at the disposal of the
Zollverein. And as it may be expected with certainty, as a result
of the continual increase in the export of manufactured goods, that
in the course of time consumption of colonial produce in the states
of the Zollverein will increase to double and treble its present
amount, and consequently their customs revenue will increase in
like proportion, sufficient provision will be made for satisfying
the requirements above mentioned, if the states of the Zollverein
establish the principle that over and above the addition of ten per
cent a part also of all future increase in import duties should be
placed at the disposal of the Prussian Government to be expended
for these objects.
    As regards the establishment of a German transport system, and
especially of a German system of railways, we beg to refer to a
work of our own which specially treats of that subject. This great
enterprise will pay for itself, and all that is required of the
Governments can be expressed in one word, and that is -- ENERGY.