

CHAPTER 2

Structural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

JACKIE SMITH AND TINA FETNER

Sociological research emphasizes how social institutions, such as the family, religion, corporations, and governments, influence people's choices about how they live. While acknowledging that individuals have some freedom to pursue different paths, sociologists argue that this freedom is limited in important ways by forces outside the control of individuals. Sociology, therefore, asks how these broader forces operate to affect the actions and beliefs of individuals and groups. As the editors have noted, sociological research on social movements can be classified as adopting either a structural or cultural emphasis. While the former focuses on the distribution of material resources and the organizations and institutions that govern such distribution, the latter approach emphasizes questions about how individuals and groups perceive and interpret these material conditions.

In practice, distinguishing between actual material conditions and popular understandings of these can be difficult. For instance, categories such as gender, class, or ethnicity that classify individuals are structurally defined, but their sociological relevance grows not simply from their existence but rather from the cultural work of individuals who help define group identities according to these structural categories. As Buechler observed, “[c]ollective identity and political consciousness are thus decisive factors mediating structures of power and collective action” (2000:123). In other words, a group must somehow come to perceive itself as both distinct and subject to unjust material or social conditions. Such “collective identities” are far from automatic, because the “interlocking systems of domination” embedded in broader political and economic structures affect possibilities for social groups to articulate and mobilize around social movement identities. Thus, any attempt to understand social change requires attention to questions about how the resources and power needed to define and defend group interests are distributed within a society. Structural approaches recognize that inequalities are closely linked to macro-level factors such as a country's position in the world economy or to meso-level ones, such as class, race, and gender. Thus, any attempt to reduce inequalities in society must include a consideration of how these broad structures are shaping broader power relationships.

A key starting point for much sociological work is the observation that virtually all societies experience inequality. The benefits and risks of society are nowhere near equally distributed, and therefore we would expect that particular clusters of people would be more likely candidates for participation in social movements. In particular, more aggrieved groups might

01 be expected to be engaged in protests against the status quo. Important debates have taken
02 place among social movement scholars regarding the role of grievances in the generation of
03 social movements. Early research in social movements saw political protest as emerging from
04 groups that were relatively disadvantaged by the status quo. Structural inequalities generated
05 strains that led individuals to protest their conditions (e.g., Davies 1962; Gurr 1970; Rose
06 1982; for a review, see Gurney and Tierney 1982). But while it made intuitive sense to argue
07 that relative or absolute deprivation is a *sine qua non* of movement emergence, in reality very
08 few of the most deprived groups actually engaged in protest. And while social scientists did
09 quite well at mapping the causes and dimensions of deprivation, they were less successful at
10 predicting when and where resistance to structural inequalities would emerge.

11 Other analysts criticized deprivation theories for failing to consider how individuals experi-
12 encing deprivation are embedded within broader social structures. Society's weakest and most
13 marginalized people are typically not well placed to engage in what can be highly risky political
14 actions. Lacking secure economic opportunities and savings, they cannot afford to take many
15 risks. Facing discrimination from a more powerful majority, they may seek to remain invisible or
16 to engage in symbolic forms of resistance as they go about their efforts to survive (e.g., Scott
17 1985). These people also tend to lack the time and political skills required to work for social
18 change, and their community organizations are more likely to lack the money needed to engage
19 in extensive political work. Thus, not only are certain groups materially deprived, but they are
20 also denied equal capacity to influence the political processes that help determine how society's
21 resources are used and distributed (King, Cornwall, and Dahlin 2005; McCarthy and Zald 1977).

22 While debates about the role of deprivation in social movement mobilization developed
23 largely among political scientists, sociologists were beginning to articulate a model of social
24 movement mobilization that focused on the *capacities* of challengers to resist injustice rather
25 than on the conditions of inequality themselves. An important contribution in this regard is
26 Charles Tilly's *From Mobilization to Revolution* (1978), which explored how the war-making
27 and tax-collecting activities of eighteenth century political elitists contributed to the institu-
28 tional elaboration of the modern national state. Tilly found that, as national states took shape,
29 popular groups adopted new forms of resistance that resembled their new, national targets
30 more than they resembled earlier protest forms. Thus, bread riots gave way to the emergence
31 of more structured associations for popular resistance. It is to the earliest days of the modern
32 state that Tilly traces common tactics in modern protest repertoires—including petitions, ral-
33 lies, blockades, and protest marches. In short, localized direct action against an immediate tar-
34 get gave way to more symbolic forms of protest designed to communicate with other political
35 actors and generate wider sympathy and support for challengers' claims. Challengers had to
36 focus their efforts on the emerging states, which increasingly controlled key decisions about
37 the distribution of resources and power. In the course of this shift, they had to mobilize larger
38 numbers of people and resources than were needed for earlier types of challenges.
39 Challengers thus needed to expand their organizational capacities accordingly to compete
40 effectively in the emerging national polity.

41 Social and material inequalities have often formed the bases on which the largest social
42 movements have emerged. In the West, for example, we see a history of robust social move-
43 ments organized around labor, gender, and race. Each of these categories represents not only
44 a group of people wishing to improve their lot, but also a systemic social division in which
45 one group is allocated less than another. The structural approach to social movements brings
46 to the forefront of analysis the institutionalized injustices and inequalities over which con-
47 tested politics are fought. These include social barriers to material success, state policies that
48 treat groups unequally, or bureaucratic rules that favor one group (e.g., corporations) over

01 another (workers). Social movement actors form organizations to influence states and institu-
02 tions. These structural elements of activism are of primary interest to structural approaches to
03 the study of social movements. Inequalities of political access have motivated some of the
04 largest and most successful social movements in the United States. For example, the women's
05 suffrage movement was born out of the political exclusion of women. Although women's suf-
06 frage activists were disadvantaged by their gender, they were able to leverage the class
07 privileges of some key activists (Banaszak 1996; King, Cornwall, and Dahlin 1996).
08 Significantly, they also took advantage of skills, ideologies, and networks that emerged in the
09 course of abolitionist struggles.

10 Structural approaches to social movements, in short, can be seen to cover an enormous
11 terrain that takes us from questions about the nature and causes of inequality to the creation
12 of social groupings to the causes of institutional change. The centrality of the modern state to
13 shaping the distribution of resources and capacities has led many structural analysts to con-
14 sider the national state as the primary target or arena against or within which modern social
15 movements operate. The national state not only defines the possibilities for groups to affect
16 social change, but it also structures the possibilities for different groups to articulate griev-
17 ances and organize in support of social change goals. Thus, we focus much of this chapter on
18 how understandings of the national state impact analyses of social change.

19 Two concepts that have emerged from what is largely a state-centric body social move-
20 ments research—political contexts and mobilizing structures—provide useful analytical
21 tools for helping scholars analyze the ways states and other actors and structures shape social
22 movement dynamics. The concepts' usefulness grows in part from their effectiveness at
23 helping analysts assess the relative distribution of power across groups in a given society and
24 the possibilities for altering power relations. We therefore focus much of our discussion on
25 these concepts, identifying both how they have contributed to our knowledge of social move-
26 ments and how they have changed over time. We pay particular attention to the ways global
27 structural changes have affected both the political contexts and mobilizing structures.
28 Finally, we identify some remaining questions and demonstrate how structural approaches
29 can complement and contribute to cultural ones to enhance our overall understanding of
30 social movements.

31 We emphasize a global perspective in our discussion of the structural approaches to
32 social movements, because we find it increasingly difficult to ignore the ways that national
33 states are embedded within broader sets of relationships to other states and to global institu-
34 tions. If the modern state was key to the emergence of what we know as social movements,
35 then we must consider how global integration is affecting the character of the national state,
36 as well as social movements' attempts to influence it. Our perspective, which views states as
37 interdependent actors embedded within a complex system of global relationships rather than
38 as free-standing, autonomous social entities, has important implications for how we think
39 about the state as actor and as movement target.

40 41 42 POLITICAL CONTEXTS

43
44 Structuralist accounts in sociology build on the work of Karl Marx, who saw basic material or
45 economic relationships as the key factor shaping the evolution of society. As Marx stated, "Men
46 [*sic*] make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please." For social movement
47 analysts, this basic premise has led to research exploring how social structures affect the possi-
48 bilities for collective attempts to make history. The idea of political opportunities or alternately,

01 *political contexts*,¹ refers to the ways formal political institutions and more informal alignments
 02 of relevant actors condition the prospects for relatively powerless groups to effectively challenge
 03 the existing order. Factors such as the extent to which the political system is open to public par-
 04 ticipation, the presence or absence of influential allies, state capacities to repress or respond to
 05 movement demands, and divisions among elitists all shape the political opportunities and limi-
 06 tations of movements. While some factors—such as state capacities and the degree of openness
 07 of the polity—change little over time, others—such as constellations of potential and actual
 08 allies and opponents—can shift more quickly to favor or hinder political activism. Political con-
 09 texts affect both how people can try to influence political outcomes as well as how they can
 10 come together as a group.

11 A key insight of research on political contexts is that we must look beyond movements
 12 themselves if we are to understand how movements arise and under what conditions they suc-
 13 ceed or fail. People such as Mohandas Gandhi or Martin Luther King Jr. may indeed have
 14 been highly exceptional political leaders and strategists, but if they had lived at different his-
 15 torical moments, we would not be recalling them today. Similarly, other Gandhis and Kings
 16 have existed throughout history, but unless they were born into an era where political condi-
 17 tions favored movement activism, they remain outside of our understanding of history (e.g.,
 18 Wuthnow 1989).

21 **Political Opportunities**

22
 23 Early formulations of the external dynamics relevant to social movements consider the vary-
 24 ing levels of “openness” of a particular political context to a social movement. Charles Tilly
 25 (1978) argues that social movements are likely to emerge when windows of opportunity for
 26 access to the polity open. Thus, several early studies in political opportunities gauge the rel-
 27 ative “openness” of political structures. Kitschelt’s comparison (1986) of antinuclear move-
 28 ments in four democracies is a key example. Eisinger (1973), analyzing U.S. cities, argued
 29 that the relationship between social movement emergence and political openness is an
 30 “inverted-U” shaped curve. If a city is extremely open to input from political outsiders, this
 31 will suppress social movements by rendering them unnecessary. At the other extreme, a very
 32 closed system will also suppress social movement activity. Social movements, he argued,
 33 would be most likely in states that fall between these two extremes. While later social move-
 34 ment scholarship has supported these propositions, many scholars have sought to develop a
 35 more multifaceted conceptualization of political opportunity (e.g., Gamson and Meyer 1996;
 36 Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 1996; for a review, see Meyer and Minkoff 2004).

37 Doug McAdam’s political process model of social movement emergence and decline is
 38 a key work in developing this perspective (1982). He argued that shifts in the structure of
 39 political opportunities promote the expansion of social protest and the emergence of social
 40 movements (see also Tarrow 1998b; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975). His conceptualization of
 41 relationships between large-scale structural forces, such as transformations of regional and
 42 national economies, migration patterns, and institutional configurations, has been central to
 43
 44
 45

46 ¹ Many analysts adopt the term “political opportunities” to discuss these, but since broader institutions and politi-
 47 cal alignments define obstacles as well as constraints, we adopt the more inclusive notion of political contexts (see
 48 Amenta et al. 2002).

2. Structural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

17

01 encouraging a proliferation of new research on political contexts. By making explicit the
02 connections between broad structural change and mobilization processes, McAdam's work
03 contributed to the emergence of discussions about "social movement society" in the late twen-
04 tieth century. This concept helped analysts think about social movements not as aberrations,
05 but rather as constituent elements of routine politics. We discuss this concept further in rela-
06 tion to globalization later in this chapter.

07 Some have found it helpful to distinguish between more static, structural opportunities
08 and dynamic opportunities. Structural opportunities refer to the more stable features of polit-
09 ical institutions, such as bureaucratic agencies, formal mechanisms regulating access to polit-
10 ical authorities, and the capacity of state agents to implement changes. These opportunities
11 are relatively consistent across time, though not impervious to change. Dynamic opportuni-
12 ties are more volatile and particularistic. Important examples of dynamic opportunities that
13 have been linked to social movement success are divisions among elitists, social control
14 strategies by state actors, and momentary crises and events (Gamson and Meyer 1996). The
15 latter are significant only if social movement actors recognize them as opportunities and act
16 on them. Another possibility, however, is that movement actors fail to perceive opportunities
17 or openings in the system, and therefore fail to take advantage of these. Thus, many analysts
18 point to the problem of distinguishing between "objective" conditions and activists' percep-
19 tions of those conditions, and some have addressed this with the notion that "signaling"
20 processes help link structure and action (more on signaling later).

21 Some contend that the opposite of an opportunity is a threat. Nonetheless, threats, too,
22 have been shown to contribute to efforts for social movement mobilization (Francisco 1996;
23 Rasler 1996; Staggenborg 1986; Van Dyke 2003). Movements, it is claimed, are sometimes
24 more focused on preventing bad ends than for securing good ones. Tilly (1978) argued that
25 groups may be more responsive to threats because they require less mobilization than oppor-
26 tunities. He argued that social movements can respond to threats using networks and practices
27 already in place, whereas opportunities require new forms of mobilization.

28 Some social movement scholars have raised concerns with political opportunities as an
29 analytic category. For example, Goodwin and Jasper (1999) argued that the concept of polit-
30 ical opportunity was so vague and pliable as to apply to anything at all external to a social
31 movement organization. They also argued that, as applied to studies of social movements,
32 political opportunity theory tends toward a tautology: any source that produces social move-
33 ment activity is *post hoc* identified as an opportunity (Gamson and Meyer 1996). They
34 also were concerned that cultural factors are either subsumed under this concept or ignored
35 altogether.

36 Some scholars responded to this criticism by further specifying their usage of the con-
37 cept political opportunities. For example, McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) articulate two
38 key concepts: state capacity (the impact of the state on activities and resources) and democ-
39 ratization. With this model, states themselves are the unit of analysis, as well as a number of
40 clearly articulated dimensions along which states may vary. This framework can be used to
41 compare social movements in different state contexts. However, this framework is limited in
42 its ability to explain variation in patterns of mobilization among states that are similar in terms
43 of their capacities and levels of democratization.

44 Meyer and Minkoff (2004) also argued for retaining the political opportunity concept.
45 While they agreed that there are discrepancies in how different scholars operationalized polit-
46 ical opportunities, they argued for more conceptual clarity, as well as a clear explanation
47 of causal mechanisms, rather than a new framework. In particular, they argue that *structural*
48 political opportunities influence most strongly the policy-related outcomes of social movement

01 efforts. Other political opportunities serve to structure the cultural dimensions of social move-
02 ments' work by signaling to activists and the public at large which issues and frames might be
03 successful at a given point in time (Tarrow 1996). These are most influential in the founding
04 of social movement organizations and in the formation of coalitions. For instance, Wuthnow
05 (1989) analyzed how the emergence of significant "communities of discourse" is shaped by
06 environmental conditions, institutional contexts, and sequences of actions. Koopmans's analy-
07 sis (2005) of the "discursive frames" that affected right-wing mobilization in Germany,
08 Steinberg's analysis (1995) of labor mobilizations in the nineteenth century, and Maney,
09 Woehrle, and Coy's analyses (2005) of peace movement frames illustrate how political
10 contexts shape ideological work in social movements. Meyer and Minkoff (2004) called for
11 scholars to keep in mind the questions, "political opportunity for whom?" and "political oppor-
12 tunity for what?" as a method to avoid conceptual cloudiness.
13

14 **From Political Opportunities to Political Contexts**

15
16
17 Another approach has been to move away from the concept "opportunity" and instead focus
18 on political contexts (Kriesi 1996; Rucht 1996). This shift has allowed scholars to avoid the
19 limiting metaphor of the opening and closing "window" of opportunity and instead identify
20 both durable and variable aspects of the state relevant to a given movement at a particular
21 point in time. This approach centers on questions of how major political institutions structure
22 the contexts for political action by both challengers and authorities.

23 Kriesi and colleagues (1995), and later Amenta and colleagues (2002) argued that the
24 structure of the polity, ranging from highly centralized to highly dispersed, affects both social
25 movement forms and outcomes by creating more or fewer points of access to (as well as "veto
26 points" within) the polity (Skocpol 1992). Measures of democratization, such as suffrage, the
27 number of political parties, and "direct democracy" legislative processes (e.g., ballot initia-
28 tives) will also impact the number of social movements and their forms (Amenta et al. 2002).
29 State policies are also a critical component of the political context. They have the capacity to
30 shape the grievances of social movements as well as channel their actions (Burstein,
31 Einwohner, and Hollander 1995; Clemens 1998; Feree 1987; Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly
32 1999; McCarthy, Britt, and Wolfson 1991; Piven and Cloward 1979; Quadagno 1992;
33 Valocchi 1990; Western 1993). A final component of political contexts is state bureaucracies
34 and repressive capacities. Kriesi and colleagues (1995), studying "new" social movements in
35 Western Europe, argue that high levels of repression may effectively prevent protest, but the
36 impact of low levels of repression is unclear. Della Porta (1998) argued that a state's failure
37 to invoke repressive action increases the likelihood that social movements will use peaceful
38 protest tactics. On the other hand, strong bureaucracies are likely to increase social movement
39 mobilization in that they increase the state's capacity to implement social change (Amenta et
40 al. 2002). To the extent that bureaucrats support social movement goals, they may aid chal-
41 lengers directly (Orloff and Skocpol 1984).

42 Research on the ways states have worked to police public protests has shown that during
43 the 1960s and 1970s a system of "public order management" evolved as authorities worked to
44 balance their competing mandates to maintain public order while also protecting citizens' rights
45 to speech and assembly (della Porta and Reiter 1998; McCarthy, McPhail, and Crist 1999). This
46 institutionalization of protest and state responses to it, however, is just one aspect of the ways
47 states have sought to neutralize threats from social movement challengers. For instance,
48 researchers have detailed the covert actions of the U.S. government to repress movements of

2. Structural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

19

01 both the left and right during the 1960s (Cunningham 2005), and contemporary news accounts
02 suggests that such practices may be expanding today. Davenport and his collaborators (2005)
03 call for a wider interpretation of state repression to account for the varieties of tools available
04 for modern states to channel and subvert challenges to their authority. One study in that volume
05 calls for an extension of the historical emphasis of McAdam's political process approach to the
06 study of movements to address the decline phase of movements. Zwerman and Steinhoff (2005)
07 analyzed the effects of state repression on activism in the United States and Japan, and they
08 found that repression in both cases generated enduring and robust forms of militancy. They con-
09 cluded, "repression may have serious long-term costs not just for the activists it represses but
10 for the state that imposes it [. . .]" (p. 102). These insights from research on state repression and
11 other forms of protest control demonstrate the need for structural analyses to account for the
12 ways interactions between challengers, authorities, and other actors shape the evolving contexts
13 for protest (Earl 2006; Jenkins and Klandermans 1995).

14 Further demonstrating the importance of adopting an interactive and dynamic approach
15 to understanding political contexts, newer analyses have shown that the system of "negotiated
16 protest management" observed over recent years has broken down in recent years, and this is
17 partly due to the expansion of the global neoliberal agenda and a related reduction in officially
18 sanctioned spaces of protest, known as the public forum (McCarthy and McPhail 2006). As
19 a result, more overtly repressive police tactics have been seen in many Western countries,
20 reversing the earlier trend toward more nonviolent policing strategies (della Porta, Peterson,
21 and Reiter 2007). Together this work illustrates the importance of understanding the ways
22 states are organized to both manage and resist challenges from social change advocates,
23 affecting the relevant political contexts.

24 Some critics wonder whether, if political contexts are so important to social change,
25 social movements might themselves be irrelevant to the process of social change (e.g.,
26 Goodwin and Jasper 1999). However, several studies have shown that the movements
27 themselves do matter to the process of social change (Burstein Einwohner, and Hollander
28 1995; Giugni 1998; Giugni et al. 1999; Piven and Cloward 1979). One study on the emer-
29 gence of Old Age Assistance in the United States tests this question directly by using
30 time-series and cross-sectional data (Amenta, Caren, and Olasky 2005). They find that the
31 pension movement did influence social policy by acting as an important mediator between
32 the favorable political conditions and the legislative process.

33 Not all movements are oriented to changing state policies or reforming state bureaucra-
34 cies. Some movements, for example, target the policies or practices of private corporations.
35 Nicole C. Raeburn's (2004) study of lesbian and gay employee associations' attempts to
36 secure domestic partner benefits is an excellent example of one such movement. This analy-
37 sis tracks the successes and failures of activists who are participating in a larger project of
38 bringing benefits to lesbian and gay families; however, each employee association is bounded
39 by the institution in which it operates. Even in this case, however Raeburn finds that contexts
40 are very important to securing these benefits, both the political and labor market contexts in
41 which the organization is embedded and the institutional context of the organization itself.

42 It is well established that political contexts affect mobilization, and research on political
43 contexts has contributed to a more nuanced understanding of the ways broad structures as well
44 as institutional practices affect the prospects for social change efforts to emerge. In particular, the
45 concept of political context highlights the role of the state's more routine policies in channeling
46 the activism of social movement organizations. For example, McCarthy and colleagues (1991)
47 examined the role of federal tax law and postal service regulations in the United States. They
48

01 found that the laws requiring non-profit organizations to be “nonpartisan” have a major impact
02 on the day-to-day organization of activities, as well as the framing of social movement claims.

03 In subsequent work, McCarthy and his colleagues showed how relationships between
04 protest groups and police have also served to channel forms of political protest. They found
05 that government restrictions on people’s rights to public assembly have evolved through a
06 process of give-and-take between authorities and challengers, whereby authorities have
07 sought to limit the time, place, and manner of public protests, while challengers have used the
08 courts and other institutional mechanisms to press for more expansive rights to assembly and
09 speech. This work highlights the ways states and other institutional actors “channel” social
10 movement activities through often subtle and indirect means (e.g., McCarthy et al. 1999).
11 Neoliberal economic trends over recent years have transformed public space even further, as
12 shopping malls have replaced town commons as the primary public gathering spaces. The
13 investment of public resources in the development of privately controlled consumer spaces,
14 and the expansion of private housing communities further constrains the public forum
15 (McCarthy and McPhail 2006).

16 In today’s era of enhanced global interdependence, we find analysts rethinking their
17 understanding of states and state power. The concept of political contexts can help us extend
18 our analytical lens from conflicts that are usefully viewed in more localized terms to more
19 global contexts. In particular, the notion that social movements are shaped by broad structural
20 forces that affect distributions of economic resources and political power and that institutions
21 play important roles to encourage, channel, and/or repress social change activism can be read-
22 ily applied to a polity that is viewed in global, rather than national, terms. As we argue below,
23 structural accounts of transnational, national, and local protest are critical to understand the
24 relative strength of states, the utility of transnational activism, and the multiple access points
25 for activists in this era of increasing globalization.

26 27 28 **GLOBALIZATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS** 29 **FOR THINKING ABOUT POLITICAL CONTEXTS** 30

31 Globalization is not a new phenomenon, and in reality it is simply a new label for long-
32 enduring social and economic processes (Arrighi and Drangel 1986; Chase-Dunn 1998;
33 Chirot and Hall 1982; Robinson 2004; Wallerstein 1976, 1980). Sociologists have devoted
34 extensive attention to the ways increasing interactions among national societies have
35 affected social life on many levels, through processes such as modernization, urbanization,
36 and secularization. The fact that we find similar patterns of behavior across many very
37 diverse societies suggests that these processes have common structural roots, and that these
38 roots extend beyond the national state context. For instance, Markoff’s historical analysis
39 (1996) showed that both social movements and democracy emerged through extensive
40 transnational (and even pre-national) interactions that helped spread new ideas about poli-
41 tics and forms of collective action. Emerging pro-democracy forces learned from their coun-
42 terparts around Europe, and practices diffused readily across national boundaries.

43 Popular politics has long spilled over national political boundaries, but the much more
44 rapid speed and more extensive volume of these interactions—now commonly referred to as
45 “globalization” have intensified transnational political activity. Some of the earliest organized
46 social movements brought together people from a variety of cultural backgrounds around
47 shared aims of, for instance, promoting an end to slavery, advancing equal political rights for
48 women, and limiting the barbarism of warfare (Finnemore 1996a; Wittner 1993, 1997).

2. Structural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

21

01 Nineteenth century transnational activism was similar to that of today in that it benefited from
02 technological advances (Hanagan 2002) while also advocating notions of humanity that trans-
03 cended geographically defined boundaries (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Rupp 1997). Today, we
04 find thousands of civil society organizations that cross national borders, and more frequent
05 and dramatic instances of transnational collective action. What forces are helping to push
06 popular politics outside their traditional, nationally defined boundaries?

07 Structural accounts of social movements have highlighted the need for contemporary
08 studies of social movements to consider states as actors within a broader system of players
09 that make up what is an increasingly coherent and institutionalized global political arena.
10 Most analyses portray national governments as embedded in networks of relationships with
11 other states and international institutions. The ideas governments have about what their inter-
12 ests are and how they will pursue those interests are strongly influenced by these networks of
13 relations (Boli and Thomas 1999; Finnemore 1996b; Frank et al. 2000; Meyer et al. 1997).
14 The very basis of states' identity—the legal concept of sovereignty—is meaningful only in
15 the international context where states themselves grant each other recognition. Analyses that
16 do not account for this global system will fail to identify how global factors influence the
17 articulation and negotiation of what might otherwise appear to be nationally rooted conflicts.
18 And without considering how states are embedded within a broader system of relationships,
19 we will underestimate how variations in state power may affect their responses to challengers.
20 The next section summarizes the main elements of “globalization” and identifies how these
21 processes are relevant for our understanding of the contemporary global political arena.

24 Economic Globalization

25
26 Many popular discussions of “globalization” refer implicitly to the idea that national
27 economies are gradually becoming integrated into a single, global economy. While economic
28 factors reflect just one aspect of globalization, any attempt to understand global political
29 change must consider these underlying economic foundations. Analysts working in the
30 World-Systems tradition have argued that the system of states is highly unequal, and that the
31 global economic hierarchy is, for a variety of reasons, likely to persist, barring a major trans-
32 formation of economic relations. “Core” or early-industrializing states have enjoyed the most
33 benefits from the global expansion of capitalism, beginning with direct economic imperi-
34 alism and colonial occupation. The “periphery” states have been—through colonization or
35 some other form of unequal economic relations—relegated to a subordinate role in the world
36 economic system. Economic globalization institutionalizes and reinforces this inequality
37 (e.g., Bello 2000; Korzeniewicz and Moran 1997, 2006). “Semiperipheral” states lie some-
38 where in the middle, as they have substantial enough resources to influence world market
39 relations but they lack enough influence to play a leadership role in this system.

40 The organization of economic relationships in the core and periphery has meant that
41 these exploitative core-periphery relationships have persisted, even as periphery states for-
42 mally obtained their “independence.” As states in the core depend upon southern markets and
43 resources for their economic development, they have used their power to institutionalize their
44 dominant position in the global economic order. For instance, McMichael (2003) showed how
45 the post-WWII settlement shaped a “national development project” that gradually evolved
46 into a global market-oriented “globalization project,” serving to perpetuate and even expand
47 inequities between core and periphery states.
48

01 World-system scholarship has informed more recent attempts to articulate class-based
02 analyses of global political and economic relations. Leslie Sklair (2001) analyzed the dis-
03 courses and structures of the world's leading transnational corporations to assess whether we
04 can speak of an emergent "transnational capitalist class." He argued that transnational corpo-
05 rate structures and the practices involved in reproducing and advancing a vision of globalized
06 capitalism has indeed generated a social grouping that may be called a transnational capital-
07 ist class. Sklair showed how agents operating as part of this class have systematically
08 advanced the interest of globalized capital over other interests and agendas. Similarly,
09 Robinson (2004) made the case that a collection of corporate actors and their political allies
10 have systematically altered relationships between states and citizens while shaping global
11 institutional configurations. Opposing the transnational capitalist class is a structurally disad-
12 vantaged labor movement, which has been limited in its influence by the compromise strat-
13 egy of business unionism used by organized labor in the global north, or the core countries
14 (O'Brien 2000). This approach may have suited the short-term interests of some workers, but
15 it has contributed to nationalist divisions in the labor movement that have contributed to
16 labor's decline in the latter part of the twentieth century.²

17 An important conclusion from research on global economic relationships is that a
18 state's position in the global economic hierarchy affects both its vulnerability to interna-
19 tional pressure as well as the domestic political context. Core states in the world economic
20 system depend on cheap labor and other resources from the periphery in order to support
21 both high levels of consumption among their citizens as well as the maintenance of their
22 predominant position in the world economy (Chase-Dunn 1998:42–3). Labor protests
23 helped establish workers' rights in those countries, and protest mobilization throughout
24 the nineteenth and twentieth centuries helped expand democratic rights and protections
25 (Tilly 1995). Thus, citizens in core states have comparatively more opportunities and
26 resources for participating in social movements, and—perhaps more importantly their
27 governments have greater capacities for responding to citizens' demands (Arrighi 1999;
28 Markoff 1999).

29 In contrast, citizens in periphery countries are far more likely to face violent repression
30 (Jenkins and Schock 1992; Podobnik 2004; Walton and Seddon 1994). Because core states
31 depend on cheap access to goods and labor from the periphery, they have an interest in main-
32 taining political conditions in those countries that suit their economic interests. This further
33 limits opportunities for political mobilization in the periphery. Not only are opportunities for
34 political participation more limited in the periphery, but because their governments are so
35 dependent on international finance and aid, their experiences are more strongly determined
36 by global-level processes than are the domestic opportunities of activists in core states. So the
37 policies of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund have more immediate conse-
38 quences for people in countries that borrow money from these institutions—the global
39 South—and yet the decisions taken in these organizations are determined by just a handful of
40 core states. This leaves periphery citizens dually disenfranchised, since they have limited abil-
41 ity to influence their own governments that, in turn, have little capacity to influence the global
42 policies that most affect them. As formal democracy has spread to periphery regions, some
43
44
45

46 ² Recent years have witnessed a renewal of transnational labor organizing, and Ronaldo Munck (2002) has argued
47 that we may be seeing a new "great transformation," similar to labor's success in reigning in the most destructive
48 elements of early industrializing capital (see also Moody 1997; O'Brien forthcoming).

01 analysts have used the term “democratizing disempowerment” to describe the paradoxical
02 position of the people of the global South (Hippler 1995).³

03 Despite the relative powerlessness of the global South, it is here that some analysts see the
04 most promising developments in social movements. For instance, some analysts have identified
05 new forms of political organizing in global South countries that may reinvigorate institutional-
06 ized politics in those countries while also providing models for parties elsewhere (Baiocchi 2004;
07 Markoff 2003).⁴ Semiperiphery countries such as Brazil, South Korea, and South Africa are also
08 sites of labor movement revitalization, and transnational ties among labor groups as well as
09 between labor and other movement sectors are seen as one of the most promising developments
10 in contemporary global justice activism (Baiocchi 2004; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Levering 1997;
11 Moody 1997; Munck 2002; O’Brien forthcoming; Waterman and Timms 2004).

14 Political Globalization

16 Alongside global economic integration, we see the formation and strengthening of interna-
17 tional institutions designed to help states manage their external as well as internal insecuri-
18 ties. These insecurities are not only military, but also involve environmental, economic, and
19 public health concerns, among others. Some speak of this process as “internationalization,” in
20 contrast to economic “globalization” (Daly 2002; Tarrow 2001). Internationalization refers to
21 the development of formal cooperative relationships among states, usually through formal
22 treaties and the establishment of international organizations.

23 The expansion of intergovernmental agencies that address substantive issues creates both
24 challenges and opportunities for social movement actors. On the one hand, when governments
25 relinquish part of their authority to global institutions, they undermine the traditional channels
26 of political accountability. This leads to what is called the “democratic deficit” of international
27 institutions, which are typically staffed by appointed rather than elected officials who have few
28 if any ties to local or national constituencies (Evans 1997; Markoff 1999; Tilly 1995). In some
29 instances, particularly within the global financial institutions, international officials are
30 selected for their technical expertise alone, and institutional cultures either ignore or disdain
31 democratic values (Markoff and Montecinos 1993; Montecinos 2001; Stiglitz 2003). In fact,
32 the World Trade Organization (WTO) even posted on its Web site a “top ten list” of the main
33 benefits of the WTO, which included the supposed “benefit” of “protecting governments from
34 the influences of special interests” within their borders. Why is it that proponents of interna-
35 tional trade oppose more input and oversight from groups that are affected by policies?

36 While international institutions can undermine democracy, they can also be used
37 to strengthen democracy by enhancing transparency and providing opportunities and
38

40
41 ³ The end of the Cold War has also reduced the ability of states in the global South to impact global policy. During
42 the era of competition between the U.S. and Soviet Union, these two countries courted Third World allies as a way
43 to advance their own ideological positions and influence in the global system. With the demise of the USSR, there
44 is no counterweight to the pro-capitalist initiatives of the U.S., and the lone superpower status of the U.S. means
45 that it no longer needs to cultivate allies from among the world’s poorer regions. Thus, we see declining flows of
46 international aid between the global North and South, as well as a reduced political influence of global South
47 countries in the inter-state system that has contributed to the strengthening of the Bretton Woods Institutions rela-
48 tive to the United Nations.

⁴ There is also evidence that political parties in Western contexts are responding to pressures from contemporary
global protests (see, e.g., della Porta, Donatella et al. 2006).

01 resources for social movements to strengthen their position vis-à-vis other more powerful
 02 actors (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Korzeniewicz and Smith
 03 2000; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Sassen 1998; Smith et al. 1997; Tarrow 2001). The
 04 fact that international institutions are charged with addressing global problems relating to
 05 peace, the environment, and human rights means that within these organizations, social
 06 movements can find powerful allies as well as material and symbolic resources. In fact,
 07 because international agencies lack the “natural” constituencies that support local and
 08 national elected officials, international officials see a need to build direct links between
 09 their agencies and popular groups. The fact that governments have signed international dec-
 10 larations and treaties indicating their support for the values movements advance provides
 11 both international and legal legitimacy for activists’ claims as well as political leverage
 12 against states that would prefer to maintain reputations of good global citizenship.
 13 Although governments may sign treaties with no intention of actually implementing them,
 14 no government welcomes—and most actively resist—attempts to bring international atten-
 15 tion to their violations of these treaties.⁵

16 The pattern of increased formalization and bureaucratization of interstate structures par-
 17 allels the evolution of the modern state. Just as we saw with the rise of the modern national
 18 state, we see that social movements have had a similar relationship to global institutions as
 19 they do to national ones. They have pressed for the expansion of global institutions to estab-
 20 lish citizens’ rights and to promote and protect social welfare, and they have reinforced these
 21 institutions by making appeals to international authorities and norms (see, e.g. Smith 1995).
 22 This process parallels the strategy of U.S. civil rights activists, who appealed to federal
 23 authorities and the U.S. Constitution against repressive state and local officials. And as states
 24 move political decisions into transnational political arenas, we find more and more evidence
 25 that social movements are adapting their strategies to respond to—if not to affect—these
 26 shifts in the locus of authority.

27 Scholars who have examined the ways social movements make use of international
 28 political arenas in their struggles have used a variety of concepts to describe how internation-
 29 alization affects movements’ mobilizing prospects. Marks and McAdam, for instance,
 30 describe it as a system of “multilevel governance” arguing that,

31 Whereas the classic nation-state tended to define the ‘structure of political opportunities’ for all
 32 challenging groups, the emergence of a multi-level polity means that movements are increasingly
 33 likely to confront highly idiosyncratic opportunity structures defined by that unique combination
 34 of governmental bodies (at all levels) which share decision making authority over the issues of
 35 interest to the movement. So instead of the rise of a single new social movement form, we are
 36 more apt to see the development and proliferation of multiple movement forms keyed to inher-
 37 ited structures and the demands of mobilization in particular policy areas. (1996:119)

38 Rothman and Oliver (1999) used the notion of “nested political opportunity struc-
 39 tures,” where “[l]ocal political opportunity structures are embedded in national political
 40 opportunity structures, which are in turn embedded in international political opportunity
 41 structures” (p. 43; see also Boyer and Hollingsworth 1997:470), creating possibilities for
 42 complex patterns of relations among actors seeking political influence. Tarrow (2001) sees
 43 a “composite polity,” whereby international agreements add another overlapping layer to an
 44

45
 46
 47
 48 ⁵ Here we find an important link between structural and cultural accounts of social movements, as global institu-
 tions are seen as spaces where social movements and other actors compete to define global norms as well as to
 promote their implementation (Clark 2003; Risse et al. 1999; Sikkink 2005).

2. Structural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

25

01 already existing national polity, creating “opportunities for coalitions of actors and states to
02 formulate common positions and overcome their diversity and dispersion to exploit its
03 political opportunities” (pp. 243–244).

04 The key point here is that as decisions of national governments become increasingly
05 subject to political processes beyond national borders, existing structures designed to pro-
06 vide for public input and accountability can no longer ensure democratic governance. We
07 must therefore understand the global political system as a set of interconnected and inter-
08 dependent national polities linked by a growing array of international institutions. As the
09 international political system expands and exerts more influence on people’s everyday
10 experiences, we see intensified demands for enhanced democracy in global institutions.
11 Social movements have increasingly cultivated transnational alliances to enhance their
12 influence in shaping the structures of global regulation and accountability (e.g., Clark
13 2003; Foster and Anand 1999; Fox and Brown 1998; Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink 2002;
14 Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 1997).

15 Social movements have long been involved in struggles to define the global political
16 context and to support and expand international law. Throughout history, social movement
17 actors have pressed governments to adopt new and different approaches to the world out-
18 side their borders. We now take for granted the idea that slavery is something that no soci-
19 ety should allow, that governments engaged in warfare must adhere to some minimal
20 standards of human decency, and that the world’s sea beds are the common inheritance of
21 all people. Without the tireless efforts of a relatively small number of dedicated citizen
22 advocates, governments are unlikely to have agreed to these formal rules that limit their
23 sovereignty (e.g., Chatfield 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Levering 1997). More recently,
24 social movement pressures have led to the adoption of important new treaties such as the
25 International Convention to Ban Land Mines and the International Criminal Court (e.g.,
26 Glasius 2002; Price 1998; J. Smith forthcoming). Few analysts would disagree that without
27 the concerted efforts of citizens’ groups around the world, neither of these treaties would
28 have been adopted. And despite continued opposition from the United States, both treaties
29 were among the fastest to enter into force, setting new speed records in the evolution of
30 international law. Transnational social movements have proved an important antidote to the
31 glacial pace of many intergovernmental negotiations.

32 In addition to pressing for new laws that might limit and constrain state action, social
33 movements play key roles to bring pressure on governments to comply with international
34 norms and standards. Keck and Sikkink (1998) refer to this as the “boomerang effect,”
35 whereby citizens finding their governments unresponsive to domestic pressures appeal to
36 international allies and institutions to bring international pressure onto their governments.
37 Without such citizen efforts to engage “boomerangs” in many places around the world, the
38 correspondence of national practice with international human rights and other norms would
39 be very weak indeed. Key international human rights bodies rely on civil society groups to
40 “name and shame” governments into complying with human rights norms. The boomerang
41 process contributes to the “domestication” of international law (J. Smith forthcoming; Tarrow
42 2005). We should note, however, that these global-local pressures can also work in the other
43 direction. For example, Stewart’s analysis (2004) of an indigenous Guatemalan movement for
44 the proper burial of victims of a political massacre indicate that local transnational activism
45 can bring pressure to bear on global institutions, such as the World Bank, in addition to local
46 governments.

47
48

Cultural Globalization

Global integration has important influences on the cultures and collective identities of communities everywhere. For instance, the extensive flow of information about diverse cultures helps encourage an appreciation for the diversity and richness of different peoples' histories and traditions. It can also foster perceptions of relative deprivation and rising expectations as global marketing promotes images of consumption pattern that eludes vast portions of the world's population. This helps fuel defensive responses from groups that perceive such information as threatening to their own cultural practices and identities (Barber 1995).

At the same time as it poses very real threats to many cultural traditions, the expansion of what might be called a global culture or at least a global media market also facilitates transnational dialogue and communication of all sorts. It helps create common grievances and reference points and shared sets of ideas upon which social movements and other groups can build. To unite individuals from very diverse political and cultural backgrounds, social movements must cultivate some shared ideologies and identities that help define a joint purpose and form a basis for trust and solidarity. Transnational associations cultivate group identities that transcend the geographic ones defined by national states. They encourage people, for instance, to emphasize their identity with their profession (i.e., the International Sociological Association), their hobby (i.e., the International Chess Club), or their political views (i.e., People's Global Action) over political nationalities. And important mobilizations have taken place in recent decades among diverse indigenous peoples around the world (Brysk 2000; Passy 1999). Indeed, many participants in these groups find that they have far more in common with the other members of the group than they do with many compatriots (Minkoff 1997a; J. Smith 1998).

Cultural globalization is therefore reinforced by both economic and political processes, and it helps provide a foundation upon which both of those processes build. While this chapter emphasizes the more structural aspects of globalization, it must be said that the cultural materials—the ideas, traditions, practices, and identities—that constitute culture have important influences on the processes we examine here. And indeed these cultural artifacts are shaped by the broader institutions and structures discussed throughout the chapter (Boli and Thomas 1999; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Meyer 2003). Of particular importance is the notion that transnational processes and interactions are helping to generate new ideas of citizenship and loyalty that are challenging traditional, nationally bounded identities. These provide important cultural foundations for transnational social movement mobilization.

Contextualizing the State

It is increasingly clear that the political contexts within particular states cannot be understood independently of that state's relations to other actors in the global system. There has been fairly extensive debate about the relative importance of global, as opposed to national, structures and institutions on the trajectories of social movements (e.g., Imig and Tarrow 2001; Koopmans and Statham 1999a; Laxer and Halperin 2003). Numerous analysts caution against arguments suggesting that a growth in global level institutions and policies signals the demise of the national state (e.g., Tarrow, 1998a). Some also show that earlier eras of global integration represented comparable or even greater levels of international trade and investment,

2. Structural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

27

01 questioning whether today's globalization is fundamentally new or different (Hanagan 2002;
02 Laxer and Halperin 2003).

03 Without denying the continued importance of states, we emphasize the idea that the
04 complex web of global relations has significant impacts on state structures and capacities,
05 and this, in turn, influences the possibilities for movement mobilization and impact. Global
06 institutions, structures, and processes are simultaneously shaping both states and other
07 political actors, including social movements (and vice versa). Global institutions affect not
08 only the political and legal contexts that define opportunities and constraints for states and
09 all other actors, but they also influence the collective identities of those actors. Thus, the
10 practices of states vis-à-vis their own citizens are increasingly defined in global terms (e.g.,
11 Reimann 2002; Sassen 1998). Moreover, the notion of a state itself is irrelevant without an
12 interstate context of other states able to recognize the rights and legitimacy of a given
13 national authority. Collectivities define themselves in terms of broader sets of relationships,
14 and an interstate system provides the context that encourages and facilitates the elaboration
15 of both national and transnational identities (Boli and Thomas 1999). As Buss and
16 Hermann conclude,

17
18 To dismiss transnational activism as relevant only in terms of domestic politics overlooks the
19 extent to which international law and policy are important realms in their own right. The 'international'
20 is more than just the space 'outside' of the domestic. It has taken on a significance
21 as, among other things, a site of struggle over the shape and meaning of social relations in the context
22 of global change. (2003:134)

23
24 Gay Seidman's analysis of anti-apartheid and labor activism leads her to conclude that
25 activists are capable of articulating multiple identities in the course of their struggles, or
26 "shifting the ground" on which they work, moving quite easily across national borders. The
27 fact that many conflicts are oriented around national political structures is merely an artifact
28 of the institutional arrangements in which people are embedded:

29
30 [. . .] the institutional fact that international bodies are generally composed of national representa-
31 tives forces potentially global identities into national frames. But it need not blind us to the possi-
32 bility that activists might under other circumstances frame their concerns more globally. (2000:347)

33
34 While recognizing how global relations have transformed the nature of the state over
35 time, we must also avoid another conceptual pitfall of thinking that global politics *must* take
36 place in transnational contexts. Looking at women's activism in India, Subramaniam and her
37 colleagues found that analyses of the global downplay the extent to which globally relevant
38 politics occur in local settings:

39
40 [Although] global processes are often viewed as taking place in a world context, above nation
41 states, networks can be anchored between and across all borders (villages, districts, states, and
42 nations) involving actors and groups at the grassroots. (Subramaniam, Gupte, and Mitra 2003:335)

43
44 These observations⁶ suggest that we must relax our traditional notions of borders and
45 instead see states as just a bundle of comparatively dense networks of relations that has a vari-
46 ety of diverse, and expanding, ties to similar national networks and to other transnational
47 actors around the world. This networked, multilayered political structure provides the context
48 in which social movements, states, and other political actors contend. As Tilly (1984, 1990)

⁶ Is it just a coincidence that they are all made by women?!

01 found in his research on the rise of the modern state, it is these contentious interactions that
 02 are constantly shaping and reshaping social institutions at the local, national, and global lev-
 03 els. Thus, through their interactions with states and other global actors, social movements are
 04 helping to shape the course of globalization—even if the results aren't completely consistent
 05 with movement aims.

06 07 08 FROM ORGANIZATIONS 09 TO MOBILIZING STRUCTURES 10

11 Another key concept in structural approaches to social movements is the notion of *mobilizing*
 12 *structures*. This refers to the formal and informal organizations and networks that facilitate
 13 routine communication and coordination among groups of people. Early research in this tra-
 14 dition emphasized the importance of formal organizations—or social movement organiza-
 15 tions or SMOs—to the development of social movements (McCarthy and Zald 1973, 1977).
 16 Though important debates have been waged in the literature on the tensions between the
 17 demands of building organizations and challenging predominant power relations,⁷ most ana-
 18 lysts accept that without some effort to organize, no movement can mobilize a sustained flow
 19 of resources and energy toward social change efforts.

20 Research in this area shows that SMOs have become routine and enduring features of the
 21 modern political landscape, contributing to what scholars have referred to as a “movement
 22 society.” As we discuss in more detail later, the movement society refers to the increased
 23 prevalence in modern societies of formal and professionally staffed organizations advocating
 24 for social and political change (Meyer and Tarrow 1998; Tarrow 1998b). While social move-
 25 ment organizations have become more prevalent and professional, they still vary tremen-
 26 dously along a number of important dimensions. This variation affects both the audiences an
 27 SMO can reach as well as the likelihood that a given organization or movement will be suc-
 28 cessful in realizing its goals. For instance, organizations adopt more or less formal structures,
 29 work at different levels (e.g., local, national), depend on more or less volunteer labor, and
 30 have differing access to the resources they need for their work (Edwards and McCarthy 2004;
 31 Edwards and Marullo 1995, 2003; McCarthy and Wolfson 1996).

32 In addition, different movements and organizations vary in their strategic approaches to
 33 policy processes. While some engage formal political institutions by mobilizing voters or lob-
 34 bying policymakers, others engage in “outsider” strategies such as public demonstrations or
 35 civil disobedience, and many groups use some combination of conventional and protest forms
 36 of political action. Cross-nationally, we find even more variation in how movements are orga-
 37 nized, and this variation is shaped in part by the formal political institutions that define the pos-
 38 sibilities for political mobilization as well as by historical and cultural traditions. For example,
 39 in authoritarian settings such as Kenya and China we find pro-democracy advocacy emerging
 40 through organizations and activities framed in environmental terms (Economy 2004;
 41 Michaelson 1994), whereas movements in core countries tend to form professional social
 42 movement organizations specifically devoted to their social change aims. Another important
 43 organizational difference seems to parallel class rather than national variation, as social move-
 44 ments for the poor may tend to be larger and more formal and hierarchical in structure than
 45 those of middle class activists (e.g., Lichterman 1996; Polletta 2002; Wood 2005).

46
47
48 ⁷ See, e.g., Piven and Cloward (1979); Gamson and Schmeidler (1984).

01 The concept of mobilizing structures takes the focus away from organizations specif-
02 ically devoted to promoting social change (SMOs) to emphasize the roles that groups such
03 as churches, unions, and others not explicitly focused on political advocacy play in most
04 social movements. It has also sensitized scholars to the ways particular organizations or
05 clusters of organizations (known as “populations”) relate to each other and to their environ-
06 ments as they struggle to maintain their organization and promote social change (Hannan
07 and Freeman 1977; McPherson and Rotolo 1996; Minkoff 1995, 1997b). This has led many
08 analysts to include in their analyses a range of other types of less formal groupings as well
09 as formal organizations that are not explicitly devoted to the aims of a movement.
10 Especially in repressive contexts, the key organizational structures and networks that are
11 engaged to challenge authorities are unlikely to be explicit in their oppositional stance. So,
12 for instance, opposition to authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and
13 South Africa emerged from religious institutions (Borer 1998; Chilton 1995; Mueller 1999;
14 C. Smith 1996; Thomas 2001).

15 Successful movements are not necessarily those that generate their own organizations
16 but rather they are ones that compete successfully for adherents within multi-organizational
17 fields (Campbell 2005). By mobilizing constellations of diverse organizations and networks
18 in society, social movements help to amplify the voices of less powerful groups by aligning
19 their interests and issues with a broader public agenda (e.g., McCarthy, Smith, and Zald
20 1996). Successful movements are thus those that find their way into what we might call the
21 structures of everyday life (Wuthnow 1998).

22 A variety of conditions—ranging from overt political repression to far more subtle
23 developments such as shifting party structures or living and working patterns—reduce the
24 time and space most citizens have to join political organizations. Thus, movements must work
25 against the tide to convince people that particular problems are both urgent and subject to
26 change. To convey such notions, movements must reach people within their daily routines of
27 earning a living and raising families. By cultivating connections to groups such as labor
28 unions, parent-teacher associations, churches, and other civic associations, SMOs can reach
29 a much broader audience than they otherwise could. Increasingly, both activists and analysts
30 use the term “networks” to characterize the broad and dense relationships among diverse
31 types of organizations coming together around particular goals (della Porta 2005; Diani 1995,
32 2003; Escobar 2003; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Rucht 2004). The notions of fluidity and
33 contingency that networks imply shift the focus of research away from questions about
34 whether or not organizations help or hinder movements to questions about how particular sets
35 of relationships affect possibilities for social change.

36 37 38 **Early Scholarship in Social Movement Organizations**

39
40 The earliest scholars of collective action focused on the collective psychology and irra-
41 tional actions of crowd behavior at political protest rallies. This scholarship was seen as
42 critical of the activists, painting a portrait of irrational actors led by their emotions alone.
43 In the 1970s, a handful of scholars set about to correct this partial portrait of collective
44 behavior by documenting the rational, even bureaucratic, aspects of social movement activ-
45 ity. For example, Turner and Killian (1957) documented various types of social movements,
46 and Killian (1964) argued that successful social movements become institutionalized in
47 some way.
48

01 **RESOURCE MOBILIZATION.** Against this backdrop of debate about the emotionality of
02 social movements, McCarthy and Zald (1973) borrowed from rational choice theory in their
03 seminal work that outlines resource mobilization theory. Resource mobilization argues that
04 social movements in the contemporary period have become professionalized. They see social
05 movements as part of the flow of normal politics, with cycles of protest and quiescence. They
06 demonstrate that much of the work of social movements is done by paid professionals in for-
07 mal organizations, whose jobs include collecting, channeling and managing money,
08 resources, and time. Their emphasis on social movement organizations meant that, rather than
09 considering social action from the perspective of the individual participant, we can under-
10 stand social movements to be the result of “social movement entrepreneurs” mobilizing indi-
11 vidual participation by fostering discontent and channeling it into formal social movement
12 organizations.

13 Resource mobilization theory focuses on the material resources, organizational capaci-
14 ties (including skills and networks), and tactics that enable organizations to mobilize support
15 to address these grievances. They develop a framework for understanding movement success
16 as a function of the resources available to social movement actors. Access to external
17 resources—money, media attention, institutional ties, is considered at least as important to
18 movement emergence or social movement outcomes as any individual processes. Gamson
19 (1990 [1975]) provided an important test of these propositions by analyzing the outcomes of
20 various social movements. He examined 53 “challenging groups” in the United States, and
21 found that success entailed groups with reformist objectives that make use of available chan-
22 nels of political participation, such as the electoral system and political lobbying, were more
23 successful than those who took to the streets. Lipsky (1968) posited that while powerful
24 groups can engage in direct confrontation, relatively powerless groups used protest as a lever-
25 age to increase their bargaining ability. Protest groups were successful to the extent that they
26 could gain the support of “reference publics” who would join the conflict in ways favorable
27 to their protest goals.

28 Oberschall (1973) similarly emphasized the role of material and organizational resources
29 in mobilizing people and channeling their action. In his analysis of the United States civil
30 rights movement, he demonstrated that sympathetic third parties, such as northern whites and
31 political insiders, were important to the effectiveness of civil disobedience as a protest tactic.
32 Jenkins and Perrow’s study (1977) of three farm worker union movements showed that sup-
33 port from third parties, such as labor unions and liberal interest groups were integral to move-
34 ment success.

35
36 **MOBILIZING STRUCTURES.** Resource mobilization’s focus on the institutionalization of
37 social movement activity has led researchers to consider the role of social movement organi-
38 zations in fostering mobilization, facilitating activism, and producing social change. Debates
39 in this area, however, have stressed the inherent tensions between movements’ need for flex-
40 ibility and the demands of organizational maintenance (e.g., Oliver 1989). Scholars have also
41 pointed to the wide variety of organizational forms that movement actors have used to build
42 their struggles, noting how these differ from conventional assumptions about formal organi-
43 zations (Ferree and Mueller 2004; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Staggenborg and Taylor 2005).
44 Also important is the central importance of alliance-building to social movements’ work,
45 which contributes to their relatively amorphous and variable structures. Thus, the concept of
46 mobilizing structures has been applied to help sensitize analysts to the importance of both for-
47 mal and informal organizations or networks to most social movements. The mobilizing struc-
48 tures concept emphasizes the fact that most social movements combine diverse sets of

01 actors—some of which are explicitly organized around movement goals and others that are
02 organized for other social purposes (McCarthy 1996). How these diverse forms combine to
03 form particular movements, moreover, is largely affected by the broader political context
04 (Kriesi 1996). This concept was particularly useful in helping scholars explore relationships
05 between the professional social movement organizations that had become increasingly dom-
06 inant in the United States context and other organized and informal elements of movements.
07 Professional SMOs are formal organizations that tend to have paid staff members to help
08 organize fundraising, lobbying, and protest actions such as letter-writing campaigns
09 (McCarthy and Zald 1973). Such organizations themselves can be key agents of social
10 change, even when they have only limited participation by grassroots supporters. They can
11 help sustain movement foundations and develop movement critiques even in times of move-
12 ment abeyance (Rupp and Taylor 1987).

13 Such professional organizations are by no means the only example of mobilizing struc-
14 tures. Other classic accounts of mobilizing structures in social movements include Sara
15 Evans' analysis (1980) of the informal friendship networks among women in the civil rights
16 and New Left movements that gave rise to the women's liberation movement, and numerous
17 examples of the role that black churches played in fostering the civil rights movement
18 (McAdam 1982; Morris 1984). As we discuss later, global justice activists are inventing new,
19 networked structures to support diverse forms of activism and movement goals. It is widely
20 agreed that the organizational capacities of these various mobilizing structures deserve the
21 attention of social movements scholars.

22 Ironically, despite resource mobilization's explicit emphasis on the organizational
23 dynamics of social movement activity, social movements scholars have paid relatively little
24 attention to the systematic study of organizations themselves (McCarthy and Zald 2002). And
25 most work tends to be case studies of particular movement groups. What literature exists
26 tends to focus on the level of formal organizational structure in social movements, as well as
27 changes in organizational forms over time (e.g. Rucht 1999; Staggenborg 1988; Voss and
28 Sherman 2000). This scholarship has found that, while many social movements do become
29 "professionalized," meaning that they move from informal, grassroots organizations to cen-
30 tralized, bureaucratized organizations over time, there are numerous examples to the contrary
31 (Edwards and Foley 2003; Edwards and McCarthy 2004; Kriesi 1996). Further, profession-
32 alization is not a singular process, and the degree of formality and centralization can vary. There
33 is often a difference, for example, between the level of bureaucratization at higher organiza-
34 tional levels, such as a national office, than at local levels (Edwards and Foley 2003; Oliver
35 and Furman 1989).

38 **Organizations in Recent Scholarship**

39
40 More recent work has sought to bridge the fields of social movement studies with the sociol-
41 ogy of organizations. A small number of scholars have shown how analyses of organizational
42 populations can contribute to our understanding of various dimensions of social movement
43 organizational dynamics (McCarthy et al. 1988; Minkoff 1993). The emergence, growth and
44 decline of social movement organizations have been important topics of study for social
45 movement scholars (e.g., Zald and Garner 1994). Another important area of inquiry has been
46 the relationship between social movement organizations and social movements. Studies of
47 social movements over time often show that even when organizations are small or absent, the
48

01 larger movement can carry on (e.g., Taylor 1989). Nonetheless, most scholars agree that
02 social movement organizations are important centers for social movement activity.

03 Some scholarship has moved beyond studies of organizational populations to draw
04 attention to the embeddedness of social movement organizations in various social, politi-
05 cal, and institutional contexts. A recent collection explores various connections between the
06 fields of social movements and organizational studies (Davis et al. 2005). This work
07 emphasizes the need to account for broader organizational “fields,” in which numerous
08 organizations operate, cooperate, and compete in order to understand social movement
09 dynamics. By examining social movements as players within these organizational fields,
10 scholars can recognize the diversity of organizational forms within social movements, the
11 response of social movement organizations to shifts in political contexts, and the relation-
12 ships among social movement organizations.

13 For example, examining the case of the environmental movement in North Carolina,
14 Andrews and Edwards (2005) looked at the relationship between an organization’s position
15 in the field and a number of aspects of their activism, such as the tactics they choose and
16 whether they participate in coalitions with other organizations. They consider local organiza-
17 tions’ affiliations with national groups, and their willingness to form coalitions with other
18 local groups. They find that local organizations are more likely to be affiliated with a national
19 organization than a state or regional organizations, but that they are less likely to ally them-
20 selves with organizationally distinct groups that share similar interests than state and regional
21 groups are. This finding suggests that the field of environmental organizations is structured in
22 such a way that inhibits coalitions between local groups, but facilitates cooperation between
23 mid-level state and regional groups.

24 A number of social movement case studies analyze the fields of activism as well. One
25 recent example is Elizabeth Armstrong’s (2002) analysis of the lesbian and gay movement in
26 San Francisco. Armstrong demonstrates that the emergence of a number of identity-based
27 organizations in the 1970s was reflective of a new social movement field crystallizing around
28 the concept of gay and lesbian identity, as opposed to the more radical New Left ideologies
29 that previous organizations held. Similarly, Raka Ray’s (1999) analysis of women’s move-
30 ment groups in India surveys the fields of activism in which movement organizations are posi-
31 tioned. This work shows the utility of the concept of organizational fields for understanding
32 how organizational identities and tactics develop over time, through interactions with move-
33 ment allies and opponents. The field-level analysis highlights a promising if underexplored
34 approach to understanding the inter-organizational dynamics that influence movement activ-
35 ities. It also points to important relationships between structural and cultural approaches to
36 the study of social movements.

37 Other scholars also consider the increasing importance of coalition building among
38 organizations, including the factors that foster coalitions among movement organizations. In
39 her analysis of six decades of student activism on college campuses, Nella Van Dyke (2003)
40 found that movement organizations are more likely to work across social movement bound-
41 aries in the presence of a threat that affects multiple movements, while they are more likely
42 to work together within movements in the presence of local threats. Gillian Murphy’s analy-
43 sis (2005) of the interdependencies of movement organizations suggested that there are unin-
44 tended consequences to coalitions, however. She argues that increased coalition activity
45 suppresses the emergence of new organizations, even as it optimizes the distribution of
46 resources among coalitions. Coalitions are a particularly important aspect of transnational
47 activism, which we discuss later.

48

GLOBALIZATION AND MOBILIZING STRUCTURES

Studies of social movements in different parts of the world have generated important new questions and insights into the factors shaping social movements. For instance, why do movements in distant places tend to adopt similar forms, tactics, and ideologies? And why do we see an increasing tendency of activists from different countries to come together around common struggles? Marco Giugni (2002) summarizes three explanations for this. The first is that changes at the global level—such as international economic and political integration—generate common sets of complaints (e.g., loss of jobs due to trade competition) and targets (e.g., transnational corporations or international institutions) around which movements mobilize. Second, global political coordination has produced similar government structures within states (Meyer et al. 1997), something analysts call “structural affinity.” Because the organization of governments is more similar across different national contexts, activists can more readily share useful knowledge and experiences across national borders. Third, the proliferation of international exchanges of all sorts—including international travel, communication, and expanding use of the Internet—greatly enhances opportunities for citizens in all countries to communicate with others around the world and to share ideas and experiences about political participation, among other activities. Global interconnectedness also increases the vulnerability of governments to international pressures.

Global integration thus affects both the ways people engage in political participation and state responses to popular pressures. Increasing flows of information and ideas as well as growing numbers of ties between people and organizations from diverse nations affect the character of societies and governments everywhere. First, they have helped produce a global emergence of what analysts have called a “movement society.”⁸ Once thought to be sporadic and short-term forms of political involvement, social movements are proving to be more permanent fixtures in all democratic political systems. A movement society perspective understands social movements as central to politics and to the evolution of social and political institutions at national and global levels.

Second, as we discussed earlier, increasing volumes of social, political, and economic interactions that cross national boundaries challenges the abilities of governments to affect conditions within their borders while making it increasingly difficult to separate national from global policy processes. As each nation’s activities have more obvious impacts beyond their national borders, more decisions that once were the sole domain of national governments are now subject to international pressures and regulations. Social movements both contribute to and respond to these two interrelated developments.

A Global Movement Society?

According to Mayer Zald, key characteristics of today’s movement society include “the growth of a relatively continuous social movement sector, the development of [social movement organizations] as enduring features of the society, the professionalization of movement

⁸ See, e.g., Tarrow (1998b; Zald and McCarthy 1987; Rochon 1998). Tarrow is most explicit in his discussion of the parallel processes of globalization and the rise of a social movement society.

Box 2.1. Transnational Social Movement Strategies in Multilevel Politics

This section discusses how political decisions are increasingly shaped by global policy arenas. This has altered the way many activists organize their political strategies. In particular, it often requires that activists operate at multiple levels simultaneously, or at least that they understand how politics at the global level impact the possibilities for local activism. We can identify several distinct, “multilevel” strategies in contemporary transnational campaigns. The first is the classic “boomerang” model discussed by Keck and Sikkink (1998), whereby activists look outside the state to international institutions to bring outside pressure on national governments. Such a strategy is evident in many human rights campaigns, when human rights advocates bring their grievances to international organizations or other international audiences in the hopes that other governments and international agencies will raise the costs of continued rights violations within their countries (e.g., Risse et al. 1999; Sikkink 1993). Such transnational coalitions activists’ interpretations of how global forces affect local conditions, and several authors remind us of the mutual directions of influence between local human rights groups and their transnational allies (e.g., Rothman and Oliver 2002; Stewart 2004; Hertel 2006). In addition to seeking greater government adherence to international norms, activists work to shape the international normative context itself. By proposing and lobbying for new international agreements, and they help institutionalize new norms as well as mechanisms for their enforcement. For instance, citizens’ groups were at the forefront of new treaties to ban landmines and to form the International Criminal Court (Glasius 2002; Price 1998). And indigenous communities have been very active internationally to press for their rights to self-determination within the international legal order (Brysk 2000; Passy 1999). Campaigns like that working to ban international trade in toxic wastes work at both levels to help define international norms while also pressing national governments to act (J. Smith 1999). And more recently we see more examples of “defensive transnationalization” by groups aiming to defend existing rights of democratic participation against encroachments by global institutions (Sikkink 2005).

leadership, and the transition from a search for [social movement] membership in the polity, to the search for specific policy outcomes” (1987:321). In other words, we see an ongoing and fairly stable mobilization of people and resources away from more conventional modes of political participation and toward more protest-oriented forms (Norris 2002). At the same time, movements are taking on a more formally structured character, adapting themselves to become more stable features of the institutional environments in which they operate (Soule and Earl 2005).

A movement society perspective thus anticipates that protest or movement politics will only become more central to the operation of our political institutions. Long-term shifts in the structure of our economies and political systems—such as urbanization, expansion of the scope and scale of government, increases in professionalization and in the centrality of information to economic and political life—make it easier for potential challengers to mobilize resources and people to promote social change (McCarthy and Zald 1987). At the same time, however, they also enhance the capacities of governments and corporate actors to resist changes that threaten their economic and political interests (McMichael 2003).

01 Because states are embedded within an increasingly dense web of relationships to other
 02 states, they have adopted—not always voluntarily—similar ways of organizing social rela-
 03 tions and state functions (Meyer et al. 1997). This “structural affinity” has allowed for the
 04 development of a globalized movement society, since social change advocates everywhere
 05 find that they face similar conditions within their national contexts, or that the targets of local-
 06 ized grievances are interstate institutions (Giugni 2002; Walton and Seddon 1994). The need
 07 to develop strategies and organizational resources in order to confront modern states helps
 08 generate modularity among social movement forms that defies national and cultural differ-
 09 ences (e.g., Tarrow 2005; Traugott 1995). And as the world capitalist economy unifies the
 10 world labor market through processes such as proletarianization, urbanization, industrializa-
 11 tion, professionalization, and casualization, it structures both the capacities of diverse groups
 12 to resist exploitation as well as the specific conditions they are likely to protest (Boswell and
 13 Chase-Dunn 2000). In the text that follows we explore in more detail how large-scale changes
 14 in inter-state social institutions and processes have helped shape a global, movement society.
 15

16 **SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND ECONOMIC CHANGE.** In the preceding text we discussed
 17 above how military competition among states contributed to the expansion of state bureaucra-
 18 cies that could generate revenues through taxation and provide a growing range of services
 19 for citizens. States’ need for revenues made them dependent on favorable ties to economic
 20 elitists, and most analyses of state formation treat the character of relations between state
 21 authorities and capitalists as central to the emergence and stability of democracy (e.g.,
 22 Markoff 1996; Moore 1966; Tilly 1978; Wolf 1982; cf. Centeno 2002).⁹

23 Today it is largely taken for granted that the state should be involved in promoting the
 24 national economy, and today this often means that governments should help increase the
 25 global competitiveness of their “national” corporations (McMichael 2003; Moody 1997;
 26 Robinson 2004; Sklair 2001). But this assumption has not always existed, and it arose out of
 27 competitive interactions among globalizing states, international organizations and their offi-
 28 cers, advocates of neoliberal globalization, and other organized social interests such as labor
 29 and other groups. Social movement challengers have long been involved in struggles to define
 30 the role of government and the character of local and national economies, and we have noted
 31 how they are increasingly mobilizing across national boundaries to transform global eco-
 32 nomic relations. At the same time, the policies designed to encourage economic development
 33 and to aid in the development of national states have also affected possibilities for social
 34 movements. In particular, both national states and the economies they fostered depended on
 35 mass media and education for their success. And these same institutions play central roles in
 36 our attempts to understand social movement development as well.
 37

38 *Mass Media.* Benedict Anderson’s work (1991) highlights the centrality of the promotion
 39 of a mass print media to the development of the modern nation state. He argues that the intro-
 40 duction of the printing press enabled emerging state authorities to cultivate national “imag-
 41 ined communities,” such as France, where only locally defined communities had previously
 42 existed. For people to feel some connection with remote others, they needed some common
 43
 44

45 ⁹ Note: Latin American and other periphery and semi-periphery states are characterized by important differences
 46 in the relationship of states to capital and citizens. For instance, many Latin American countries supported their
 47 militaries through taxes on imports and exports, thereby eliminating the need for a democratizing bargain with
 48 citizen-taxpayers (Centeno 2002). We are grateful to John Markoff for this observation.

01 bond, and print media helped nurture such bonds. Together with systems of roadways that
02 made direct contact more likely across groups within a given set of territorial boundaries, the
03 print media helped expand people's sense of community to a wider, national level.¹⁰

04 Sidney Tarrow builds further on this notion of imagined communities to demonstrate how
05 the print media also shaped the development of social movements. He argues that newspapers
06 and journals allowed citizens with no direct contact to cultivate a sense of solidarity and shared
07 experiences that made collective action more likely across very loosely connected networks.
08 Moreover, print media contributed to a political leveling of society. It fostered greater scrutiny
09 of political leaders who were once seen as "divine" rulers, and it expanded popular access to
10 knowledge. In a sense, just as states were encouraging people to think of themselves as part of
11 imagined national communities, social movement leaders were articulating other imagined
12 identities around the shared experiences of exploitation and resistance (Tarrow 1998b).

13 The mass media represent an important site of struggle between those who benefit from
14 the existing order and those who seek its transformation. To the extent that global processes
15 are fostering the emergence of a global economy and political institutions, we would expect
16 the mass media to be playing a similar role in cultivating shared assumptions and values as a
17 way of fostering global markets and commitment to global institutions such as the European
18 Union. We find what Leslie Sklair (2001) identifies as "consumerist elites," including mer-
19 chants and mass media, to be an essential element of a "transnational capitalist class" that
20 promotes a global capitalist order. Movements also recognize the importance of the mass
21 media, even if they don't have equal access to its most visible forms.

22 Today, the Internet has amplified the traditional media forms and has become an impor-
23 tant tool in this same process of disseminating information and fostering communication
24 that both promotes the aims of governments while giving rise to various challenges to them.
25 At the same time, the increasing privatization of the mass media reduces the space for pro-
26 gramming that serves noncommercial, public purposes. Public concerns that directly threaten
27 commercial interests, such as global warming and public health, receive limited and biased
28 coverage in corporate-owned media.¹¹ Although the internet has helped create many new
29 openings for public dialogue and communication, access to this technology varies widely
30 cross-nationally and within countries. While the internet has facilitated access to information
31 by people in poor countries and communities, the same groups have relatively less access to
32 the technology and high-speed connections needed to make effective use of this medium
33 (Bissio 1999). And increasing amounts of online material is now available only to paid
34 subscribers, further exacerbating rich-poor inequalities in information access. Moreover,
35 legislation like the U.S. Telecommunications Act of 1996 has helped centralize broadcast
36 media in that country and constrained the diversity of and popular access to mainstream
37 media sources (Herman 1995; Herman and Chomsky 1988; Kimball 1994; McChesney
38 1999). More broadly, international trade agreements on services threaten national govern-
39 ments' ability to influence media content and accessibility.

40
41
42 ¹⁰ We must remember, too, that, as they built systems of roadways and communications to cultivate national soci-
43 eties, nation-builders destroyed local communities and cultures. National languages displaced local and regional
44 ones, and the process of national integration was often violent.

45 ¹¹ Numerous scholars and policy analysts have engaged this question of whether and how corporate ownership affects
46 the operation of the mass media. For instance, Project Censored offers an annual review of the top stories of the
47 year that were un- or under- reported in the mass commercial media, based upon systematic reviews of the U.S.
48 mainstream and alternative media by researchers (see, e.g., Bennett and Entman 2001; Herman 1995; Herman and
Chomsky 1988).

2. Structural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

37

01 *Education and Professionalization in the "Information Society."* As governments have
 02 become involved in an increasing array of complex issues, and as global integration increases
 03 the complexity of economic and political life, the demand for expertise increases. Thus, states
 04 are increasingly faced with the challenge of educating their populations to build a skilled and
 05 globally competitive workforce. The professionalization and information-driven needs of
 06 government can undermine democracy and the prospects for popular mobilization by turning
 07 policy decisions into technical matters in which only experts can be involved. But most pro-
 08 ponents of democracy would argue that many questions in which technical complexity is used
 09 as an excuse to limit public involvement in policy decisions are in fact political rather than
 10 technical ones. Experts can provide information relevant to policy debates—such as evalua-
 11 tions of evidence about global warming or of the effects of global trade on employment
 12 patterns—but they do not deserve a stronger voice than other citizens in the fundamentally
 13 political questions about how the benefits or risks associated with different policy choices
 14 should be distributed (e.g., Coleman and Porter 2000; Markoff and Montecinos 1993).

15 While the information needs of modern states can serve to exclude popular groups from
 16 policy arenas, an important consequence of education and professionalization within contem-
 17 porary societies is the emergence of professionally-oriented associations that cultivate new,
 18 post-material identities and alliances that don't privilege national boundaries (Inglehart and
 19 Baker 2000; Melucci 1989). The expertise and professional credentials of such groups can
 20 counter the legitimacy and authority of governments (Moore 1996). Some analysts discuss the
 21 growing role of "epistemic communities"—or "networks of knowledge-based experts" in
 22 global policy decisions (Haas 1992).

23 A highly educated workforce is likely to be more independent and less deferential to state
 24 authorities than a less educated one. Educated citizens are better able to independently collect
 25 and analyze information and are less easily swayed by appeals to traditional charismatic
 26 authority. The availability of information and skills for analysis also makes governance more
 27 transparent, even in authoritarian settings. Thus, in contemporary society especially, political
 28 influence depends upon the effective mobilization of information (Florini 2003; Sikkink 2002).

29 The implications of these changes for social movements are numerous. First, the demand
 30 in government and the economy for highly skilled workers means that skills related to the mobi-
 31 lization and dissemination of information will be widely available in the population. Thus,
 32 movements mobilizing around highly technical problems can depend upon a certain level of
 33 knowledge within the population they seek to influence, and they also can hope to recruit
 34 activists with expertise related to the problems around which they are organizing. As Zald notes,

35 The skills of networking, of meeting notification, of developing newsletters, have spread quite
 36 remarkably in the society. Networking, fund raising, and organizational techniques for utilizing
 37 the media are all transformed from techniques learned on the job to formally transmitted skills.
 38 (1987:329)

39 Sidney Verba and his colleagues also found a relationship between the skills people learned
 40 in the course of their everyday work routines and their participation in democratic politics
 41 (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

42 Of course, as many have observed, the distribution of professional skills is by no means
 43 equitable, and we can expect to find higher concentrations of these capabilities among more
 44 privileged classes and groups. Moreover, given the stratification in the global labor market,
 45 we can also expect a higher concentration of such skills among populations in the richer
 46 countries of the global North. But Verba and his colleagues also found that, outside the work-
 47 place, participation in public associations such as churches and unions helped enhance
 48

01 people's skills for political participation. A wide range of studies show that people who are
02 active in any form of association are also more involved in politics (e.g., Schofer and
03 Fourcade-Gournchas 2001). This is due in part to the impacts these groups have not only on
04 people's understandings of issues and access to information, but also on the skills they have
05 in, for instance, public speaking, computing, policy analysis, coalition-building, etc.
06 (Baiocchi 2003; Norris 2002; Verba et al. 1995).

07 *In sum, the activities of governments aimed at promoting economic development*
08 *expands the role of scientific professionals in government while also enhancing the pool of*
09 *resources available to potential challengers. Today's economies depend on the rapid flow of*
10 *information across national boundaries, and they demand a highly educated workforce.*
11 *Structures that facilitate rapid communication and the development of technical skills also*
12 *provide a foundation that citizens can use to mobilize interests that may counter those of eco-*
13 *nomical and political elitists. And in the course of employing these resources in political con-*
14 *texts, challengers help transform political processes and institutions.*
15

16 **SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY.** While social movements are shaped by
17 global political and economic changes, they also help transform the social contexts in which
18 they operate (Rochon 1998). Political activism, according to Pippa Norris, is being reinvented
19 around the world through the creation of new forms of association, new repertoires, and new
20 targets for political action (Norris, 2002). Urbanization, education, communication, and other
21 changes described above have contributed to the emergence of new values that are impacting
22 political participation around the world (Curtis, Baer, and Grabb 2001; Inglehart and Baker
23 2000). Because these processes are global, they are producing parallel, although not identical,
24 developments in different countries (Giugni 2002). To the extent that social movements
25 help articulate and spread identities that challenge traditional loyalties (such as to national
26 states or traditional political parties) and to the extent that they are active in promoting new
27 forms of organizing and action, they are important catalysts in this "reinvention" of political
28 action. Indeed, research on social movements shows that some protest tactics and movement
29 actors become institutionalized (Meyer and Tarrow 1998), that is, they become part of the
30 "normal" political process. Thus, the interactions between movements and more influential
31 players in the policy process generate new ideas and forms of political action that shape sub-
32 sequent action, organization, and policy (Kriesi 2004). So while movements might achieve
33 relatively little in terms of their specific policy goals, they have, over time, exerted enormous
34 influence over how we do politics today (e.g., Clemens 1996).

35 It is also important to remember that many different groups are seeking to mobilize pop-
36 ular support for their causes at any given time. While perhaps a majority of social movement
37 actors work either directly or indirectly to advance democratic aims, we must keep in mind
38 that anti-democratic movements adopt similar strategies and forms (Koopmans and Stratham
39 1999b). Indeed, the idea of a "movement society" anticipates that practices that evolve within
40 the context of social movements will become institutionalized. As they do, a wider range of
41 political actors will employ them in attempts at political gain. Moreover, those that demo-
42 cratic movements challenge—including corporations, governments, and other social
43 groups—often appropriate ideas and action forms from progressive movements. Thus, we see
44 corporate lobbyists engaging in efforts to demonstrate broad-based, "grassroots" support for
45 policies they support by generating masses of public letters through "grass-tops" or "astro-
46 turf" campaigns (Faucheux 1995). And Nike has attempted (unsuccessfully) to appropriate its
47 critics' approach by building its own Web site to criticize the company for allegedly produc-
48 ing such a superior product (Greenberg and Knight 2004). Corporate opponents of global

01 agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions have employed similar strategies in order to
02 prevent public mobilizations on environmental protection (McCright and Dunlap 2003).
03 Thus, recent movement scholarship stresses the need to focus more attention on *interactions*
04 between social movements and their opponents than has been the case in much research.

05 A movement society perspective, in short, seeks to link broader social changes with every-
06 day practices throughout society. It sensitizes analysts to how issues and actors are defined
07 through their interactions with other actors. It helps us understand politics as an ever-changing
08 process involving the articulation of conflicts and struggles to win favorable policy outcomes.
09 It also embeds social conflicts within a context of a globally integrated economy, recognizing
10 that global-level actors and forces have helped create similarities in organizational forms across
11 national societies. Also, a global economy implies a globalized labor market, whereby more and
12 more people around the world are increasingly subjected to similar opportunities and pressures.
13 Indeed, thousands of workers from scores of countries may be linked through a single complex
14 commodity chain controlled by one transnational corporation (Silver 2003).

15 A key argument we are making here is that the processes that have shaped the develop-
16 ment of a “movement society” are not confined to individual nations, and we can identify
17 global trends that support the development of an interconnected, global movement society.
18 This society shapes the evolution of national and international political institutions. National
19 polities are nested within a much broader system of institutional relations, and analysts and
20 citizens must consider how this influences any given political conflict by providing potential
21 for alliances, symbolic or material resources, and/or political leverage for both challengers
22 and authorities. Thus, we must view states as embedded within a broader network of transna-
23 tional relationships to other states, international institutions, and other global actors. These
24 complex relationships shape possibilities for movement emergence and impact, and we can
25 also argue that the movement society itself is a global phenomenon.

28 **Networks and Globalization**

29
30 Another way we see globalization impacting social movements is in the increased recognition
31 of—if not the reliance upon—networks as a form of social organization. While networks are
32 certainly not new, globalization may be enhancing their prevalence and making actors more
33 self-conscious of this form of social relationships. In the preceding section we discussed rela-
34 tions between globalization and the development of the social movement society because
35 global processes have shaped fundamentally the ways people work, consume, socialize, and
36 engage in political action. By linking production and consumption processes across geo-
37 graphic boundaries, global economic forces have led what were once highly varied commu-
38 nities to adopt similar forms of association and action. And the network form has thus been
39 uniquely associated with globalization, since it adapts the modern formal bureaucratic organ-
40 ization to the demands placed on it by complex, rapidly changing, and highly uncertain envi-
41 ronments (Castells 1996; Knoke 1990; Riles 2001). Thus, when scholars consider the
42 mobilizing structures from which social change efforts are likely to emerge, they increasingly
43 find themselves speaking in terms of “networks” of associations (Diani and McAdam 2003;
44 Keck and Sikkink 1998; Khagram et al. 2002).

45 It is no coincidence that the concept of networks has gained prominence in the social sci-
46 ences at the same time as we’ve seen a growing awareness of enhanced global interdepend-
47 ence and inter-connectedness. The evolution of modern political and social institutions
48 has generated new forms of organization that resist the rigid structures and formalities of

01 traditional bureaucratic institutions. As Wuthnow (1998) argues, changes in the demands on
02 people's time, on the built environments in which people live, and in the character of our
03 social and political institutions have generated a greater reliance on "loose connections," that
04 foster communication and trust. Uncertain and changing environments require organizational
05 flexibility and innovation, and so organizations must maintain ties to other actors in order to
06 maximize their access to relevant information (Campbell and Pedersen 2001; Powell 1990).
07 Thus, organizational analyses must increasingly address the reality that contemporary organ-
08 izations are likely to have more porous and flexible organizational boundaries.

09 Much social movement scholarship focuses on contentious interactions between social
10 movements and authorities, often neglecting the importance of movement links to affinity
11 groups, public bystanders, and third-party mediators for explaining conflict dynamics. As Rucht
12 argues, "[t]hese linkages . . . should become part and parcel of social movement studies. It is time
13 to abandon the simplified image of a two-party struggle between a (unified) movement and its
14 (unified) opponent acting in some kind of a social vacuum" (2004:212–213). Mediators operate
15 both within and across conflicting groups, frequently intervening to de-escalate conflicts, add
16 new resources, or to broker relations between adversaries (Rucht 2004). Others (e.g., Burstein
17 et al. 1995; della Porta and Rucht 1995; Kriesi 2004; Kriesi et al. 1995; Rucht 1996) also argue
18 for greater attention to the interplay between movements' "alliance" and "conflict" systems.
19 Indeed, for most movements, cultivating allies that can help counteract the power of adversaries
20 constitute the bulk of social change efforts (e.g., Diani 1995, 2004; Maney 2001; Mueller 1994;
21 Osa 2003; Polletta 2002; Rochon 1998; J. Smith forthcoming; Winston 2004; Wood 2004). We
22 have comparatively little systematic evidence about changing relationships among actors in these
23 broad social movement alliance and conflict systems.

24 As some of our earlier discussion suggests, recent research on social movements seems
25 to be moving in the direction that Rucht prescribes, and we find greater attention to how infor-
26 mal networks of actors contribute to social conflict processes. Much of this work points to the
27 need to understand more about how networks of organizations and individuals develop
28 durable cooperative relationships (e.g., Anheier and Katz 2005; Bandy and Smith 2005; Diani
29 and McAdam 2003; Gamson 2004; Katz and Anheier 2006). Demonstrating the need for
30 more nuanced understandings of movement actors, Ferree and Mueller argued that "organi-
31 zational repertoires may be broader, more strategic and more interconnected than dominant
32 ways of conceptualizing social movements suggests" (2004:595). Staggenborg and Taylor
33 (2005) show how conventional approaches to social movement analysis produced inaccurate
34 claims about the women's movement.

35 Some researchers have focused explicitly on the importance of *networks* of individuals
36 and organizations to social movement outcomes (e.g., Bennett 2004; Davis et al. 2005; Diani
37 and McAdam 2003; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Passy 2003). For instance, Caniglia (2001)
38 found that transnational environmental organizations with informal ties to international agen-
39 cies played more central roles in transnational social movement networks by helping channel
40 information and pressure among disconnected social actors. Demonstrating the particular
41 importance of networking for transnational alliances, Stark and his colleagues found in a
42 study of civil society groups in Hungary that those with international links were compara-
43 tively more densely networked with local and national groups, suggesting that transnational
44 associations may serve as brokers between international and more geographically proximate
45 political arenas (Stark, Vedres, and Bruszt 2006). This finding resonates with one from a
46 study of movement networks in Vancouver by Carroll and Ratner (1996), which found that
47 groups working with a political economy and justice frame were more outward-oriented and
48 connected to extra-local groups. Groups adopting other frames tended to remain more

2. Structural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

41

01 concentrated within their local geographic space. This may help explain why the global justice
02 movement is undoubtedly the most widely visible and populous of transnational social
03 movements. It also suggests that we should expect to find extensive networking going on
04 within this movement, and even a cursory look at the literature confirms this (e.g.,
05 Adamovsky 2005; Bennett 2005; della Porta et al. 2006; Moghadam 2005).

06 Riles' study (2001) of transnational women's organizing at the 1995 United Nations
07 Conference on Women highlights the centrality of the network as the recognized and legiti-
08 mate form for transnational political work. She demonstrates how delegates at the UN
09 Conference learned new skills through their ties to other participants in the Conference as
10 well as how they brought new ideas and strategic proposals to local groups when they
11 returned from the conference. The network form, Riles and others argue, is preferred for its
12 ability to help people navigate across different levels of political engagement while affording
13 them greater informational, material, and political resources than they could have as isolated
14 individuals or groups.

15 The emergence of the network form of mobilization is, in short, closely linked with
16 changes in the operation of governance institutions. As states shift their authority to supranational
17 institutions, devolve some authority to local governments, and privatize government
18 functions, they fundamentally redefine the character of the state as well as the meaning of citi-
19 zenship (Brysk and Shafir 2004; Markoff 2004). Thus, citizens active in social movements
20 have worked to forge new types of relationships with government officials as they have sought
21 to remedy grievances and improve social conditions for their constituents (Coleman and
22 Wayland 2004; Korzeniewicz and Smith 2003). Advocates of social change have found that
23 they must adapt the mobilizing structures they employ as globalization processes have funda-
24 mentally altered the allocation of political authority.

25 Research on transnational organizing in particular has shown that social change advo-
26 cates often benefit from connections to international institutions and their agents. For
27 instance, Jackie Smith's analysis (2005) of networking among transnational social movement
28 organizations finds that the shape of networks is largely determined by institutional contexts
29 defined at both regional and global levels. While there was some variation across different
30 issue areas, for the most part, groups within particular world regions adopted network struc-
31 tures that maximized the institutional openings for their particular region. Lending further
32 support to the claim that network structures among transnational social movement groups
33 reflects broader institutional contexts is Wiest and Smith's finding (2006) that regional net-
34 work ties were more likely in regions with larger numbers of regional intergovernmental
35 organizations and treaties.

36 The emergence of routinized and fairly cooperative relationships between social
37 movement actors and agents of governments may seem puzzling to some, although social
38 movement scholars have long recognized that movement-government cooperation is often
39 essential to their efforts to affect policy (McCarthy and Wolfson 1992). Some analysts
40 speak of the need for "networked governance" as an approach to managing the complex
41 array of problems and actors under the jurisdiction of global institutions (United Nations
42 2004; World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalization 2004). And analyzing
43 civil society networks in Latin America, Korzeniewicz and Smith (2000, 2001, 2003) argue
44 for a more self-conscious cultivation of "polycentric governance coalitions" to address the
45 inequalities that have hampered development efforts in that region and elsewhere.

46 Many United Nations agencies—especially those working on the environment, develop-
47 ment, disarmament, and public health—share the values and objectives of social movements,
48

01 and many analysts see movement pressure as key to strengthening international norms and
02 institutions by pressing states to adopt multilateral over unilateral approaches to foreign policy
03 (Clark 2003; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Passy, 1999; Risse et al. 1999; Smith et al. 1997).
04 Moreover, underlying the entire UN system is a commitment to values of equity, fairness, and
05 participation—principles that motivate and lend legitimacy to a considerable amount of social
06 movement activity. Although links with authorities always introduce risks that movements will
07 be co-opted, such links can fundamentally alter unequal power relations by expanding the
08 political access of relatively powerless groups. Thus, understanding transnational social move-
09 ment dynamics requires attention to the extensive links between transnational social change
10 groups and international institutions as well as the transnational networks of social movement
11 and other civil society actors.

12 Our approach to this discussion of structural approaches to the study of social move-
13 ments has emphasized the centrality of the national state to our efforts to understand the
14 causes and consequences of social movement emergence and impact. As a target of social
15 movement pressure and an institution that shapes the distribution of resources and power in
16 society, states are central to any social movement analysis. As global forces have altered the
17 authority and structure of the national state, they have forced social movement actors to adapt
18 their own organizing strategies accordingly. Thus, alongside the expansion of international
19 institutions, we find an increasing reliance on networks by all groups seeking to operate
20 transnationally. The network itself comprises the mobilizing structures from which social
21 movements emerge. But networking as an activity becomes a form of agency whereby social
22 change advocates might seek to enhance their political power by forging new alliances and
23 other strategic ties.

24 UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

25 We chose to emphasize in this review our concern with how different conceptualizations of
26 the state have shaped structural accounts of social movements. This emphasis grows from our
27 recognition that our very notion of social movement is conceptually inseparable from the
28 modern national state. National states both affect the distribution of power and resources in
29 society and define possibilities for challenges from social movements. Therefore, social
30 movement analysts should take into account the historical and geographic contexts in which
31 relevant state actors are situated.

32 Despite the historical grounding of modern social movements in the era of the modern
33 state, what is largely missing from much scholarship in social movements is attention to the
34 possibility that the national state itself may be changing in fundamental ways, just as did the
35 pre-national, competitive systems of warlords and localized sovereignties that were displaced
36 by the national state during the eighteenth century.¹² Social movement research is, by and
37 large, state-centric (McMichael 2005). Much existing work assumes that social conflicts are
38 contained within the boundaries of the national state. But if states, and social movements,
39 were not always around in their current forms, why should we expect the forms we observe
40
41
42
43
44

45 ¹² Even this understanding of the state is challenged as European-centric. Looking at the Latin American experience,
46 for instance, Centeno argues that the European experience was the exception rather than the rule in regard to the
47 processes characterizing modern state formation Centeno, Miguel Angel. 2002. *Blood and Debt: War and the*
48 *Nation-State in Latin America*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

01 today to endure over the long-term? Structural analyses typically presume that change comes
 02 slowly and large structures have long-term impacts on social relations. But no one would
 03 argue that structures never change. Nevertheless, a considerable amount of debate has been
 04 generated over the rather simplistic question of whether an increase in global influences nec-
 05 essarily reduces the importance of the national state.

06 The implication in this dualism between globalism and the state is that the modern state
 07 is some unchanging entity that is in constant tension with forces of global integration. In real-
 08 ity, the national state can exist only in a global context that recognizes national sovereignty
 09 and certifies national governments as legitimate actors on the world stage. If national states
 10 only exist in relation with other states, then their structures have evolved in the course of inter-
 11 actions among states and other global actors. Thus, global embeddedness is not necessarily
 12 inversely related to the strength or viability of the national state. Further, the nature of the
 13 state will continue to change as new actors emerge in the global arena and as power constel-
 14 lations among actors shift. Our discussion has sought to draw attention to possible conceptual
 15 limitations that might prevent us from seeing fundamental changes in how social movements
 16 relate to states and other forces in an increasingly interconnected global environment.

17 Given this analytical starting point, we offer some thoughts about questions that deserve
 18 greater attention from researchers working in the field of social movements and social
 19 change.

22 Political Contexts

- 24 • To understand the ways political contexts shape social movement dynamics, it is
 25 imperative that analysts try to account for the transnational influences that may be
 26 impinging on a given social conflict. National borders are in many ways arbitrary
 27 boundaries that reside more in our conceptual maps than in the real world where polit-
 28 ical actors operate. This is not to say that national policies and institutions don't mat-
 29 ter, but rather that these are often shaped by transnational or global forces. By ignoring
 30 global influences on national political contexts we fail to appreciate fully the range of
 31 constraints and opportunities that define the political contexts in which social move-
 32 ments operate. Analysts should seek a more complete understanding of the important
 33 relationships between national and global level economic, cultural, and political
 34 processes. For instance, how does the embeddedness of the state within a broader sys-
 35 tem of global political and economic relationships affect social movement mobiliza-
 36 tion and policy impact? How does the position of a given state in the broader world
 37 system define alliance opportunities for social movements within that state?
- 38 • By taking a global perspective, we quickly notice that recent years have witnessed a
 39 growing and widespread sense of disillusion with democratic institutions and the
 40 prospects for democratization in the global south. There are expanding discussions of
 41 a "legitimacy crisis" in global institutions, as states transfer authority and capacity to
 42 international organizations without developing a corresponding structure to allow
 43 democratic input and accountability (Bello 2003; Markoff 1999; McMichael 2003). At
 44 the same time, national democratic institutions are also losing the confidence of citi-
 45 zens (Norris 1999). This signals a vulnerability of global institutions that could either
 46 generate new nationalist mobilizations or contribute to expanded calls for global
 47 democratization (cf. Barber 1995). We can readily point to evidence that both nation-
 48 alist and pro-democracy mobilizations are happening in different parts of the world,

- 01 and we need to better understand what shapes each one as well as how each affects the
 02 broader political context.
- 03 • Political contexts at national levels are increasingly influenced by inter-state institu-
 04 tional factors. But we need more research to assess how transnational political contexts
 05 impact social movement dynamics within and across states. For instance, in recent
 06 years, we have seen a turn toward more confrontational relationships between social
 07 movements and global institutions. Why has this change happened, and does it sig-
 08 nal changes in the configurations of opportunities at the global level, or does it result
 09 more from changing activist perceptions of these?
 - 10 • As scholars puzzle over the structural aspects of social movements under increasing
 11 globalization, one of the questions that movements pose is the extent to which mobiliz-
 12 ing structures can be transferred to other political contexts. As activists themselves
 13 endeavor to extend the reach of their movements beyond national borders, it is worth
 14 considering which institutional resources can be moved from one country to another, and
 15 which mobilizing structures can be replicated or approximated in other locations.
 16 Scholars have only begun asking questions about the relative transferability of structural
 17 aspects of social movements at this point, and it is sure to be an important ongoing
 18 pursuit among scholars and activists alike.
 - 19 • Finally, in the post-9/11 era, it is crucial that social movement scholars consider the
 20 long-term impacts of the “war on terror” (or as it is now called the “long war”) on both
 21 domestic and transnational social movements. Will the emphasis on counter-terrorism
 22 generate a strengthening of coercive state apparatus and a reversal of the international
 23 human rights regime? Will it help slow and reverse the globalization project that has
 24 been the predominant influence on the world political economy in recent decades?
 25 Will it alter our assumptions about the social movement society as it has been experi-
 26 enced in the West?

30 Mobilizing Structures

31 As our discussion in the preceding suggests, global integration has important implications for
 32 how people organize politically, in large part because it is driven largely by the expansion of
 33 capitalist modes of production and labor organization. As more people’s lives are governed
 34 by production and distribution processes that are globally organized, we must account for
 35 how the global organization of work impacts the very local mobilizing contexts in which indi-
 36 viduals are embedded. Also, global integration involves the emergence of new types of orga-
 37 nizational structures that impact social movements as well as other parts of society.

- 39 • Social movement scholars have focused increasingly on questions of collective iden-
 40 tity, and this is a promising development in the literature. Nevertheless, we see room
 41 for even more work to explore the relationships between economic and political struc-
 42 tures and transnational identity formation in particular. One area that deserves more
 43 attention from social movement scholars is the labor movement. The U.S. labor move-
 44 ment’s emphasis on business unionism as well as the conservative, anti-communist
 45 emphasis in much international labor organizing (e.g., O’Brien 2000) led many social
 46 movement researchers to neglect the labor movement as a topic of inquiry. But even
 47 though it is now clear that people are motivated to act politically around a range of
 48 different issues and identities, labor remains a crucial area of potential political

01 engagement. Indeed, segments of labor movements from different parts of the world
 02 are playing leadership roles in contemporary transnational mobilizations. We need to
 03 know more about the possibilities for making connections between labor and other
 04 collective identities within and between nations. For instance, what are possibilities for
 05 transnational labor movement, given the changes brought about by global economic
 06 integration? Will the movement be mobilized as labor, or as a coalition of civil soci-
 07 ety actors/interests (cf. Clawson 2003; Turner, 2003; Waterman and Timms 2004).

- 08 • Another important feature of globalization's impact on the organization of labor is
 09 seen in patterns of migration and conflicts over definitions of citizenship (Brysk and
 10 Shafir 2004; Fox 2005; Sassen 2000). The contemporary immigrant rights mobiliza-
 11 tions dramatize the importance of this theme, and social movements researchers can
 12 contribute to our understandings of these mobilizations and their impact by explor-
 13 ing questions such as: what shapes effective coalition-building between immigrant
 14 and non-immigrant sectors of particular societies? What sorts of claims-making are
 15 being articulated by different groups of immigrant activists, and are claims anchored
 16 in international human rights language or some other language? What variation
 17 exists in terms of national responses to immigrants' claims, and what explains this
 18 variation?
- 19 • As technologies enable new forms of political and social organization, we should
 20 expect changes in how social movements are organized. People around the world are
 21 increasingly likely to be involved somehow in globally organized commodity produc-
 22 tion and distribution chains, and therefore they are exposed to ways of thinking and
 23 acting that are consistent with globalized organizational structures. Forms of organi-
 24 zation once unfamiliar are now well understood by people around the globe. This
 25 expands organizing possibilities, and may increase the extent of isomorphism between
 26 corporate and civil society organizational forms. For instance, we noted that social
 27 movements researchers speak increasingly of networks or multiorganizational fields of
 28 interconnected actors. But despite the importance of the network concept to our under-
 29 standing of social movements, most existing networks research is based on case stud-
 30 ies of single movements. We lack systematic data that will allow us to compare
 31 networks across issues or time (cf. Lauman and Knoke 1987). Future research should
 32 seek to develop more comparative analyses of networks across time, issue, and place.
 33 Also, more work needs to be done to examine networks of ties between social move-
 34 ment actors and governments, parties, and international organizations (e.g., della Porta
 35 et al. 2006). Analyses of global political institutions, for instance, suggest that network
 36 ties between social movements and the United Nations will differ in important ways
 37 from those between movements and global financial institutions.

38 39 40 41 **BRIDGES AND OVERLAPS WITH OTHER** 42 **DISCIPLINES AND REVIEW** 43 **OF INTERDISCIPLINARY ADVANCES** 44

45 Although we have focused here on structural approaches to the study of social movements,
 46 we do not claim that this lens is the only one through which social movements should be
 47 viewed. Rather, we consider this perspective is best utilized when taken as an orienting
 48 concept, keeping social movements theorists attuned to the structural, institutional, and

01 contextual factors that order social movement activity. We therefore see many opportunities
02 for structural perspectives to bridge with other approaches to the study of social movements.
03 We see structural approaches in dialogue with, for example, cultural aspects of social move-
04 ments. For instance:

- 05 • Constructivism in international relations research has focused on the ways nongovern-
06 mental actors, including social movements, interact with other global actors, shaping
07 global institutions and norms.
- 08 • The world polity approach in sociology has expanded attention to institutional
09 processes and cultural influences that affect the organizational forms, agendas, and
10 systems of meanings across diverse national states.
- 11 • Organizational and institutional analyses can contribute to our understandings of
12 social movement processes (Davis et al. 2005).

13 Social movement scholars will also find much in common with political scientists
14 working on themes of democracy and democratization. While many scholars do read
15 across these literatures, there is much room for expanding a dialogue here. Indeed,
16 social movement scholars might be more explicit in their attention to questions of
17 how movement mobilizations relate to broader processes of democratization and
18 repression.
19

20 Understanding social change processes that take place within a context of multiple and
21 inter-connected political arenas operating at local, national, and global levels requires that we
22 re-think our methods and concepts. We have argued here, for instance, that globalization
23 processes are fundamentally altering the structure and operations of national states. But much
24 research continues to assume fairly constant state structures and meaningful boundaries
25 between states. The expansion of global research highlights some of the historical, geographic,
26 and disciplinary blinders that may be inhibiting our efforts to understand the processes of
27 social change. Anheier and Katz (and others) warn against “methodological nationalism,”
28 or the “tendency of the social sciences to remain in the statistical and conceptual categories of
29 the nation state” (2005:206). Overcoming methodological nationalism requires both intellec-
30 tual openness and innovativeness on the part of researchers.

31 In particular, it is clear that understanding relationships between social structure, human
32 agency, and social change requires a multiplicity of disciplinary approaches and research
33 methods ranging from detailed qualitative studies to large-scale quantitative and historical
34 work. This is required because many of the relationships between local contexts or experi-
35 ences and global structures and processes remain to be uncovered. We need rich descriptive
36 accounts of the global–local links in the specific places where relevant policies are enacted,
37 decided, and invented in order to put the global puzzle together. And we also need “big
38 picture,” macro-level accounts that can help us understand how particular practices, beliefs,
39 and structures have differed or changed across time and place.

40 Another methodological challenge is that the spaces in which global politics take place
41 may not resemble those social spaces for which conventional research methodologies have
42 been designed. For instance, the global conference is a unique site of social experience that
43 differs fundamentally from the ethnographic field sites in which the architects of ethno-
44 graphic methodologies worked. While we can draw from that foundation, attempts to adapt
45 these research tools to somewhat novel social spaces can be fruitful. For instance, research on
46 activist discourses and actions at the World Social Forums and other global meetings requires
47 the short-term deployment of trained observers to meetings lasting several days, rather than
48 the long-term embedding of a single observer within a single organization or community.

01 Greater efforts at collaborative research are needed to study effectively important events such
02 as the World Social Forums and their counterparts at regional, national, and local levels.

03 While states are embedded within an increasingly global institutional arena, they still
04 have distinct histories and social contexts, and therefore we need to enhance our access to
05 data that can allow us to make comparisons across different national contexts. This is quite
06 difficult for those studying social movements in particular, as it is often difficult to find valid
07 records of civil society organizations and events in particular countries. Much more difficult
08 is finding data sources that can be reliably compared across nations. But how useful it would
09 be to have a measure, for instance, of the comparative strength of civil societies across nations
10 and even time!

11 12 13 SUGGESTED READINGS

- 14
15 Buechler, Stephen M. 2000. *Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism: The Political Economy and Cultural*
16 *Construction of Social Activism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- 17 Clemens, Elizabeth S. and Debra Minkoff. "Beyond the Iron Law: Rethinking the Place of Organizations in Social
18 Movement Research." Pp. 155–170 in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by D. A. Snow,
19 S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi. Oxford: Blackwell.
- 20 Diani, Mario and Doug McAdam (eds). 2003. *Social Movements and Networks*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 21 della Porta, Donatella, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Dieter Rucht, Eds. 1999. *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*.
22 New York: St. Martin's Press.
- 23 Edwards, Bob and John D. McCarthy. 2004. "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization." Pp. 116151 in
24 *Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi. New York:
25 Blackwell.
- 26 Jenkins, J. Craig and Bert Klandermans. 1995. *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States*
27 *and Social Movements*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- 28 Kriesi, Hanspeter, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Marco Giugni. 1995. *New Social Movements in*
29 *Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- 30 McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer Zald (eds). 1996. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements:*
31 *Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 32 McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald (eds). 1987. *Social Movements in an Organizational Society*. New Brunswick,
33 NJ: Transaction.
- 34 Mueller, Carol. 1994. "Conflict Networks and the Origins of Women's Liberation." Pp. 234–263 in *New Social*
35 *Movements: From Ideology to Identity*, edited by E. Larana, H. Johnston, and J. R. Gusfield. Philadelphia:
36 Temple University Press.
- 37 Quadagno, Jill. 1992. "Social Movements and State Transformation: Labor Unions and Racial Conflict in the War
38 on Poverty." *American Sociological Review* 57:616–634.
- 39 Ray, Raka. 1999. *Fields of Protest: Women's Movements in India*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- 40 Tarrow, Sidney. 1998. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics*, 2nd edition. New York:
41 Cambridge University Press.
- 42 Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.

43 44 45 REFERENCES

- 46 Adamovsky, Ezequiel. 2005. "Beyond the World Social Forum: The Need for New Institutions," vol. 2005:
47 Opendemocracy.net.
- 48 Amenta, Edwin, Neal Caren, and Sheera J. Olasky. 2005. "Age for Leisure? Political Mediation and the Impact of
the Pension Movement on U.S. Old-Age Policy." *American Sociological Review* 70:516–538.
- Amenta, Edwin, Neal Caren, Tina Fetner, and Michael P. Young. 2002. "Challengers and States: Toward a Political
Sociology of Social Movements." *Research in Political Sociology* 10:47–83.
- Anderson, Benedict. 1991. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London:
Verso.

- 01 Andrews, Kenneth T. and Bob Edwards. 2005. "The Organizational Structure of Local Environmentalism."
02 *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 10(2):213–234.
- 03 Anheier, Helmut and Hagai Katz. 2005. "Network Approaches to Global Civil Society." Pp. 206–221 in *Global Civil*
04 *Society 2004/5*, edited by H. Anheier, M. Glasius, and M. Kaldor. London: Sage Publications.
- 05 Armstrong, Elizabeth A. 2002. *Forging Gay Identities: Organizing Sexuality in San Francisco, 1950–1994*. Chicago:
06 University of Chicago Press.
- 07 Arrighi, Giovanni. 1999. "Globalization and Historical Macrosociology." Pp. 117–133 in *Sociology for the Twenty-*
08 *First Century*, edited by J. L. Abu-Lughod. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 09 Arrighi, Giovanni and Jessica Drangel. 1986. "The Stratification of the World-Economy: An Exploration of the
10 Semiperipheral Zone." *Review* 10:9–74.
- 11 Baiocchi, Gianpaolo. 2004. "The Party and the Multitudes: Brazil's Worker's Party (PT) and the Challenges of
12 Building a Just Social Order in the Globalizing Context." *Journal of World Systems Research* 10:199–215.
13 Available at: <http://jwsr.ucr.edu>.
- 14 Banaszak, Lee Ann. 1996. *Why Movements Succeed or Fail* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- 15 Bandy, Joe and Jackie Smith, eds. 2005. *Coalitions Across Borders: Transnational Protest and the Neoliberal Order*.
16 Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- 17 Barber, Benjamin. 1995. *Jihad Vs. McWorld*. New York: Random House.
- 18 Bello, Walden. 2003. *Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy*. London and New York: Zed Books.
- 19 Bello, Walden. 2000. "Building an Iron Cage: Bretton Woods Institutions, the WTO, and the South." Pp. 54–90 in
20 *Views from the South: The Effects of Globalization and the WTO on Third World Countries*, edited by
21 S. Anderson. Chicago: Food First Books.
- 22 Bennett, W. Lance. 2004. "Branded Political Communication: Lifestyle Politics, Logo Campaigns, and the Rise of
23 Global Citizenship." Pp. 101–125 in *Politics, Products, and Markets: Exploring Political Consumerism Past and*
24 *Present*, edited by M. Micheletti, A. Follesdal, and D. Stolle. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
- 25 Bennett, W. Lance. 2005. "Social Movements Beyond Borders: Understanding Two Eras of Transnational Activism."
26 Pp. 203–226 in *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*, edited by D. della Porta and S. Tarrow. Lanham,
27 MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- 28 Bissio, Roberto. 1999. "Occupying New Places for Public Life: Politics and People in a Network Society."
29 Pp. 429–459 in *Whose World Is It Anyway? Civil Society, the United Nations, and the Multilateral Future*,
30 edited by J. W. Foster and A. Anand. Ottawa: United Nations Association of Canada.
- 31 Boli, John and George M. Thomas, eds. 1999. *Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental*
32 *Organizations Since 1875*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- 33 Borer, Tristan. 1998. *Challenging the State: Churches as Political Actors in South Africa, 1980–1994*. Notre Dame,
34 IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
- 35 Boswell, Terry and Christopher Chase-Dunn. 2000. *The Spiral of Capitalism and Socialism*. Boulder, CO: Lynne
36 Rienner Publishers.
- 37 Boyer, Robert and J. Rogers Hollingsworth. 1997. "From National Embeddedness to Spatial and Institutional
38 Nestedness." Pp. 433–484 in *Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions*, edited by J. R.
39 Hollingsworth and R. Boyer. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 40 Brysk, Alison. 2000. *From Tribal Village to Global Village: Indigenous Peoples Struggles in Latin America*.
41 Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- 42 Brysk, Alison and Gershon Shafir. 2004. *People Out of Place: Globalization, Human Rights, and the Citizenship*
43 *Gap*. New York: Routledge.
- 44 Buechler, Stephen M. 2000. *Social Movements in Advanced Capitalism: The Political Economy and Cultural*
45 *Construction of Social Activism*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- 46 Burstein, Paul, Rachel Einwohner, and Jocelyn Hollander. 1995. "The Success of Political Movements: A Bargaining
47 Perspective." Pp. 275–295 in *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States and Social*
48 *Movements*, edited by J. C. Jenkins and B. Klandermans. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Buss, Doris and Didi Herman. 2003. *Globalizing Family Values: The Christian Right in International Politics*.
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- Campbell, John L. 2005. "Where Do We Stand? Common Mechanisms in Organizations and Social Movements
Research." In *Social Movements and Organization Theory*, edited by G.F. Davis, D. McAdam, W.R. Scott, and
M.N. Zald. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Campbell, John L. and Ove K. Pedersen, eds. 2001. *The Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis*. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Caniglia, Beth Schaefer. 2001. "Informal Alliances Vs. Institutional Ties: The Effects of Elite Alliances on
Environmental TSMO Networks." *Mobilization: An International Journal* 6:37–54.

2. Structural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

49

- 01 Carroll, William K. and Robert S. Ratner. 1996. "Master Framing and Cross-Movement Networking in
02 Contemporary Social Movements." *Sociological Quarterly* 37:601–625.
- 03 Castells, Manuel. 1996. *The Rise of the Network Society*. Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- 04 Centeno, Miguel A. 2002. *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America*. University Park, PA:
05 Pennsylvania State University Press.
- 06 Chase-Dunn, Christopher. 1998. *Global Formation*, updated edition. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield.
- 07 Chatfield, Charles. 1997. "Intergovernmental and Nongovernmental Associations to 1945." Pp. 19–41 in
08 *Transnational Social Movements and World Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State*, edited by J. Smith,
09 C. Chatfield, and R. Pagnucco. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- 10 Chilton, Patricia. 1995. "Mechanics of Change: Social Movements, Transnational Coalitions, and the Transformation
11 Process in Eastern Europe." In *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In*, edited by T. Risse-Kappen.
12 New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 13 Chirot, Daniel and Thomas D. Hall. 1982. "World System Theory." *American Review of Sociology* 8:81–106.
- 14 Clark, Ann Marie. 2003. *Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms*.
15 Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- 16 Clawson, Dan. 2003. *The Next Upsurge: Labor and the New Social Movements*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- 17 Clemens, Elisabeth. 1996. *The People's Lobby*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 18 ——. 1998. "To Move Mountains: Collective Action and the Possibility of Institutional Change." Pp. 109–123 in
19 *From Contention to Democracy*, edited by M. G. Giugni, D. McAdam, and C. Tilly. Boulder, CO: Rowman &
20 Littlefield.
- 21 Coleman, William D. and Tony Porter. 2000. "International Institutions, Globalization and Democracy: Assessing the
22 Challenges." *Global Society* 14:377–398.
- 23 Coleman, William D. and Sarah Wayland. 2004. "The Origins of Global Civil Society and Non-Territorial
24 Governance: Some Empirical Reflections." *Globalization and Autonomy Online Compendium*. Accessed
25 November 7, 2006 at http://www.globalautonomy.ca/global1/article.jsp?index = RA_Coleman_Origins.xml.
- 26 Cunningham, David. 2005. "State versus Social Movement: FBI Counterintelligence Against the New Left."
27 Pp. 45–77 in *States, Parties, and Social Movements*, edited by J. A. Goldstone. New York: Cambridge
28 University Press.
- 29 Curtis, James E., Douglas E. Baer, and Edward G. Grabb. 2001. "Nations of Joiners: Explaining Voluntary
30 Association Membership in Democratic Societies." *American Sociological Review* 66:783–805.
- 31 Daly, Herman. 2002. "Globalization versus Internationalization, and Four Economic Arguments for Why
32 Internationalization is a Better Model for World Community." Accessed 13 November 2006 at
33 www.bsos.umd.edu/socy/conference/newpapers/daly.rtf
- 34 Davenport, Christian, Hank Johnston, and Carol Mueller, Ed(s). 2005. *Repression and Mobilization*. Minneapolis:
35 University of Minnesota Press.
- 36 Davies, John C. 1962. "Towards a Theory of Revolution." *American Sociological Review* 27:5–19.
- 37 Davis, Gerald, Doug McAdam, W. Richard Scott, and Mayer Zald, eds. 2005. *Social Movements and Organizational
38 Theory*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 39 della Porta, Donatella. 2005. "Making the Polis: Social Forums and Democracy in the Global Justice Movement."
40 *Mobilization: An International Journal* 10:73–94.
- 41 della Porta, Donatella, Massimiliano Andretta, Lorenzo Mosca, and Herbert Reiter. 2006. *Globalization From Below:
42 Transnational Activists and Protest Networks*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- 43 della Porta, Donatella, Abby Peterson, and Herbert Reiter, eds. 2007. *The Policing of Transnational Protest*. London:
44 Ashgate.
- 45 della Porta, Donatella and Herbert Reiter, eds. 1998. *Policing Protest: The Control of Mass Demonstrations in
46 Western Democracies*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- 47 della Porta, Donatella and Dieter Rucht. 1995. "Left-Libertarian Movements in Context: A Comparison of Italy and
48 West Germany, 1965–1990." Pp. 229–272 in *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States
and Social Movements*, edited by B. Klandermans and C. Jenkins. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota
Press.
- Diani, Mario. 1995. *Green Networks: A Structural Analysis of the Italian Environmental Movement*. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press.
- . 2003. "Networks and Social Movements: A Research Program." Pp. 299–319 in *Social Movements and
Networks*, edited by M. Diani and D. McAdam. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2004. "Networks and Participation." Pp. 339–358 in *Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by
D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi. Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- Diani, Mario and Doug McAdam, eds. 2003. *Social Movements and Networks*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- 01 Earl, Jennifer (guest editor). 2006. *Special Focus Issue of Mobilization on Repression and the Social Control of*
 02 *Protest. Mobilization: An International Journal* 11(2):129–280.
- 03 Economy, Elizabeth C. 2004. *The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future*. Ithaca, NY:
 04 Cornell University Press.
- 05 Edwards, Bob and Sam Marullo. 1995. "Organizational Mortality in a Declining Movement: The Demise of Peace
 06 Movement Organizations in the End of the Cold War Era." *American Sociological Review* 60:805–825.
- 07 Edwards, Bob and Sam Marullo. 2003. "Social Movement Organizations Beyond the Beltway: Understanding the
 08 Diversity of One Social Movement Industry." *Mobilization* 8:87–107.
- 09 Edwards, Bob and Michael Foley. 2003. "Social Movement Organizations Beyond the Beltway: Understanding the
 10 Diversity of One Social Movement Industry." *Mobilization: An International Journal* 8:87–107.
- 11 Edwards, Bob and John D. McCarthy. 2004. "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization." Pp. 116–151 in
 12 *Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi. Oxford and
 13 Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- 14 Eisinger, Peter. 1973. "Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities." *American Political Science Review*
 15 67:11–28.
- 16 Escobar, Arturo. 2003. "Other Worlds Are (already) Possible: Self-Organisation, Complexity, and Post-Capitalist
 17 Cultures." Pp. 349–358 in *Challenging Empires: the World Social Forum*, edited by J. Sen, A. Anand,
 18 A. Escobar, and P. Waterman. Third World Institute: Available in Pdf format at www.choike.org.
- 19 Escobar, Arturo and Sonia E. Alvarez. 1992. "The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy,
 20 and Democracy." Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- 21 Evans, Peter B. 1997. "The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization." *World Politics*
 22 50:62–87.
- 23 Evans, Sara. 1980. *Personal Politics: The Roots of Women's Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New*
 24 *Left*. New York: Vintage Books.
- 25 Faucheux, Ron. 1995. "The Grassroots Explosion." *Campaigns and Elections*
- 26 Ferree, Myra Marx. 1987. "Equality and Autonomy: Feminist Politics in the U.S. and the Federal Republic
 27 of Germany." Pp. 172–195 in *The Women's Movements of the United States and Western Europe*, edited by
 28 M. F. Katzenstein and C. M. Mueller. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- 29 Ferree, Myra Marx and Carol Mueller. 2004. "Feminism and the Women's Movement: A Global Perspective."
 30 Pp. 576–607 in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and
 31 H. Kriesi. Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- 32 Finnemore, Martha. 1996a. *National Interests in International Society*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- 33 ——. 1996b. "Sociology's Institutionalism." *International Organization* 50:325–47.
- 34 Florini, Ann. 2003. *The Coming Democracy: New Rules for Running a New World*. Washington, D.C.: Island Press.
- 35 Foster, John and Anita Anand, eds. 1999. *Whose World Is It Anyway? Civil Society, the United Nations, and the*
 36 *Multilateral Future*. Ottawa: United Nations Association of Canada.
- 37 Fox, Jonathan. 2005. "Unpacking 'Transnational Citizenship'." *Annual Review of Political Science* 8:171–201.
- 38 Fox, Jonathan and L. David Brown, eds. 1998. *The Struggle for Accountability: The World Bank, NGOs, and*
 39 *Grassroots Movements*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- 40 Francisco, Ronald. 1996. "The Relationship between Coercion and Protest." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*
 41 39:263–282.
- 42 Frank, David John, Ann Hironaka, and Evan Schofer. 2000. "The Nation-State and the Natural Environment over the
 43 Twentieth Century." *American Sociological Review* 65:96–116.
- 44 Gamson, William. 1990. *Strategy of Social Protest*, 2nd ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
- 45 Gamson, William A. 2004. "Bystanders, Public Opinion, and the Media." Pp. 242–261 in *The Blackwell Companion*
 46 *to Social Movements*, edited by D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi. Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell
 47 Publishing.
- 48 Gamson, William and David Meyer. 1996. "The Framing of Political Opportunity." In *Political Opportunities,*
Mobilizing Structures and Framing: Social Movement Dynamics in Cross-National Perspective, edited by
 D. McAdam, J. McCarthy, and M. Zald. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Giugni, Marco. 1998. "Was It Worth the Effort? The Outcomes and Consequences of Social Movements." *Annual*
Review of Sociology 24:371–393.
- . 2002. "The Other Side of the Coin: Explaining Crossnational Similarities Between Social Movements."
 Pp. 11–24 in *Globalization and Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements*, edited by J. Smith
 and H. Johnston. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Giugni, Marco, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly. 1999. *How Social Movements Matter*. Minneapolis, MN:
 University of Minnesota Press.

2. Structural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

51

- 01 Glasius, Marlies. 2002. "Expertise in the Cause of Justice: Global Civil Society Influence on the Statute for an
02 International Criminal Court." Pp. 137–169 in *Global Civil Society Yearbook, 2002*, edited by M. Glasius, M.
03 Kaldor, and H. Anheier. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 04 Goodwin, Jeffrey and James Jasper. 1999. "Caught in a Winding, Snarling Vine: The Structural Bias of Political
05 Process Theory." *Sociological Forum* 14:27–54.
- 06 Greenberg, Josh and Graham Knight. 2004. "Framing Sweatshops: Nike, Global Production, and the American News
07 Media." *Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies* 1:151–175.
- 08 Gurney, Joan Neff and Kathleen J. Tierney. 1982. "Relative Deprivation and Social Movements: A Critical Look at
09 Twenty Years of Theory and Research." *The Sociological Quarterly* 23:33–47.
- 10 Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- 11 Haas, Peter. 1992. "Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination." *International Organization*
12 46:1–35.
- 13 Hafner-Burton, Emilie M. and Kiyotero Tsutsui. 2005. "Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of
14 Empty Promises." *American Journal of Sociology* 110:1373–1411.
- 15 Hanagan, Michael. 2002. "Irish Transnational Social Movements, Migrants, and the State System." Pp. 53–74 in
16 *Globalization and Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of Social Movements*, edited by J. Smith and
17 H. Johnston. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield.
- 18 Hannan, Michael T. and John Freeman. 1977. "The Population Ecology of Organizations." *American Journal of*
19 *Sociology* 82:929–964.
- 20 Herman, Edward. 1995. *Triumph of the Market: Essays on Economics, Politics, and the Media*. Boston: South End
21 Press.
- 22 Herman, Edward and Noam Chomsky. 1988. *Manufacturing Consent*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- 23 Hertel, Shareen. 2006. *Unexpected Power: Conflict and Change Among Transnational Activists*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
24 University Press.
- 25 Hippler, Jochen, ed. 1995. *The Democratisation of Disempowerment: The Problem of Democracy in the Third World*.
26 East Haven, CT: Pluto Press with Transnational Institute.
- 27 Huntington, Samuel. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- 28 Imig, Doug and Sidney Tarrow. 2001. *Contentious Europeans: Protest and Politics in an Integrating Europe*.
29 Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- 30 Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne E. Baker. 2000. "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional
31 Values." *American Sociological Review* 65:19–51.
- 32 Jenkins, J. Craig and Charles Perrow. 1977. "Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements." *American*
33 *Sociological Review* 42:249–268.
- 34 Jenkins, J. Craig and Bert Klandermans. 1995. *The Politics of Social Protest: Comparative Perspectives on States*
35 *and Social Movements*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- 36 Jenkins, J. Craig and Kurt Schock. 1992. "Global Structures and Political Processes in the Study of Domestic
37 Political Conflict." *Annual Review of Sociology* 18:161–185.
- 38 Katz, Hagai and Helmut Anheier. 2006. "Global Connectedness: The Structure of Transnational NGO Networks."
39 Pp. 240–265 in *Global Civil Society 2005/6*, edited by M. Glasius, M. Kaldor, and H. Anheier. London: Sage
40 Publications.
- 41 Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists Beyond Borders*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- 42 Khagram, Sanjeev, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink. 2002. *Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social*
43 *Movements, Networks, and Norms*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- 44 Killian, Lewis M. 1964. "Social Movements." Pp. 426–455 in *Handbook of Modern Sociology*, edited by Robert E.
45 L. Faris. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- 46 Kimball, Penn. 1994. *Downsizing the News: Network Cutbacks in the Nation's Capital*. Washington, DC and
47 Baltimore: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- 48 King, Brayden G., Marie Cornwall, and Eric C. Dahlin. 2005. "Winning Woman Suffrage One Step at a Time: Social
Movements and the Logic of the Legislative Process." *Social Forces* 83(3):1211–1234.
- King, Brayden G., Marie Cornwall, and Eric C. Dahlin. 2005. "Winning Woman Suffrage One Step at a Time: Social
Movements and the Logic of the Legislative Process." *Social Forces* 83(3):1211–1234.
- Kitschelt, Herbert P. 1986. "Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear Movements in Four
Democracies." *British Journal of Political Science* 16:57–85.
- Knoke, David. 1990. *Political Networks: The Structural Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Koopmans, Ruud. 2005. "Repression and the Public Sphere: Discursive Opportunities for Repression against the
Extreme Right in Germany in the 1990s." Pp. 159–188 in *Mobilization and Repression*, edited by C. Davenport,
H. Johnston, and C. Mueller. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

- 01 Koopmans, Ruud and Paul Statham. 1999a. "Challenging the Liberal Nation-State? Postnationalism,
02 Multiculturalism, and the Collective Claims Making of Migrants and Ethnic Minorities in Britain and
03 Germany." *American Journal of Sociology* 105:652–696.
- 04 ——. 1999b. "Ethnic and Civic Conceptions of Nationhood and the Differential Success of the Extreme Right in
05 Germany." Pp. 225–252 in *How Social Movements Matter*, edited by M. Giugni, D. McAdam, and C. Tilly.
06 Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- 07 Korzeniewicz, Roberto P. and Timothy P. Moran. 1997. "World Economic Trends in the Distribution of Income,
08 1965–1992." *American Journal of Sociology* 102:1000–1039.
- 09 ——. 2006. "World Inequality in the Twenty-First Century: Patterns and Tendencies." in *The Blackwell Companion
10 to Globalization*, edited by G. Ritzer. Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- 11 Korzeniewicz, Roberto P. and William C. Smith. 2000. "Poverty, Inequality, and Growth in Latin America: Searching
12 for the High Road to Globalization." *Latin American Research Review* 35:7–54.
- 13 ——. 2001. "Protest and Collaboration: Transnational Civil Society Networks and the Politics of Summity and Free
14 Trade in the Americas." North-South Center, University of Miami, FL.
- 15 ——. 2003. "Mapping Regional Civil Society Networks in Latin America." Ford Foundation.
- 16 Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1996. "The Organizational Structure of New Social Movements in a Political Context."
17 Pp. 152–184 in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures,
18 and Cultural Framings*, edited by D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald. New York: Cambridge
19 University Press.
- 20 ——. 2004. "Political Context and Opportunity." Pp. 67–90 in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*,
21 edited by D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi. Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- 22 Kriesi, Hanspeter, Ruud Koopmans, Jan W. Duyvendak, and Marco G. Giugni. 1995. *New Social Movements in
23 Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- 24 Lauman, Edward O. and David Knoke. 1987. *The Organizational State: Social Choice in National Policy Domains*.
25 Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
- 26 Laxer, Gordon and Sandra Halperin. 2003. *Global Civil Society and its Limits*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- 27 Levering, Ralph A. 1997. "Brokering the Law of the Sea Treaty: The Neptune Group." In *Transnational Social
28 Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity Beyond the State*, edited by J. Smith, C. Chatfield, and R. Pagnucco.
29 Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- 30 Lichterman, Paul. 1996. *The Search for Political Community: American Activists Reinventing Commitment*. New
31 York: Cambridge University Press.
- 32 Lipsky, Michael. 1968. "Protest as a Political Resource." *American Political Science Review* 62:1144–1158.
- 33 Maney, Gregory M. 2001. "Rival Transnational Networks and Indigenous Rights: The San Blas Kuna in Panama and
34 the Yanomami in Brazil." *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change* 23:103–144.
- 35 Maney, Gregory M., Lynne M. Woehle, and Patrick G. Coy. 2005. "Harnessing and Challenging Hegemony: The
36 U.S. Peace Movement after 9/11." *Sociological Perspectives* 48:357–381.
- 37 Markoff, John. 1996. *Waves of Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change*. Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge
38 Press.
- 39 ——. 1999. "Globalization and the Future of Democracy." *Journal of World-Systems Research*
40 <http://csf.colorado.edu/wsystems/jwsr.html> 5:242–262.
- 41 ——. 2003. "Margins, Centers, and Democracy: The Paradigmatic History of Women's Suffrage." *Signs: Journal of
42 Women in Culture and Society* 29:85–116.
- 43 ——. 2004. "Who Will Construct the Global Order?" in *Transnational Democracy*, edited by B. Williamson.
44 London: Ashgate.
- 45 Markoff, John and Veronica Montecinos. 1993. "The Ubiquitous Rise of Economists." *Journal of Public Policy*
46 13:37–68.
- 47 Marks, Gary and Doug McAdam. 1996. "Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political Opportunity in
48 the European Community." Pp. 95–120 in *Governance in the European Union*, edited by G. Marks, F. W.
Scharpf, P. C. Schmitter, and W. Streeck. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Marwell, Gerald and Pamela Oliver. 1993. *The Critical Mass in Collective Action*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press.
- McAdam, Doug. 1982. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*. Chicago and
London: University of Chicago Press.
- McAdam, Doug, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer Zald (eds). 1996. *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements:
Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Cultural Framings*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- McAdam, Doug, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly. 2001. *Dynamics of Contention*. New York: Cambridge University
Press.

2. Structural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

53

- 01 McCarthy, John D. 1996. "Mobilizing Structures: Constraints and Opportunities in Adopting, Adapting and
02 Inventing." Pp. 141–151 in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing
03 Structures and Cultural Framings*, edited by D. McAdam, J. McCarthy, and M. Zald. New York: Cambridge
04 University Press.
- 05 McCarthy, John D. and Mayer Zald. 1977. "Resource Mobilization in Social Movements: A Partial Theory."
06 *American Journal of Sociology* 82:1212–1241.
- 07 McCarthy, John D., David Britt, and Mark Wolfson. 1991. "The Institutional Channeling of Social Movements in the
08 Modern State." Pp. 45–76 in *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change*, vol. 13. Greenwich, CT: JAI
09 Press.
- 10 McCarthy, John D. and Clark McPhail. 2006. "Places of Protest: The Public Forum in Principle and Practice."
11 *Mobilization* 11:229–248.
- 12 McCarthy, John D., Clark McPhail, and John Crist. 1999. "The Diffusion and Adoption of Public Order Management
13 Systems." Pp. 71–95 in *Social Movements in a Globalizing World*, edited by D. della Porta, H. Kriesi, and
14 D. Rucht. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- 15 McCarthy, John D., Jackie Smith, and Mayer Zald. 1996. "Accessing Media, Electoral and Government Agendas."
16 Pp. 291–311 in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures
17 and Cultural Framings*, edited by D. McAdam, J. McCarthy, and M. Zald. New York: Cambridge University
18 Press.
- 19 McCarthy, John D. and Mark Wolfson. 1992. "Consensus Movements, Conflict Movements, and the Cooptation of
20 Civic and State Infrastructures." Pp. 273–300 in *Frontiers in Social Movement Theory*, edited by A. Morris and
21 C. M. Mueller. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- 22 ———. 1996. "Resource Mobilization by Local Social Movement Organizations: Agency, Strategy, and Organization
23 in the Movement against Drinking and Driving." *American Sociological Review* 61:1070–1088.
- 24 McCarthy, John D., Mark Wolfson, David P. Baker, and Elaine Mosakowski. 1988. "The Founding of Social
25 Movement Organizations: Local Citizens Groups Opposing Drunk Driving." Pp. 71–84 in *Ecological Models of
26 Organizations*, edited by G. R. Carroll. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.
- 27 McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald. 1973. *The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and
28 Resource Mobilization*. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.
- 29 ———. 1987. "The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization."
30 Pp. 393–420 in *Social Movements in an Organizational Society*, edited by M. Zald and J. D. McCarthy.
31 New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- 32 ———. 2002. "The Enduring Vitality of the Resource Mobilization Theory of Social Movements." In *Handbook of
33 Sociological Theory*, edited by J. H. Turner. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Press.
- 34 McChesney, Robert W. 1999. *Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communication Politics in Dubious Times*. Champaign-
35 Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- 36 McCright, Aaron and Riley Dunlap. 2003. "Defeating Kyoto: The Conservative Movement's Impact on U.S. Climate
37 Change Policy." *Social Problems* 50:348–373.
- 38 McMichael, Philip. 2003. *Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective*, 3rd edition. Thousand Oaks, CA:
39 Pine Forge Press.
- 40 ———. 2005. "Review of *Coalitions Across Borders: Transnational Protest and the Neoliberal Order*." *American
41 Journal of Sociology* 111:954–956.
- 42 McPherson, Miller and Thomas Rotolo. 1996. "Testing a Dynamic Model of Social Composition: Diversity and
43 Change in Voluntary Groups." *American Sociological Review* 61:179–202.
- 44 Melucci, Alberto. 1989. *Nomads of the Present*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- 45 Meyer, David S. and Debra C. Minkoff. 2004. "Conceptualizing Political Opportunity." *Social Forces* 82:1457–1492.
- 46 Meyer, David S. and Sidney Tarrow, Editors. 1998. *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New
47 Century*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- 48 Meyer, John. 2003. "Globalization, National Culture, and the Future of the World Polity." *Wei Lun Lecture- Chinese
University of Hong Kong (Nov. 2001)*.
- Meyer, John W., John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez. 1997. "World Society and the Nation-
State." *American Journal of Sociology* 103:144–181.
- Michaelson, Marc. 1994. "Wangari Maathai and Kenya's Green Belt Movement: Exploring the Evolution and
Potentialities of Consensus Movement Mobilization." *Social Problems* 41:540–561.
- Minkoff, Deborah. 1993. "The Organization of Survival." *Social Forces* 71(4):887–908.
- . 1995. *Organizing for Equality: the Evolution of Women's and Racial Ethnic Organizations in America,
1955–1985*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

- 01 Minkoff, Deborah. 1997a. "Producing Social Capital: National Social Movements and Civil Society." *American*
 02 *Behavioral Scientist* 40:606–619.
- 03 ——. 1997b. "The Sequencing of Social Movements." *American Sociological Review* 62:779–799.
- 04 Moghadam, Valentine. 2005. *Globalizing Women: Transnational Feminist Networks*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
 05 University Press.
- 06 Montecinos, Veronica. 2001. "Feminists and Technocrats in the Democratization of Latin America: A Prolegomenon."
International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 15:175–199.
- 07 Moody, Kim. 1997. *Workers in a Lean World: Unions in the International Economy*. New York: Verso Books.
- 08 Moore, Barrington. 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the*
Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press.
- 09 Moore, Kelly. 1996. "Organizing Integrity: American Science and the Creation of Public Interest Organizations,
 10 1955–1975." *American Journal of Sociology* 101:1592–1627.
- 11 Morris, Aldon. 1984. *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement*. New York: The Free Press.
- 12 Mueller, Carol. 1994. "Conflict Networks and the Origins of Women's Liberation." Pp. 234–263 in *New Social*
 13 *Movements: From Ideology to Identity*, edited by E. Larana, H. Johnston, and J. R. Gusfield. Philadelphia, PA:
 14 Temple University Press.
- 15 Mueller, Carol. 1999. "Escape from the GDR, 1961–1989: Hybrid Exit Repertoires in a Disintegrating Leninist
 16 Regime." *American Journal of Sociology* 105:697–735.
- 17 Murphy, Gillian. 2005. "Coalitions and the Development of the Global Environmental Movement: A Double-Edged
 18 Sword." *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 10:235–250.
- 19 Munck, Ronaldo. 2002. *Globalization and Labour: The New Great Transformation*. London: Zed Books.
- 20 Norberg-Hodge, Helena. 1996. "The Pressure to Modernize and Globalize." Pp. 33–46 in *The Case Against the*
Global Economy and for a Turn to the Local, edited by J. Mander and E. Goldsmith. San Francisco: Sierra Club
 21 Books.
- 22 Norris, Pippa. 1999. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. New York: Oxford University
 23 Press.
- 24 ——. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 25 O'Brien, Robert. 2000. "Workers and World Order: the Tentative Transformation of the International Union
 26 Movement." *Review of International Studies* 26:533–555.
- 27 ——. Forthcoming. *The Global Labour Movement*.
- 28 Oliver, Pamela. 1989. "Bringing the Crowd Back In: The Nonorganizational Elements of Social Movements."
 29 *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change* 5:133–170.
- 30 Oliver, Pamela and Mark Furman. 1989. "Contradictions Between National and Local Organizational Strength: The
 31 Case of the John Birch Society." Pp. 155–177 in *International Social Movement Research*. Greenwich, CT: JAI
 32 Press.
- 33 Orloff, Ann S. and Theda Skocpol. 1984. "Why Not Equal Protection? Explaining the Politics of Public Social
 34 Welfare in Britain and the United States, 1880s–1920s." *American Sociological Review* 49:726–50.
- 35 Osa, Maryjane. 2003. "Networks in Opposition: Linking Organizations Through Activists in the Polish People's
 36 Republic." Pp. 77–104 in *Social Movements and Networks*, edited by M. Diani and D. McAdam. Oxford:
 37 Oxford University Press.
- 38 Passy, Florence. 1999. "Supernational Political Opportunities As a Channel of Globalization of Political Conflicts.
 39 The Case of the Conflict Around the Rights of Indigenous Peoples." Pp. 148–169 in *Social Movements in a*
Globalizing World, edited by D. d. Porta, H. Kriesi, and D. Rucht. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- 40 ——. 2003. "Social Networks Matter. But How?" Pp. 21–48 in *Social Movements and Networks*, edited by M. Diani
 41 and D. McAdam. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 42 Piven, Francis Fox and Richard Cloward. 1979. *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail*. New
 43 York: Vintage Books.
- 44 Podobnik, Bruce. 2004. "Resistance to Globalization: Cycles and Evolutions in the Globalization Protest
 45 Movement." Presented at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting. San Francisco.
- 46 Polletta, Francesca. 2002. *Freedom is an Endless Meeting*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- 47 Powell, Walter W. 1990. "Neither Markets nor Hierarchy: Network forms of Organization." *Research in*
 48 *Organizational Behavior* 12:295–336.
- Price, Richard. 1998. "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines." *International*
Organization 52:613–644.
- Quadagno, Jill. 1992. "Social Movements and State Transformation: Labor Unions and Racial Conflict in the War
 on Poverty." *American Sociological Review* 57:616–634.
- Rasler, Karen. 1996. "Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution." *American*
Sociological Review 61:132–152.

2. Structural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

55

- 01 Ray, Raka. 1999. *Fields of Protest: Women's Movements in India*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- 02 Reimann, Kim D. 2002. "Building Networks from the Outside In: International Movements, Japanese NGOs, and the
03 Kyoto Climate Change Conference." Pp. 173–189 in *Globalization and Resistance: Transnational Dimensions
04 of Social Movements*, vol. 6, edited by J. Smith and H. Johnston. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- 05 Riles, Annelise. 2001. *The Network Inside Out*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- 06 Risse, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. 1999. *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms
07 and Domestic Change*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 08 Robinson, William. 2004. *A Theory of Global Capitalism*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- 09 Rochon, Thomas. 1998. *Culture Moves: Ideas, Activism, and Changing Values*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
10 Press.
- 11 Rose, Jerry D. 1982. *Outbreaks, the Sociology of Collective Behavior*. New York: The Free Press.
- 12 Rothman, Franklin Daniel and Pamela E. Oliver. 2002. "From Local to Global: The Anti-Dam Movement in
13 Southern Brazil 1979–1992." Pp. 115–131 in *Globalization and Resistance: Transnational Dimensions of
14 Social Movements*, edited by J. Smith and H. Johnston. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- 15 Rucht, Dieter. 1996. "The Impact of National Contexts on Social Movement Structures: A Cross-Movement and
16 Cross-National Comparison." Pp. 185–224 in *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political
17 Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings*, edited by D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and
18 M. N. Zald. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 19 ——. 2004. "Movements, Allies, Adversaries, and Third Parties." Pp. 197–216 in *The Blackwell Companion to
20 Social Movements*, edited by D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi. Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell
21 Publishing.
- 22 Rupp, Leila J. 1997. *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
23 University Press.
- 24 Rupp, Leila J. and Verta Taylor. 1987. *Survival in the Doldrums: The American Women's Rights Movement*.
25 New York: Oxford University Press.
- 26 Sassen, Saskia. 1998. *Globalization and Its Discontents*. New York: The New Press.
- 27 ——. 2000. *Guests and Aliens*. New York: The New Press.
- 28 Schofer, Evan and Marion Fourcade-Gourmchas. 2001. "The Structural Contexts of Civic Engagement: Voluntary
29 Association Membership in Comparative Perspective." *American Sociological Review* 66:806–828.
- 30 Scott, James C. 1985. *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. New Haven, CT: Yale University
31 Press.
- 32 Seidman, Gay W. 2000. "Adjusting the Lens: What Do Globalizations, Transnationalism, and the Anti-apartheid
33 Movement Mean for Social Movement Theory?" Pp. 339–358 in *Globalizations and Social Movements:
34 Culture, Power, and the Transnational Public Sphere*, edited by J. A. Guidry, M. D. Kennedy, and M. N. Zald.
35 Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- 36 Sikkink, Kathryn. 1993. "Human Rights, Principled Issue-Networks, and Sovereignty in Latin America." *International
37 Organization* 47:411–441.
- 38 ——. 2002. "Restructuring World Politics: The Limits and Asymmetries of Soft Power." Pp. 301–317 in
39 *Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms*, edited by S. Khagram,
40 J. V. Riker, and K. Sikkink. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- 41 ——. 2005. "Patterns of Dynamic Multilevel Governance and the Insider-Outsider Coalition." Pp. 151–173 in
42 *Transnational Protest and Global Activism*, edited by D. della Porta and S. Tarrow. Lanham, MD: Rowman &
43 Littlefield.
- 44 Silver, Beverly J. 2003. *Forces of Labor: Workers' Movements and Globalization Since 1870*. New York: Cambridge
45 University Press.
- 46 Sklair, Leslie. 2001. *The Transnational Capitalist Class*. Oxford and Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- 47 Skocpol, Theda. 1992. *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States*.
48 Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Smith, Christian, ed. 1996. *Disruptive Religion: The Force of Faith in Social Movement Activism*. New York:
Routledge.
- Smith, Jackie. 1995. "Transnational Political Processes and the Human Rights Movement." Pp. 185–220 in *Research
in Social Movements, Conflict and Change*, vol. 18, edited by L. Kriesberg, M. Dobkowski, and I. Walliman.
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- ". "Global Civil Society? Transnational Social Movement Organizations and Social Capital." *American
Behavioral Scientist* 42:93–107.
- ". 1999. "Global Politics and Transnational Social Movements Strategies: The Transnational Campaign
against International Trade in Toxic Wastes." Pp. 170–188 in *Social Movements in a Globalizing World* edited
by D. d. Porta, H. Kriesi, and D. Rucht. New York: St. Martin's Press.

- 01 —. 2005. "Building Bridges or Building Walls? Explaining Regionalization among Transnational Social
02 Movement Organizations." *Mobilization: An International Journal* 10:251–270.
- 03 —. Forthcoming. *Global Visions/Rival Networks: Social Movements for Global Democracy*. Baltimore, MD:
04 Johns Hopkins University Press.
- 05 Smith, Jackie, Charles Chatfield, and Ron Pagnucco. 1997. *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics:
06 Solidarity Beyond the State*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- 07 Soule, Sarah A. and Jennifer Earl. 2005. "A Movement Society Evaluated: Collective Protest in the United States,
08 1960–1986." *Mobilization: An International Journal* 10:345–364.
- 09 Staggenborg, Suzanne. 1986. "Coalition Work in the Pro-Choice Movement: Organizational and Environmental
10 Opportunities and Obstacles." *Social Problems* 33:374–389.
- 11 Staggenborg, Suzanne. 1988. "The Consequences of Professionalization and Formalization in the Pro-Choice
12 Movement." *American Sociological Review* 53:585–605.
- 13 Staggenborg, Suzanne and Verta Taylor. 2005. "Whatever Happened to the Women's Movement." *Mobilization: An
14 International Journal* 10:37–52.
- 15 Stark, David, Balazs Vedres, and Laszlo Bruszt. 2006. "Rooted Transnational Publics: Integrating Foreign Ties and
16 Civic Activism." *Theory and Society* 35:323–349.
- 17 Steinberg, Marc W. 1995. "The Roar of the Crowd: Repertoires of Discourse and Collective Action among the
18 Spitalfields Silk Weavers in Nineteenth-Century London." Pp. 57–88 in *Repertoires and Cycles of Collective
19 Action*, edited by M. Traugott. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- 20 Stewart, Julie. 2004. "When Local Troubles Become Transnational: The Transformation of a Guatemalan Indigenous
21 Rights Movement." *Mobilization: An International Journal* 9(3):259–278.
- 22 Stiglitz, Joseph. 2003. *Globalization and its Discontents*. New York: W.W. Norton and Company.
- 23 Subramaniam, Mangala, Manjusha Gupte, and Debarashmi Mitra. 2003. "Local to Global: Transnational Networks
24 and Indian Women's Grassroots Organizing." *Mobilization: An International Journal* 8:335–352.
- 25 Tarrow, Sidney. 1996. "States and Opportunities: The Political Structuring of Social Movements in Democratic
26 States." Pp. 41–61 in *Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Framing: Social Movement Dynamics
27 in Cross-National Perspective*, edited by D. McAdam, J. McCarthy, and M. Zald. New York: Cambridge
28 University Press.
- 29 —. 1998a. "Fishnets, Internets and Catnets: Globalization and Transnational Collective Action." Pp. 228–244 in
30 *Challenging Authority: The Historical Study of Contentious Politics*, edited by M. Hanagan, L. P. Moch, and
31 W. T. Brake. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
- 32 —. 1998b. *Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics*, 2nd edition. New York:
33 Cambridge University Press.
- 34 —. 2001. "Transnational Politics: Contention and Institutions in International Politics." *Annual Review of Political
35 Science* 4:1–20.
- 36 —. 2005. *The New Transnational Activism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 37 Taylor, Verta. 1989. "Social Movement Continuity: The Women's Movement in Abeyance." *American Sociological
38 Review* 54:761–775.
- 39 Thomas, Daniel. 2001. *The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism*.
40 Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- 41 Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
- 42 —. 1995. "Globalization Threatens Labor Rights." *International Labor and Working Class History* 47:1–23.
- 43 Tilly, Charles. 1984. "Social Movements and National Politics." Pp. 297–317 in *Statemaking and Social Movements:
44 Essays in History and Theory*, edited by C. Bright and S. Harding. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- 45 Tilly, Charles, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly. 1975. *The Rebellious Century, 1830–1930*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
46 University Press.
- 47 Traugott, Mark. 1995. "Repertoires and Cycles of Collective Action." Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- 48 Turner, Lowell. 2003. "Reviving the Labor Movement." Pp. 23–57 in *Research in the Sociology of Work*, edited by
D. Cornfield and H. McCammon. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
- United Nations. 2004. "We the Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance: Report of the
Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations." United Nations Secretary General,
New York.
- Valocchi, Steve. 1990. "The Unemployed Workers' Movement: A Re-examination of the Piven and Cloward Thesis." *Social Problems* 37:191–205.
- Van Dyke, Nella. 2003. "Protest Cycles and Party Politics." Pp. 226–245 in *States, Parties, and Social Movements*,
edited by J. Goldstone. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Verba, Sidney, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Volunteerism in American
Politics*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

2. Structural Approaches in the Sociology of Social Movements

57

- 01 Voss, Kim and Rachel Sherman. 2000. "Breaking the Iron Law of Oligarchy: Union Revitalization in the American
02 Labor Movement." *American Journal of Sociology* 106:303–349.
- 03 Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1976. *The Modern World System*. New York: Academic Press.
- 04 ——. 1980. *The Modern World System II: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World Economy*.
05 New York: Academic Press.
- 06 Walton, John and David Seddon. 1994. *Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of Global Adjustment*. Oxford and
07 Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
- 08 Waterman, Peter and Jill Timms. 2004. "Trade Union Internationalism and a Global Civil Society in the Making."
09 Pp. 175–202 in *Global Civil Society 2004/5*. London: Sage Publications.
- 10 Western, Bruce. 1993. "Postwar Unionization in Eighteen Advanced Capitalist Countries." *American Sociological*
11 *Review* 58:266–282.
- 12 Wiest, Dawn and Jackie Smith. 2007. "Globalization, Regionalism, and the Organization of Transnational Collective
13 Action within World Regions, 1980–2000." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*
14 48(1–2):Forthcoming.
- 15 Winston, Fletcher. 2004. "Networks, Norms, and Tactics in Long Island Environmental Organizations." *Sociology*,
16 SUNY—Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY.
- 17 Wittner, Lawrence. 1993. *One World or None: A History of the Nuclear Disarmament Movement Through 1953*,
18 vol. 1. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- 19 ——. 1997. *Resisting the Bomb: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954–1970*, vol. 2.
20 Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- 21 Wolf, Eric. 1982. *Europe and the People without History*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- 22 Wood, Lesley Julia. 2004. "The Diffusion of Direct Action Tactics: From Seattle to Toronto and New York."
23 *Sociology*, Columbia University, New York.
- 24 Wood, Leslie. 2005. "Bridging the Chasms: The Case of People's Global Action." Pp. 95–119 in *Coalitions Across*
25 *Borders: Transnational Protest and the Neoliberal Order*, edited by J. Bandy and J. Smith. Lanham, MD:
26 Rowman & Littlefield.
- 27 World Commission on the Social Dimensions of Globalization. 2004. "A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities
28 for All."
- 29 Wuthnow, Robert. 1989. *Communities of Discourse: Ideology and Social Structure in the Reformation, the*
30 *Enlightenment, and European Socialism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- 31 ——. 1998. *Loose Connections: Joining Together in America's Fragmented Communities*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
32 University Press.
- 33 Zald, Mayer N. 1987. "The Future of Social Movements." Pp. 319–336 in *Social Movements in an Organizational*
34 *Society*, edited by M. N. Zald and J. D. McCarthy. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
- 35 Zald, Mayer N. and Roberta Ash Garner. 1994. "Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay and Change."
36 Pp. 121–142 in *Social Movements in an Organizational Society* edited by Mayer N. Zald and John D. McCarthy.
37 London and New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
- 38 Zald, Mayer N. and John D. McCarthy, Eds. 1987. *Social Movements in an Organizational Society*. New Brunswick:
39 Transaction.
- 40 Zwerman, Gilda and Patricia Steinhoff. 2005. "When Activists Ask for Trouble: State-Dissident Interactions and the
41 New Left Cycle of Resistance in the United States and Japan." Pp. 85–107 in *Repression and Mobilization*,
42 edited by C. Davenport, H. Johnston, and C. Mueller.
- 43
- 44
- 45
- 46
- 47
- 48

01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

UNCORRECTED PROOF

QUERIES TO BE ANSWERED (SEE MARGINAL MARKS)

IMPORTANT NOTE: Please mark your corrections and answers to these queries directly onto the proof at the relevant place. Do NOT mark your corrections on this query sheet.

CHAPTER-2

Query No.	Page No.	Line No.	Query
AQ1	14	28	As meant? Or nation-state? Pls check throughout.